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1. INTRODUCTION 
Development has entered a time where it cannot be thought of without reference to climate change. While 
historically  development  in  the  industrialized  countries  has  to  a  great  extent  been  driven  by  a  fossil  fuel  
based economy, this option is no longer seen as viable for developing countries, which are expected to pur-
sue different pathways of development. At the same time, the impacts of a changing climate affect the 
poorest countries and populations disproportionately, and multilateral policy declarations signed by most 
countries underline that there must be an effort to prevent and mitigate this. The effects of climate change 
onto development policies and practice is also reflected in donor countries’ change in perception. Donor 
countries have begun increasingly integrating climate change objectives into development cooperation pro-
grammes and official development assistance (ODA). While significant in terms of discontinuing support to 
fossil fuels and attempting to increase resilience, this trend also brings into the fore new dilemmas. The 
main dilemma which emerges – and is explored further in this book – is when development cooperation 
finance is used in the least developed countries for projects and policies which are principally oriented to-
wards climate change mitigation.   
The primary aim of development cooperation has been and remains poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. While there can be synergies between climate change policies and the goals of poverty reduc-
tion, these are not automatic or self-evident. In some cases there can even be more trade-offs than syner-
gies when attempting to attain both goals. Recent academic literature has noted that synergies between pov-
erty reduction and adaptation can be found, but when it comes to mitigation, trade-offs become more likely 
(Ayers and Huq 2009; Gupta 2009; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007). This simply relates to the fact that 
the target groups of development finance and climate mitigation finance do not necessarily overlap. The 
poorest groups rarely are the highest emitters of greenhouse gases whereas the higher polluters often are 
the richer groups and countries. This has led developing countries fearing that integrating climate change 
objectives into official development assistance may imply a diversion of resources from one target group, 
country or region to another.  
The case is ever the more pertinent for the least developed countries (LDCs), which have contributed 
the least to climate change. At the same time they are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.  
In this  book,  we also denote the least  developed countries  more positively  by the term ‘the least  carbon 
emitting countries’, which aptly portrays their current nominal contribution to global greenhouse gas con-
centrations. Simultaneously the term highlights the significance of current decisions for future emissions 
trajectories. The type of policies and practices supported by development assistance will significantly shape 
the emissions pathways of the least carbon emitting countries. Historically development assistance has con-
tributed to increasing greenhouse gas emissions through, for example, aid to fossil fuels. An important step 
forward in development cooperation has been the attempt to steer support away from activities and pro-
cesses that aggravate climate change (such as building energy infrastructure based on fossil fuels) or increas-
es the vulnerability of people to the impacts of climate change. As such, there is a need to consider devel-
opment and climate change policies from an integrative point of view. 
At the moment climate change has been linked to development assistance in multiple, complex and 
mixed ways. We aim to untangle some of the connections between climate change mitigation and ODA 
through exploring four different climate initiatives in Laos and Cambodia, which both belong to the group 
of least developed countries. These are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+), and Voluntary Carbon 
Markets (VCM). In addition, a new donor funded energy initiative is examined via the analysis of the Envi-
ronment and Energy Partnership (EEP) initiated by Finland in 2002, and now funded also by other Nordic 
countries. The mitigation initiatives have been selected to represent a variety of ways in which official de-
velopment assistance funds have been mobilized to support climate mitigation in the least developed coun-
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tries. From these four mitigation initiatives, EEP is the only one fully funded by official development assis-
tance. The CDM and VCM are based on the carbon offset markets1, but for example capacity building for 
CDM can and has been financed through ODA. The finance of REDD+ is still an open question at the 
international policy level, and currently one of the more heated discussions. Thus far REDD+ capacity 
building, readiness preparation, technical activities for carbon measurement and actual pilot projects have 
all been funded with development assistance, in addition to other types of funding. The realities on the 
ground in Laos and Cambodia explored in this book demonstrate that while official development assistance 
and the carbon markets are two different sets of funding and financing, they often become intertwined in 
various ways.   
1.1 Research context, scope and methodology  
The  empirical  analysis  for  this  book  rests  on  case  studies  that  have  covered  four  different  initiatives  at-
tempting to pursue sustainable development and climate mitigation targets simultaneously: the EEP, CDM, 
VCM and REDD+. The four mitigation initiatives are briefly presented and introduced in Box 1.1.These 
mitigation initiatives have been studied by research conducted in Laos and Cambodia. The fieldwork was 
carried out in Cambodia and Laos during 2011. The cases on the CDM and voluntary markets focus espe-
cially  on Cambodia,  the REDD+ chapters  focus separately  on Laos and Cambodia  and the EEP in turn 
covers both countries. The material for the case studies includes key-informant interviews, observations 
from site visits, focus-group discussions as well as project and policy documents. Each chapter contains a 
more detailed description of how the research was setup.    
There are several reasons for the relevance of these two least developed countries when analysing the 
four mitigation mechanisms. Both countries aim to graduate from LDC-status, and it will be interesting to 
follow the effects of these pursuits on CO2 emissions. As examples of least developed countries, both Laos 
and Cambodia have significant experience of climate mitigation mechanisms. Firstly, both countries have 
been the central stages for introducing, developing and piloting REDD+ approaches. Secondly, especially 
Cambodia has been a leading country among the LDCs in gaining CDM projects and also in advocating 
reforms that would make the CDM more LDC-friendly. Thirdly, Cambodia and Laos are both target coun-
tries of bilateral development cooperation through Finland’s EEP Mekong programme. Finally, while the 
voluntary markets are quite new and the projects receiving finance from the VCM are few in these coun-
tries, at the same time the field seems to be dynamic and the projects have interesting connections to devel-
opment assistance as well as to the compliance markets and REDD+.  
 
                                                   
 
1 The carbon market refers to the buying, selling and trading of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (measured 
in tons of carbon dioxide equivalents, tCO2e), which permits flexibility by allowing voluntary or binding emissions 
reduction commitments to be met through mitigation projects by other actors, allowing for a cost-efficient mitigation 
of emissions (Bumpus).  
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Box 1.1 The four mitigation initiatives 
 
 
The analysis and discussions of the four mitigation mechanisms and their relation to development as-
sistance in Cambodia and Laos evolve around three main dimensions: 
Multiple benefits refer to win-win situations where emission reductions, sustainable development and 
poverty reduction, are achieved simultaneously. All of the four mitigation mechanisms studied in this report 
EEP: The Energy and Environment Partnership Program (EEP) is a Finnish development cooperation project 
which aims at promoting the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and combating climate change. 
There are EEP Programs in the Mekong Region, Southern and East Africa, Indonesia and the Andean Region. 
In  this  report,  the  focus  is  solely  on  EEP  Mekong  projects  in  Laos  and  Cambodia.  EEP  Mekong  has  been  
funded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (4,9€M) and the Nordic Development Fund (3€M) in 2009–
2012. The overall long term objective of the program is: “to contribute to improved access to energy and ener-
gy services and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.”  EEP aims to achieve this by  supporting national poli-
cy, legislation and institutional frameworks, developing renewable energy (RE), waste-to-energy (WTE) and 
energy efficiency (EE) technologies and services (through partnership projects), and by providing information 
and capacity building for RE, WTE, EE and energy markets. EEP provides different options for projects, in-
cluding studies and surveys as well as feasibility studies and policy development. EEP projects can be carried 
out by a host of actors, ranging from research centres to NGOs to consultancy firms. 
  
CDM: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the three flexibility mechanisms that are part of 
the UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. As a market mechanism situated in 
developing countries, the CDM has a twofold objective.  First, CDM gives flexibility to the industrialised Annex 
I countries to meet their binding emissions reduction targets by acquiring certified emissions reductions (CERs) 
from mitigation activities in developing countries. Second, CDM includes a requirement for industrialized coun-
tries to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development. Thus far important buyers of CERs 
have included EU countries and also companies that are part of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Majority of 
CDM projects have been in the emerging economies of the developing world – namely China, India, and Brazil. 
Only 1.1% of registered CDM projects are located in LDCs. Cambodia is an especially interesting case as, with 
Uganda, it has the most registered CDM projects in LDCs, both countries having five registered projects.  
 
VCM: Voluntary carbon markets (VCM) function outside of the compliance markets and enable companies 
and individuals to purchase carbon offsets on a voluntary basis. A VCM project generates Verified or Voluntary 
Emissions Reductions (VERs). VERs are verified by a host of different standards, which have their own rules 
and requirements. Among the most popular standards are the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Gold 
Standard. In a way, VCM can be seen as complementary to the official compliance markets as it enables indi-
viduals NGOs, institutions or companies to voluntarily offset their emissions by the purchase of carbon credits 
from carbon offset projects. A significant part of VCM projects are carried out in the global South, where emis-
sions reductions are cheaper. Even though only two projects in Cambodia and none in Laos are selling VERs in 
VCM, there is an increasing interest towards voluntary market. VCM operates in a variety of fields ranging from 
renewable energy and energy efficiency to forestry projects. Due to their flexible nature, voluntary markets can 
at least in theory be accommodating for smaller scale projects with more direct benefits for communities and 
for the poor. This, however, is not necessarily the case. The VCM is especially vulnerable to changes in the 
global economy, and the demand of VERs can be significantly affected by recessions.  
 
REDD+: Estimates  have  put  the  amount  of  emissions  because  of  deforestation  and  forest  degradation  at  
around 8-20 % of all GHG emissions, with the IPCC at the higher end of this figure with 18 %. The Stern re-
port (2006) claimed that addressing tropical deforestation is the fastest and cheapest way to achieve needed 
large-scale emissions reductions. Targeting deforestation as a source of emissions has been discussed for several 
years in international fora. In 2007 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
with the Bali Action Plan agreed on the importance of policy approaches and positive incentives for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). REDD+ is an effort to create a financial 
value for carbon stored in forests, and to incentivize forest protection. As REDD+ is still a mechanism in the 
making, its final structure is as of yet unclear. REDD+ activities are currently funded through a variety of inter-
national initiatives, including UN-REDD under FAO and UNDP, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) and Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative, as well as voluntary market initiatives. 
REDD+ is currently not linked to the compliance market of the Kyoto Protocol. In both Laos and Cambodia, 
land-use change and deforestation are highest-emitting sectors and the potential for REDD+ in these countries 
is considered high, making them interesting areas to study the options and obstacles for REDD+ in the least 
developed countries. 
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are in policy texts presented as able to create multiple benefits. The ability to generate pro-poor and sus-
tainable development benefits is also a pre-condition for the use of development assistance to support the 
mitigation efforts. Despite the optimistic tone and win-win storylines often present in policy texts, reality is 
seldom this simple: mitigation actions can also create trade-offs, especially with poverty reduction actions. 
A central question in the analysis of all mitigation initiatives is: how are the four mitigation initiatives able to 
produce multiple benefits in LDC countries like Laos and Cambodia? And how do the initiatives differ in 
this respect?  
Capacity building is a key element for carrying out climate mitigation in developing countries. It has 
often been stated that one of the challenges for the least developed countries to benefit from mitigation 
mechanisms, and also from potential multiple benefits, relates greatly to the institutional capacity (or lack 
thereof) in these countries. One of the main roles of development assistance in mitigation mechanisms such 
as the CDM and REDD+ has been to support capacity building to enable LDCs to enter the carbon mar-
kets.  A closer look deserves to be taken at the nuances of the different capacity building needs, especially in 
the least developed countries and on whose terms the needs should be identified and addressed. In addi-
tion, it is important to ask whether capacities are supported in order to be able to set agendas, or rather 
simply to implement agendas set by other actors. Therefore, in the chapters we ask: what kind of capacity 
building activities have been carried out related to the mitigation initiatives? And what could be the most 
meaningful ways to support the capacities that the mitigation initiatives and the fostering of multiple bene-
fits would require?  
Ownership has been highlighted as an important principle of development cooperation, codified in 
the Paris Accord, the Accra Agenda for Action and most recently in the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation. Ownership is sometimes understood quite instrumentally as a tool to enhance 
aid effectiveness, but taken further it also implies notions of enhancing equity and balancing power rela-
tions between donors and recipients in setting the development agenda. In policy and discussions where 
climate mitigation has been integrated into development cooperation, discussions on ownership have, how-
ever, been almost non-existent. This report explores and analyses how the integration of climate mitigation 
and development assistance look from the ownership perspective. The report asks: how do the questions of 
ownership figure in the mitigation initiatives in Laos and Cambodia and what could be the ways to 
strengthen the wider ownership of mitigation initiatives in the LDCs?  
In effect, all three questions are closely interrelated, and questions of ownership are strongly linked to 
multiple benefits and capacities. If the mechanisms bring only global benefits, building local ownership be-
comes more challenging. If there are limited capacities in the countries to take part in the agenda setting of 
mitigation objectives and sustainable development and pro-poor targets, again, ownership is likely to be 
limited. Thus the report aims to expand on previous debates about ownership in development discourse to 
the arena of climate change policies.  
The analysis  of  the four  studied initiatives,  EEP,  CDM, VCM and REDD+, allows us  to discuss  the 
different kinds of funding arrangements and institutional architectures in mitigation efforts, and to explore 
how they  work  for  the  least  developed  countries  and  for  the  poor.  It  also  enables  discussions  from the  
comparative perspective of the different capacity building needs and ownership dilemmas that the different 
mitigation mechanisms may imply. Through the analysis in this book the aim is to present some suggestions 
on how to approach dilemmas related to integrating climate change with development cooperation, espe-
cially in the context of the least developed countries.  
1.2 Structure of the book 
The chapters  of  this  book are  built  around different  case  studies  and they will  provide the reader  with a  
broad picture of climate change mitigation mechanisms operating in the context of the least developed 
countries, namely Laos and Cambodia. Each chapter sheds light to the different dilemmas in the field of 
climate mitigation and development assistance. The objective of the different case studies is also to enable 
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analysis of the relationships and linkages between the three dimensions presented above: multiple benefits, 
capacity building and ownership.  
Chapter 2 by Kamilla Karhunmaa, Otto Bruun and Mira Käkönen introduces the background of in-
ternational climate change policy. A key question for developing countries in climate change negotiations is 
the lack of clarity over how to define “new and additional” funds to support climate activities in developing 
countries.  
Chapter 3 by  Otto  Bruun  and  Mira  Käkönen  discusses  the  role  of  one  donor  country,  Finland,  in  
combining climate change and development policy. The chapter is based on a textual analysis of the key 
Finnish development policy documents in 2007-2011.  
Chapter 4 by Visa Tuominen takes a close look at the Environment Energy Partnership (EEP) in the 
Mekong region as a case in which poverty reduction and mitigation objectives are integrated into a bilateral 
development program. As such, the program exemplifies a shift towards climate change mitigation from the 
more traditional objectives of development cooperation such as poverty reduction and sustainable devel-
opment.  
Chapter 5 by Mira Käkönen shifts the discussion from an ODA-funded mitigation programmes to the 
market-based compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The chapter discusses the main constraints, 
barriers and challenges of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) especially in the context of Cambo-
dia, which currently hosts the highest number of registered CDM projects amongst the least developed 
countries. It explores whether the CDM could be rendered into a mechanism that in addition to emission 
reductions brings local environmental and social benefits to the least developed countries and to the host 
communities in them.  
Chapter 6 by Hanna Kaisti maintains the attention on energy-related projects in the carbon markets, 
while shifting the discussion from the compliance market to the Voluntary Carbon Markets. Only a few 
projects in Cambodia get funding from voluntary markets, but the number is expected to increase in the 
future both in Cambodia and in Laos. The chapter discusses the possible linkages between development 
assistance and the Voluntary Carbon Market, focusing on the options and obstacles faced by the project 
developers to receive funding from the VCM in order to upscale, extend and lengthen projects that have 
been started with development assistance.  
Chapter 7 by Try Thuon and Kamilla Karhunmaa looks at the current practices in Cambodia’s two pi-
lot REDD+ projects. The focus is particularly on the current threats to forest areas and livelihoods and to 
what extent could REDD+ attempt to mitigate these. Tenure arrangements and livelihoods remain a key 
concern for the communities residing in the REDD+ areas.  
In Chapter 8 Otto Bruun analyses the entrance of the forest agenda into climate mitigation policies 
through an evaluation of REDD+ in Laos. The chapter walks through the international level to the setting 
up of national institutions. Through looking at the deforestation drivers and their relation to the govern-
ance being built up through pilot cases and central administration, the chapter compares the different op-
tions available and how REDD+ is situated in relation to national development targets.  
The concluding Chapter 9 summarises the results from the different case studies, and attempts to draw 
some comparative comments. In addition, it analyses the four mitigation mechanisms studied and the expe-
riences related to them in Laos and Cambodia from the point of view of potential multiple benefits, capaci-
ty building challenges and opportunities, and ownership dilemmas. The conclusion ends with a look at pos-
sible futures: how is the relationship between climate change mitigation and development assistance envis-
aged from here on? 
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2. WHEN CLIMATE MEETS DEVELOPMENT  
– AN INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE POLICIES 
CARBON MARKETS AND OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE  
Kamilla Karhunmaa, Otto Bruun and Mira Käkönen 
Climate change and its various social, political and economic impacts have been confronted by a variety of 
policy responses. This chapter sets the background of climate change policies and serves as an introduction 
to the themes explored in this book. It briefly introduces the history of international climate policy and the 
birth of the carbon markets, focusing on the most relevant questions and implications for developing coun-
tries. These include the role of new and additional climate finance for developing countries and the implica-
tions of focusing on mitigation activities in the least carbon emitting countries.  
International efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change have been codified in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which since 1992 has gathered over 160 signato-
ries. In the framework convention, signatories have committed to the “stabilization of greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (UNFCCC 1992; 5). The framework convention itself does not, however, provide guidance 
on the means and measures for achieving this stabilization, nor is there consensus amongst the parties what 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” in practice could signify. In 1997 the par-
ties of the UNFCCC negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to provide targets and methods for reducing green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol contains legally-binding emissions reduc-
tions targets for most industrialized countries (known as Annex 1 countries), which are to be achieved dur-
ing the first Kyoto commitment period of 2008-2012. The emissions reductions are country-specific and 
measured using greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels in 1990 as a baseline. Non-Annex I countries, to 
which developing countries belong to, have no binding emissions reduction targets set out in the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is based on the signatories of the UNFCCC acknowledging that developed and developing 
countries have “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” with regards to cli-
mate change (UNFCCC 1992). In the preamble of the UNFCCC it is also acknowledged that a majority of 
historic and current emissions originate from the industrialized developed countries.  
As the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in the late 1990s, the carbon markets became formalized as the rele-
vant policy response to climate change. The idea behind carbon markets stresses efficiency as a key policy 
goal. In regulating climate change, efficiency can be maximised when emissions are transformed into eco-
nomically scarce resources and a market is created for trading them. In economic terms, climate change is 
labeled an externality, the impacts of which are not reflected in current market prices (cf. Stern 2006). On a 
longer time scale, investment decisions would be guided by a high carbon price, serving to steer invest-
ments away from fossil fuels and towards developing a low-carbon economy. As Newell and Paterson 
(2010; 34) summarize:  
“[B]y the time the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed in 1997, it had become absolutely normal  to 
think that the appropriate way to deal with climate change is not so much to focus on  restricting 
fossil fuel use, but on the creation of markets. Governments, international organizations and pri-
vate actors were all focused on the creation of markets for emissions, of new or expanding mar-
kets for renewable energy technologies and of new investment opportunities.”  
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The focus on economic efficiency and the creation of markets for carbon has, however, sidelined other 
concerns, such as the important equity implications of carbon market approaches to regulating climate change. 
The ideas of ecological modernization behind the carbon markets are further explored in Chapter 3.  
To function, the carbon markets require a tradable commodity. The commodities traded on carbon 
markets are often generically called carbon credits. One carbon credit is equivalent to one tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (tCO2e). Avoided or mitigated GHG emissions are transformed into tCO2e by calculat-
ing the equivalent impact of various greenhouse gases in terms of their global warming potential as com-
pared to the global warming potential of carbon dioxide. Different carbon credits are produced in different 
ways, either by reducing emissions or offsetting emissions. An offset is produced when a reduction in a unit 
of GHG emissions is used to compensate a unit of emissions released elsewhere. The offset produced must 
prove to be additional to what would have occurred in a business-as-usual scenario. This signifies that the 
project from which the offset is produced must go beyond business-as-usual financial and regulatory prac-
tice and not be counted towards another emission reduction scheme.  
Many private and public actors were involved in the creation of markets for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Consequently a variety of markets and terms has arisen around carbon markets. ‘Carbon market’ is a wide 
umbrella term, which generally refers to all actions where units of tCO2e are being sold, bought or traded 
(Bumpus 2011). Within the carbon markets, a distinction is often made between the compliance market and 
the voluntary carbon market: 
· The compliance market refers to a market in which participants comply with agreed upon regulations. 
The term is  most  often used to refer  to the market  created for  the flexibility  mechanisms of  the 
Kyoto Protocol (International emissions trading, Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mech-
anism). The emission reductions targets agree to in the Kyoto Protocol are legally-binding.  
· The voluntary market refers to markets that buyers and sellers of carbon credits engage in on a volun-
tary basis (in comparison to compliance to regulation). The voluntary market involves the sale and 
purchase of carbon credits by different types of actors wishing to offset their own emissions. Buy-
ers in the voluntary market include, for example, individuals, firms, non-governmental organiza-
tions and governments. The tCO2e units sold in the voluntary carbon market are generally referred 
to as Voluntary or Verified Emissions Reductions (VERs).  
In the compliance market, the flexibility mechanisms were designed to provide the industrialized An-
nex-I countries with a cheaper means to achieve their own emissions reduction targets. Emissions trading 
has globally become a key response to climate change, despite its shortcomings in comparison to a carbon 
tax (cf. Hepburn 2007). Emissions trading provides an economic incentive for actors to reduce their green-
house gas emissions. In short, a central regulatory authority issues fewer polluting allowances than the pol-
luting actors require.  Because fewer allowances are issued than what the polluters need, allowances become 
valuable and trade with a positive price. The price provides an incentive to reduce emissions when this is 
cheaper than purchasing allowances. Various carbon credits are traded in the different markets of the Kyo-
to Protocol, including assigned amount units (AAUs) and Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs).  In addi-
tion to emissions trading, the Kyoto Protocol defines two project-based mechanisms that allow Annex I 
countries to meet their emissions reductions in a flexible manner. In Joint Implementation (JI), an Annex 1 
country can invest in GHG reduction activities in another Annex 1 country. Emissions reductions pro-
duced by JI are awarded credits called Emissions Reductions Units (ERUs). In the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), an Annex 1 country can fund emissions reductions projects in developing countries 
(i.e. non-Annex 1 countries) and receive Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) to assist in meeting the 
domestic targets set out by the Kyoto Protocol. Both JI and CDM projects must be additional: had the pro-
ject not been implemented, the tCO2e reduction would not have occurred.  
Out of the variety of different carbon markets and projects, the most relevant ones for the developing 
countries are the CDM and VCM. Both involve a wide array of actors, including the buyers of credits, the 
suppliers and implementers of credits and the intermediaries involved in delivering the credits to the buyers. 
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CDM and VCM activities in Laos and Cambodia and their potential to bring about pro-poor and sustaina-
ble development benefits will be looked at in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Climate change mitigation activities and carbon markets are on-going reality in developing countries and 
also in the least carbon emitting countries. Especially two general concerns have arisen regarding the opera-
tionalization of climate change policies in developing countries according to UNFCCC principles. The first 
relates to how developed countries have understood and implemented “new and additional” financial re-
sources for aiding developing countries in responding to climate change and what are the links to official 
development assistance. The second question follows directly from the first and is concerned more specifi-
cally with the allocation of climate finance funds between mitigation and adaption projects and policies in 
the least developed countries.  
2.1  Defining “new and additional” climate finance  
The principle behind mobilizing new and additional financial resources for global environmental problems 
stems from Agenda 21 and the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992.  
“1.4. The developmental and environmental objectives of Agenda 21 will require a substantial 
flow of new and additional financial resources to developing countries, in order to cover the incre-
mental costs for the actions they have to undertake to deal with global environmental problems 
and to accelerate sustainable development “. (UNDESA 1992)  
At the negotiations, developing countries managed to push for including a commitment to provide new 
and additional financial resources to developing countries into the agreement. This promise is grounded in 
the normative commitment of developing countries’ right to develop as the first priority of development 
assistance. As global environmental problems have increased and been incorporated into international poli-
cies, at the same time the fear has arisen in developing countries that funds previously dedicated to devel-
opment cooperation would now be diverted towards addressing environmental issues.  These fears are am-
plified by the fact that most industrialized nations have failed to meet the target of directing 0.7 % of their 
GNI towards development assistance, pledged already over forty years ago in 1970 (UN 1970 paragraph 43) 
and reiterated since at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 
2002 (also known as the ‘Monterrey Consensus’). As long as the 0.7% target remains unattained, developing 
countries doubt where new and additional funds could come from to meet environmental goals.  
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol acknowledge that climate change will affect the poorest popula-
tions and nations disproportionately. Both have been designed with the aim of preventing and mitigating 
this. The promise of new and additional funds for assisting developing countries in climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation was first iterated in Article 3 of the United Nations Climate Change Convention (UN-
FCCC) in 1992. The same promise has since been reiterated in several key international climate policy doc-
uments, including the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Bali Action Plan (2008), and the Copenhagen Accord 
(2009).  
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide 
new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1.” (UNFCCC 
1992; Article 3, emphasis added)  
In the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, new and additional climate finance was codified into two separate 
promises: fast start finance to be met in the short term (2010-2012) and longer term financial commitments 
to be met after 2020.  
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“…provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through interna-
tional institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012 with balanced alloca-
tion between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most 
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing 
States and Africa… developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion 
dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.” (UNFCCC 2009; 7, em-
phasis added)  
The promise of new and additional climate finance can aptly be described as an essential requirement 
that is clearly iterated in climate policy documents. In reality, however, there is an astounding mismatch 
between the codified principle in international environmental agreements and the delivered climate finance 
pledges.  
Following the COP15 negotiations, industrialized nations have pledged 34.5 M USD in fast start fi-
nances to developing countries2.  These pledges are to be met in 2010-2012. However, lacking an interna-
tionally set common operational definition, industrialized nations have unilaterally defined new and addi-
tional climate finance and its relationship to official development assistance. Ambiguity and overlap with 
ODA funds are pervasive in industrialized countries’ definitions and in the operationalization of fast start 
climate funds. The wealthier industrialized nations, such as Luxembourg, Norway and the Netherlands, 
who have already committed 0.7 % of their GNI to development assistance, can claim climate finance as 
additional to any funds over and above 0.7 % GNI3. Other donor nations have addressed the issue differ-
ently. For example, Finland is meeting its pledges through a net increase in finance, using the COP15 year 
2009 as a baseline. All Finnish fast start financing is also counted as ODA (WRI 2011). The Finnish defini-
tion of fast start finance is presented in Box 2.1. 
                                                   
 
2 climatefundsupdate.org, accessed 14.08.2012 
3 Stadelman et al. (2010) contest that funds over 0,7 % GNI could automatically be accounting as “new and addition-
al” as countries already achieving 0,7% may divert existing ODA commitments and re-label them as “new and addi-
tional” climate finance  
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Box 2.1 Defining new and additional climate finance: the case of Finland 
 
 
In this book, the aim is to highlight the implications of differing donor country definitions of ‘new and 
additional’ climate finance, which often result in climate finance overlapping with ODA. Tracking the actual 
deliverance of climate finance pledges and their overlap with ODA is beyond the scope of this book4. In 
this book, the focus is on the effects of diverse and mixed definitions of new and additional climate finance 
for the least carbon emitting countries. A relevant question explored in the following chapters is: to what 
extent do mitigation initiatives with links to ODA result in pro-poor and sustainable development benefits? 
This question is significant for the least developed countries, which generally are the most dependent on 
aid. For them, any diversion of ODA funds from their principle function of poverty alleviation can imply a 
true trade-off of resources.  
 
  
                                                   
 
4 For  a  more  systematic  overview of  fast  start  finance  pledges  and their  operationalization,  see  e.g.  Stadelman et al  
2010, Ciplet et al 2011 and the website www.faststartfinance.org. 
Finland is currently meeting the climate finance pledges it committed to in the Copenhagen Accord through a net 
increase in climate funding in 2010–2012, using funds committed to climate finance in 2009 as a baseline (WRI 
2011). All fast start climate finance is counted as official development assistance. Since Finland has defined 2009 
climate finance as its baseline, all increases in climate finance in the years 2010-2012, which are above 2009 levels 
can be defined as new and additional. In addition, as the development part of ODA is still increasing in 2010-2012, 
climate finance may be defined as new and additional.  
 
The European Union has committed to providing 7.2 billion € of fast start financing in 2010-2012. Finland’s share 
of this is 110 million euros. In the baseline year of 2009, Finnish fast start finance was 26.8 € million. In 2010 fi-
nance increased to 41.6 € million. With 2009 as a baseline, the net increase was thus 14.9 € million. The provided 
estimates for 2011 and 2012 are 51 € million and 44 € million respectively.  
 
In light of the discussion on defining an internationally acceptable baseline for new and additional, the Finnish 
definition does, however,  carry some problems. Finnish ODA has been increasing over time, and is expected to 
increase even more in the future. Indeed, Finland has committed to reaching the 0.7% of GNI target by 2015 
(Council of European Union 2005). Thus when compared to a pre-defined projection of development assistance, as suggest-
ed by Stadelman et al (2010a; 2010b) Finnish ODA is not new and additional. In absence of a commonly defined 
baseline, however, the question of a baseline will remain as one of opinion and most heated debate.  
 
An interesting phase in Finnish climate financing is expected for following years. The new government began its 
work in 2011, and its revised spending limits for 2012–2015 outline that development assistance funds for 2013–
2014 will  be frozen at 2012 levels (1 124 million €).  Funds are expected to increase again slightly in 2015. While 
future GNI is difficult to predict, the budgetary constraints would most likely lead to a decrease in ODA as a per-
centage of GNI. Estimates place ODA in 2014 at 0.51% of GNI according to these new budgetary constraints. It 
will be interesting to follow the effects of this on climate finance, which currently comes from development assis-
tance. As development assistance decreases, what will be the percentage of climate finance within development 
assistance? Will it increase or decrease?  
 
The same revised spending limits suggest that funds from the auctioning of emissions permits could be funneled 
into development assistance. This could assist Finland in increasing its ODA as a percentage of GNI while funds 
are otherwise cut. It does, however, carry some problems. The price from auctioning permits will vary and be sub-
ject to market fluctuations. It is thus difficult to predict the amount of funds that can be received from auctioning 
permits. Within development assistance, what will be the percentages guided towards climate projects and devel-
opment projects? The proposed freezing of development assistance funds as well as using funds from permit auc-
tioning raises questions about the likelihood of Finland reaching the 0.7% target by the time limit of 2015. 
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2.2  Mitigation in the least emitting countries  
The second important question for the least developed countries relates to how international climate fi-
nance funds are allocated between mitigation and adaptation activities. As outlined above, the variety of 
definitions of “new and additional” results in ambiguity and overlap with ODA funds. If ODA is used to 
support climate change activities in the least developed countries, these activities should also support the 
primary purpose of development cooperation, namely poverty reduction.  
Internal climate policy documents (e.g. UNFCCC 2009) call for a balanced allocation between mitiga-
tion and adaptation finance, and a prioritization of adaptation for the most vulnerable developing countries. 
As seen from the graph below (Figure 2.1), however, mitigation finance has been strongly favoured over 
adaptation in the deliverance of funds.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of total disbursed fast start finance funds (in USD million)5 
This is the case also for the low income countries, where adaptation financing does not surpass mitigation.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of disbursed fast start finance funds for low-income countries (in USD mil-
lion)6 
                                                   
 
5 data from www.climatefundsupdate.org, accessed 15.08.2012.  
6 data from www.climatefundsupdate.org, accessed 15.08.2012. 
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The  focus  on  climate  change  mitigation  is  an  important  question  in  the  context  of  the  least  carbon  
emitting countries. These countries contribute nominally to global GHG emissions. For example, annual 
per capita emissions of Laos and Cambodia are around 0.3 t CO2e compared to the global annual per capita 
average of  4  t  of  CO2e or  Finland’s  12 t  of  CO2e. While LDC emissions are generally on a rising trend, 
emissions reductions in them will not contribute significantly towards the reduction of global GHG levels. 
Funding climate change mitigation in the least developed countries also implies that less finance from the 
fast start finance pledges is available for adaptation activities. This presents a direct contradiction of interna-
tional environmental agreements that clearly call for prioritizing adaptation funding for the least developed 
countries. Further, in the current situation where climate finance carries various levels of links to ODA, 
adaptation funding might be better justified in the context of development. Recent academic literature finds 
that adaptation policies are more likely to resonate with the primary aims of ODA, namely poverty reduc-
tion and sustainable development (Ayers and Huq 2009; Gupta 2009; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007). 
This, of course, depends strongly on how adaptation policies are executed (cf. Brown 2011).  
In all the different mitigation initiatives explored in this book, mitigation has been justified by present-
ing its synergy with poverty reduction. Focusing on multiple positive outcomes and synergies per se is often 
characteristic for policy and necessary for constructing consensus and unifying disparate perspectives (cf. 
Hall et al. 2011). At the same time, however, overly consensual and optimistic storylines of win-win situa-
tions can easily result in diverting attention away from the possible trade-offs at stake and in obscuring the 
need for making difficult choices over policy priorities. Mitigation initiatives and the use of ODA in the 
least carbon emitting countries is an area of contestation, with significant implications for both climate and 
development policy. There is a strong need for empirical research on the synergies and trade-offs between 
climate mitigation activities and poverty reduction objectives. There is also a need to look at the various 
mitigation initiatives currently being carried out in the least carbon emitting countries and how these differ 
in terms of their impacts on poverty reduction and sustainable development. This book aims to present 
findings from two least carbon emitting countries and mitigation initiatives in them. The book is intended 
as a contribution to ongoing discussions where climate change policies meet development.  
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3. CLIMATE ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT POLICY  
IN FINLAND: WHAT ROLE FOR MARKET  
MECHANISMS?  
Otto Bruun and Mira Käkönen 
It is estimated that developing countries will bear 75-80 % of the costs of adapting to climate change (WB 
2010). At the same time the 50 poorest countries of the planet have very low emission levels, historical and 
present. The incorporation of climate objectives into development cooperation is well justified, however, 
there are good reasons to ask how and on whose terms this is being done.  
The analysis of this chapter focuses on the “climate oriented development policy” of one particular do-
nor country: Finland. Finland reoriented its development policies in 2007 through a new development poli-
cy program, which aimed at integrating climate and developmental policy targets. This has materialised in 
funding and activities, and the proportion of Finnish aid to climate related activities has been one of the 
highest of all donors since 2007. So far donors have committed more funds to climate mitigation than to 
adaptation in developing countries (see Chapter 2). Finnish fast start public climate finance, also counted as 
development assistance (see Box 2.1), reflects this: in 2010, 49.9% was for mitigation, 39.4% for adaptation 
and 10.7% for forest-related climate mitigation. The Finnish development policy of 2007 was justified by 
claims of synergies between climate and poverty reduction objectives. While adaptation to climate change 
by definition supports vulnerable communities, mitigation funding mostly ends up targeting the higher 
emitters – presenting a risk of diverting funds away from the poorest segments in society. In this chapter 
the discussion is specifically on the integration of mitigation objectives to the development agenda. 
The analysis is based on a close reading of key policy texts. These include the Development Policy Pro-
gramme of 2007 (MFA 2007) and the guidelines developed for the energy (MFA 2005), environmental 
(MFA 2009a) and forestry sectors (MFA 2009b). Additional material consists of key-informant interviews 
with Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials. The analysis focuses on discursive policy story-lines that 
define problems in certain ways and justify specific interventions. The discussion is on how the story-lines 
enable and call upon certain kind of policies, experts, mechanisms and technologies while possibly sidelin-
ing others.  
3.1   Climate mitigation, carbon markets and ecological modernisation 
One of the main policy responses in the climate change mitigation front has been the creation of carbon 
markets. When the Kyoto Protocol was agreed in 1997 the focus was not only on binding emission reduc-
tion targets but also on the ways of meeting these targets flexibly through the creation of new markets for 
carbon credits  and offsets.  A carbon offset  is  a  reduction in  a  unit  of  greenhouse gas  emissions made to 
compensate (i.e. offset) a unit of emissions released elsewhere. Thus far the most significant carbon market 
for developing countries has been formed by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is one of 
the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. It allows industrialised countries to meet part of their emission 
reduction targets by buying credits from mitigation projects carried out in developing countries. To a great 
extent the CDM operates in the energy and industrial gas sector. The main mitigation mechanism address-
ing the forest sector in developing countries is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
dation (REDD+), which has been in the making since the 2007 climate summit. In REDD+ efforts are 
made to limit emissions from tropical deforestation through governance reform, forest inventory improve-
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ment and payments for ecosystem services to forest users. REDD+ is an effort to create financial value for 
carbon stored in forests. Activities that promote this create marketable carbon credits.  
The assumption for actors, including governments and several NGOs, is that carbon trade and markets 
lead to positive incentives for change through forming a market price for carbon emissions. This implies 
the birth of a model that combines capitalism’s need for continual economic growth with low-carbon in-
dustrial development (Newell and Paterson 2010). While many of the United Nation’s climate summits aim-
ing to mobilise the political will among governments to act have been seen as failures, the private climate 
business sector has grown. The sector consists largely of actors in the industrialised North. The carbon 
markets require a very elaborate and complex institutional framework, which is challenging to set up espe-
cially in developing countries. Significant support for the setting up of required legal, administrative and 
technical frameworks has been given through official development assistance for example in the form of 
capacity building and technical assistance.  
The market oriented mitigation policies described above seems to rely on particular ideas of how envi-
ronmental  problems  can  be  solved.  These  ideas  can  be  traced  to  the  identified  shift  from discussing  the  
“limits to growth” to the co-existence of economic growth and environmental protection. Ecological mod-
ernisation has been understood as a discursive framing embodying this turn (Hajer 1995). It rests on a belief 
that the co-existence of economic growth and environmental protection is possible through a gradual trans-
formation of the state and the market to promote green regulation, technology, investment and trade. In-
stead of focusing on structural changes in the economy a central role is given to technological fixes. Strate-
gies leaning on ecological modernisation form a continuum: on one end importance is given to regulation 
and restructuring of institutional structures and on the other end to market mechanisms, based on an idea 
of “green capitalism” (Bäckstrand and Lovbrand 2006). The framework of market-based environmental 
policy has been especially manifest in the context of climate change mitigation. In the market-oriented ap-
proach direct regulation is replaced by the creation of new environmental commodities, which are put up 
through the monetary valuation of ecosystem services, or of the entire carbon cycle as in the case of carbon 
markets (cf. Costanza et al. 1987). The core assumption is that this is more cost-efficient and flexible than 
direct regulation or banning environmentally problematic processes.  
The discourse of ecological modernisation emerges around different win-win storylines, which claim 
that economic, ecological and social targets can be realised simultaneously. The analysis now shifts to the 
win-win story lines the integration of development and mitigation objectives in Finnish development policy 
rests on. 
3.2 Finnish climate-oriented development policy  
The 2007 Government Programme announced that “Finland will place greater emphasis on climate and 
environmental issues” in development policy (Prime Minister’s Office 2007; 9). This statement of political 
intent was followed up by an influential Development Policy Programme, complemented by guidelines for 
environment, forestry and water sectors in 2009. The energy guidelines dating to 2005 gained new traction 
with the new policy.  
The justification for the climate-oriented development approach rests on several win-win narratives, 
which lean on the discourse of ecological modernisation. The concept of sustainable development, the 
main guiding principle for the development policy, is closely related to the rationale of ecological moderni-
sation because it assumes that economic growth and environmental protection are compatible. These two 
objectives are also presented as non-conflicting with poverty reduction. Further, the guidelines for envi-
ronment emphasise that the “eradication of poverty and climate change mitigation and adaptation are com-
plementary issues in developing countries and cannot be viewed as separate issues” (MFA 2009a; 10). This 
is a new and specific version of a win-win storyline, which aims to legitimise the integration of climate ob-
jectives to the development agenda. 
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The central themes of ecological modernisation, the decoupling of economic growth from environ-
mental degradation, the economic calculation of ecological services and the promotion of clean technology, 
are all present in the policy documents. Especially in relation to the climate goals a central role is given to 
technological innovations as well as to market-based mechanisms. An important objective is making re-
source use in developing countries more effective and work on climate change mitigation more cost-
effective. This seems to give space for one more “win” added to the win-win narratives – the opportunity 
to export Finnish know-how and clean technology utilising the concept of “Finnish added value”. The en-
vironmental guidelines highlight the importance of creating opportunities for the private sector, while the 
public sector and development institutions are given a supporting and facilitating role through focusing on 
administrative capacity building, promotion of technology cooperation by supporting the creation of a fa-
vourable investment climate and by boosting private investment. 
In this approach the main environmental sectors are interpreted through their relevance to climate 
change. It is stated that mitigation is dealt with in the energy and forestry sectors (carbon sinks), and adap-
tation in the water sector and rural development. According to the policy documents these are the same 
sectors  where Finland’s  special  expertise  is  to  be found,  and where Finland is  framed as  an international  
problem solver. Next the chapter delivers a closer look at the two main sectors related to mitigation – ener-
gy and forestry – and discusses the optimistic win-win narratives in the light of recent academic research. 
3.3 Energy and CDM in development cooperation 
Energy has been on the development cooperation agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland ex-
plicitly since 2005 when the ministry published guidelines for energy in development aiming for “the mobi-
lisation of not only development cooperation but also Finnish expertise and companies to offer energy ser-
vices and increase the importance of renewable energy” (MFA 2005; 2). The development policy program 
of 2007 and the 2009 guideline paper for environment prioritise a sustainable energy economy through pri-
vate sector cooperation and trade. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and thus carbon markets 
have been highlighted as an important dimension of energy cooperation with developing countries. In the 
2009 guidelines it was stated that “Finland actively advances the implementation of CDM projects as far as 
possible in all least developed countries” (MFA 2009a; 10). The synergies between mitigation and poverty 
alleviation  are  stressed  in  different  forms,  for  example,  by  highlighting  how the  provision  of  energy  can  
reduce poverty.  
Energy policies have materialised in different projects and funding decisions, the flagship program be-
ing the Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP) which supports different renewable energy projects. It 
started in Central America and was recognised as a successful model, which after 2007 has been replicated 
in several other regions. CDM has been fostered by channelling support to the to the Asian Development 
Bank’s Carbon Market Initiative and to the Nairobi Framework which aims to promote CDM to Southern 
Africa. For more discussion on the Nairobi Framework, see Box 3.1. The EEP has also been to some ex-
tent connected to the CDM as at least in Central America the initiative was “expected to bring about such 
increased awareness and skills which can be of use in developing and implementing Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) activities.” (INDUFOR 2008)  
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Box 3.1 The Nairobi Framework 
  
 
 
CDM capacity building supported by official development assistance  
 
The purchase of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) generated from CDM projects is not ODA-eligible. How-
ever, capacity building activities for the CDM are eligible for official development assistance (ODA). When support 
and funds to CDM capacity building are channeled through development assistance the importance for these activi-
ties to promote sustainable development becomes more pronounced. In Finland, CDM related support has thus far 
been given to the Nairobi Framework, which aims to extend the scope of CDM activities to sub-Saharan Africa.  
Finland has also supported the Technical Support Facility of the Asian Development Bank’s Carbon Market Initia-
tive, which aims to increase the volume of clean energy and energy efficiency projects in the Asian Pacific Region. 
Finnish support to the Technical Support Facility totaled 1,5 M EUR in 2007-2008. In comparison to the Nairobi 
Framework, the Technical Support Facility aims to combine technical support with increased finance options for 
actual CDM project development.  
 
Concerns about CDM projects reaching the least developed countries, especially those situated in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca (SSA) were behind the launching of the Nairobi Framework in 2006 by the UN. The Nairobi Framework (NF) 
aims to increase the level of participation of developing countries, especially the LDCs, in CDM projects and thus 
enhance the geographical scope of the CDM. As such, the NF is intended to address the second goal of the CDM 
by promoting sustainable development. As a policy initiative, the framework has set out five objectives with which it 
aims to achieve these goals: 1) Build capacity in developing CDM project activities 2) Build and enhance capacity of 
CDM Designated National Authorities to become fully operational 3) Promote investment opportunities for pro-
jects 4) Improve information sharing/outreach/exchange of views on activities/education and training 5) Inter-
agency coordination (UNFCCC, 2010a). 
 
The framework is supported by various governments through international organisations and multilateral donors, 
including UNFCCC, UNDP, UNEP, UNCTAD, UNITAR, World Bank, and the AfDB. The work programme of 
2010 outlines 37 past, present and future projects. Finland has supported the Nairobi Framework with 200 000€ in 
2007. This money was directed at a capacity building program in sub-Saharan Africa,  administered by the UNDP 
and UNEP. The US $1.5 million project was also financed by the governments of Spain (EUR 450 0000) and Swe-
den (US $675 000).  The project operated on the basis of forming a “regional cluster” of CDM capacity develop-
ment, to reap benefits from economies of scale and tailor activities based on specific regional needs. UNDP’s Envi-
ronment and Energy Group (EEG) in New York had the primary role in executing the project and was supported 
by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP Country Offices, UNEP Risoe Centre, the Regional Project Co-
ordinator, short-term consultants and the MDG Carbon Facility.  
 
As a market-based mechanism, the CDM relies on the existence of market infrastructures and conditions conducive 
for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the host countries. However, these rarely exist in the LDCs, at least to a full 
extent and operational capacity. The Nairobi Framework presents the lack of CDM projects in developing countries 
as the result of a combination of various barriers within the host countries themselves. The main barriers identified 
are a risky investment climate; limited capacity to identify and implement CDM projects; and high transaction costs. 
The framework is therefore tailored to address these problems specifically, which can be seen from the distribution 
of projects according to the five objectives.  
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Table compiled from UNFCCC, 2010b. Nb. the table presents some double counting, as several projects were 
hosted by two or more coordinating agencies/donors, and addressed two or more objectives simultaneously. 
  
A majority  of  the  projects  address  the  third  and fourth  objectives  (11  projects  respectively).  Most  policy  docu-
ments focus on creating and supporting an “enabling environment” for the CDM and bringing in more climate 
finance. The private market is intended to flourish by creating information products and tools. Further, several 
documents outline how climate finance could be integrated into development assistance. The lack of CDM pro-
jects in developing countries is attributed to an investment environment deemed ‘risky’ by mainstream financial 
institutions. The Nairobi Framework focuses on developing the host countries’ capacities for the CDM, by target-
ing local financial institutions and raising their awareness through, for example, regional carbon forums. Countries 
own commitments to developing infrastructure (such as financial institutions and legal arrangements) suitable for 
increasing  investments  is  important.  An inadequate  investment  climate  is  a  wide  problem in  LDCs and extends  
beyond merely CDM-related investments. Changing the general investment climate would require measures be-
yond the scope of the Nairobi Framework (Byigero et al 2010). An area which has not been targeted by the Nairo-
bi Framework is the other side of the coin: investor perceptions. While, understandably, the extent to which the 
framework can influence such a complex issue as investor perceptions is limited, there is potential scope for activi-
ties in this area as well. For example Byigero et al (2010:187) see that “the NF might better address itself, at least as 
far as Objective 3 is concerned, to promoting information on success stories in Africa and allaying investors’ fears, 
than to activities within Africa itself”. Another key barrier identified by the Nairobi Framework is the lack of local 
capacity to acquire and implement CDM projects at national and sub-national levels. To solve this, the framework 
focuses on establishing DNA’s in all developing countries that are signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, and develop-
ing their capacities through workshops and innovative learning. A majority of projects have, however, focused on 
developing the technical capacities of DNAs in relation to the CDM project cycle, and ignored wider institutional 
settings. To succeed, capacity development should go beyond targeting only the DNA’s and raise awareness and 
knowledge in other levels of government. Further, DNA’s would benefit from having a strong political mandate 
and financial support to apply the capacity development efforts. 
 
The Finnish supported capacity building program in sub-Saharan Africa serves as an example of the challenges the 
Nairobi Framework attempts to address. While conscious of the purposes of capacity building, “capacity devel-
opment activities were regarded as a means to an end, rather than end in themselves” (UNDP, 2009; 8), only a few 
projects  were  developed into  the  CDM pipeline  and none  proceeded to  registration.  This  is  a  factor  of  several  
issues. First and foremost, sub-Saharan economies mainly have low GHG emissions and thus the potential to 
decrease emissions is low. Projects also lack access to finance, which can be attributed to several reasons including 
a challenging investment climate and lack of CDM capacities. The project had difficulties in combining the tech-
nical support and capacity building to activities that would have assisted in acquiring financing.  
 UNFCCC UNEP UNDP UNCTAD UNITAR AfDB WB  Total amount of 
projects per 
objective  
1. Build capacity in 
developing CDM 
project activities 
 
 4 1  1 1  7 
2. Build and enhance 
capacity of CDM 
Designated National 
Authorities to 
become fully 
operational 
 
1 3 1 1  1  7 
3. Promote investment 
opportunities for 
projects 
2 2 1 1  2 3 11 
4. Improve information 
sharing / outreach / 
exchange of views on 
activities / education 
and training 
 
2 2 2 1  1 3 11 
5. Inter-agency 
coordination 
1       1 
Total amount of projects 
by coordinating agency  
6 11 5 3 1 5 6 37 
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EEP and CDM are presented as win-win mechanisms in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and sustainable development. However, the success and replication of the EEP model was declared without 
any thorough evaluation of the poverty reduction impacts in Central America. On the CDM there is already 
plenty of research carried out that indicates that the mechanism as such has been unable to bring significant 
co-benefits and in some cases CDM projects have had negative environmental and social impacts (Boyd et 
al 2009). For a more thorough discussion on the potential for the CDM to deliver co-benefits, see Chapter 
5. It is also noteworthy that amongst CDM projects, the provision of rural energy has been one of the rar-
est project types thus far because it is seldom financially attractive for private sector actors. 
3.4 Forest Carbon Mitigation and Finnish Development Policy 
The reduction of deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries has been argued to be the 
cheapest way to quickly reduce global emissions, as the sector currently accounts for approximately 10 % of 
global emissions. At the moment REDD+ preparedness activities and pilot projects are ongoing in tropical 
forest countries with considerably increases to development funding in the forest sector. The Finnish policy 
documents see mitigating climate change through halting deforestation as a key opportunity, where Finland 
drives an “inclusion of forest carbon sinks within the emission trading in the future” (MFA 2009a; 12). The 
2007 Development Policy Programme argues for active management of forests because “[s]ustainably man-
aged forests grow faster and capture more carbon than forests in a natural state” (MFA 2007; 19). The pro-
gram does pay attention to the multiple values that forests protect or harbour. Especially the role of the 
private sector and technology in the forestry sector is underlined. The Finnish involvement is legitimated by 
the strong role of forestry sector in Finland. The Finnish value-added principle has, according to Ministry 
officials, in practice during 2007-2011 led to aid being used towards the technical baseline measurements of 
forest carbon sinks. Here Finnish leading companies have been expected and able to win open tenders by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
As up to 2 billion people globally rely heavily on forests for their livelihoods, there is little doubt that 
there is room for win-wins between poverty reduction and environmental protection. However, the policy 
documents for the forest sector seem to argue that multiple benefits can be reached in mitigation projects, 
and do not make explicit how to avoid replicating the disappointing results of previous integrated forest 
conservation and development projects, or the unequal distribution of benefits in most market initiatives 
(Hall et al.  2011). It is observed that the REDD+ preparedness activities (also financed directly and indi-
rectly by Finland) tend to highlight forest destruction by poor communities and disregard other drivers of 
The capacity building of the UNDP-UNEP programme contained several positive elements. An emphasis was 
placed on hiring national project coordinators instead of the all too common “fly-in fly-out” consultants. Fur-
ther, it was acknowledged how different countries participating in the programme are at various stages of CDM 
development. Thus no universal, “one size fits all” solutions could be presented. The programme emphasized 
South-South exchanges with, for example, DNA visits. Finally, the programme attempted to place more empha-
sis on aiding developing countries determine their own sustainable development criteria.  
 
Past CDM investment flows have tended to mirror the flows of FDI more generally. The Nairobi Framework 
presents increasing the geographical scope of the CDM as a method for increasing the deliverance of sustainable 
development by the CDM. However, when ODA funds are used to support activities such as those of the Nai-
robi Framework, it can be asked is merely extending the geographical scope of the CDM sufficient for securing 
sustainable development benefits? The CDM projects initiated through the Nairobi Framework would still have 
to demonstrate their contribution to local sustainable development in the host countries. In its current mode the 
Nairobi Framework is unlikely to greatly alter the distribution of CDM projects to be more favourable towards 
the LDCs. The Nairobi Framework does not extend deep enough to target the structural causes of developing 
countries being unable to attract CDM investments, nor does it facilitate the creation of wider institutional 
mechanisms with abilities to host CDM projects. Governance decisions, such as the EU’s decision to limit 
CERs generated after 2012 only to those from the LDCs, can have a much wider impact on the uptake of CDM 
in the LDCs.  
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deforestation that often lead to adverse impacts for poorest communities (mining, hydropower, tree planta-
tions). For more discussion on defining the drivers of deforestation in Laos, see Chapter 8. If rent-seeking 
elites seek to benefit from payments for forest carbon sinks this implies a further trade-off for poor com-
munities (Brandon and Wells 2010). 
3.5 The will to mitigate: fostering co-benefits or buying legitimacy for 
flexible emission credits and export interests? 
So far the carbon markets have not demonstrated any strong tendency to create pro-poor outcomes and 
they have fallen short on expectations for co-benefits. The quest for measurable mitigated emissions to sell 
in carbon markets seems to overrun other social and environmental targets. Can official development assis-
tance (ODA) funds then rescue this situation by altering the functioning of these markets towards the ben-
efit of poor communities and contributions to sustainable development more generally? Proponents argue: 
potentially, and probably yes.  
It is not, however, only the fostering of co-benefits that is motivating the will to mitigate with devel-
opment assistance. Firstly, as already discussed above, the use of ODA for mitigation has been seen in Fin-
land as a way to create an enabling environment for clean technology investments and for Finnish experts. 
Other  donor countries  as  well  have used ODA to foster  their  own clean technology companies  and as  a  
way to develop CDM/REDD+ projects in the recipient country. Secondly, the attractiveness of mitigation 
activities that advance the carbon markets can relate to the offset logic, which provides a cheap and flexible 
way for countries and companies in the North to fulfill their own emissions reduction commitments. Third-
ly, CDM and REDD+ -related ODA finance offers a possibility to pursue legitimacy for a climate change 
agenda dominated by the global North. The influence of ODA money is greatest in the least developed 
countries where the dependency on development aid is the strongest.  
These self-interests are likely to be counter-productive vis-à-vis the objective to steer mitigation initia-
tives to deliver meaningfully to the poor. The expertise and technology orientation, as in the case of Fin-
land,  is  very  much  ignoring  the  past  failures  in  development  cooperation  that  have  been  explained  by  a  
technology push approach, which does not give priority to local needs, conditions and knowledge. The 
main concern here is that self-interest driven projects create a demand for and dependence on commercial, 
Northern- and corporate-controlled clean technologies rather than for projects that support the recipient’s 
development and mitigation priorities. In the case of mitigation “out-sourcing” interest, aid is likely to di-
vert to countries and sectors with the largest and easiest mitigation potential from the sectors where the 
most depressing needs for development and poverty alleviation may lie (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007; 
Gupta 2009). What is missing is a strict policy framework that would really limit these counter-productive 
self-interests – without one, co-benefits are difficult to come by. 
3.6  Conclusions  
This chapter has looked at the climate-orientation in Finnish development policy in the years 2007-2011. 
The approach in development policy has been discursively legitimized through win-win storylines that show 
how the integration of climate and development targets lead to co-benefits. Indeed, the targets of sustaina-
bility and environment in development are indispensable. However, problematic story-lines that give legiti-
macy for strengthened private sector orientation, for the extension of carbon markets and for the promo-
tion of Finnish export interests through development cooperation can also be found. The approach, 
strongly leaning on a market-oriented form of ecological modernisation, overlooks and sidelines several 
contradictions between the targets of poverty reduction and market-based private-sector led mitigation. It is 
worrying as the new Finnish development policy was referred to in the EU as an inspiring pioneering mod-
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el or “beacon” (Remes 2011). The overly optimistic and consensual story-lines of multiple synergies can 
also free policy-makers from making truly transformative choices. 
It is important to note that the discourse of ecological modernisation does not address issues of politi-
cal economy but rather renders environmental questions technical and manageable and gives the impression 
that these are non-political questions. The win-win storylines identified in the analysed policy texts lead to 
problematic diversions of public attention. Firstly, they divert focus from topical ecological distribution 
conflicts (on land, water, forest) in developing countries. Secondly, through focusing on mitigation in the 
developing world attention is diverted from industrialised and rapidly developing countries’ responsibilities 
to address climate change. Finally, win-win storylines often do not sufficiently emphasize the need for find-
ing wholly different technologies and practices in developing countries than those of the global North, 
which would be more suitable or their conditions and constraints.  
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4.   THE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT PARTNER-
SHIP IN THE MEKONG REGION: INTEGRATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE INTO DEVELOPMENT  
COOPERATION  
Visa Tuominen 
“Every activity that we [finance] in these countries is  
of course development also, but for us the key is  
really to determine whether it’s [relevant for] climate change.” 
 - Donor - 
4.1  Introduction 
This case study analyses the Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP) in the Mekong region, which is a 
Finnish development cooperation program that aims at responding to climate change by promoting the use 
of renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE). It is a grant offering program designed to promote 
the use of renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean technologies, and it is financed by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland7 (MFA) with the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), with contributions of 
4,9€m and 3€m respectively for the period of 2009–2012. As such, it provides an illustrating example of the 
growing number of development cooperation programs which deal directly with climate change.  
This section explores how the EEP Mekong integrates the objectives of poverty reduction, as pro-
nounced in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and climate change mitigation, what this integra-
tion implies for the outcomes of the program and the sustainability of the outcomes. The EEP is looked at 
as a development cooperation program funded by official development assistance (ODA). The analysis 
would look different if the program were analysed as a climate finance project as these two have certain 
different objectives. Herein an emphasis is placed on poverty reduction and ownership issues. Climate fi-
nance projects are mainly concerned with mitigation and adaptation although they can also include ele-
ments that contribute towards poverty reduction and take into account ownership issues. The questions 
this section aims to answer are: 
1. What kind of development does the EEP promote? 
a) What kind of a climate finance mechanism is the EEP and how does it work? 
b) What is the role of climate change mitigation in the EEP? 
c) How are ownership issues taken into account in the program? 
2. Is the win-win approach contributing to cost effective solutions and if not, why? 
a) How will poverty reduction and sustainable development be achieved in the projects? 
b) What obstacles does the EEP approach face in Cambodia and Lao PDR? 
                                                   
 
7 In  the  Central  American  EEP the  other  donors  taking  part  in  the  EEP include  the  Central  American  Integration  
System, the Central American Commission on Environment and Development and the Austrian Development Coop-
eration. 
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The structure of this case study will follow along the lines of these questions. This first section intro-
duces the methodology of the study. After that the approach of the EEP towards development will be ana-
lysed. This section will start with a description of the EEP; its structure, aims and extent. Building on this in 
the third section the role of climate change mitigation in the EEP is explored and afterwards an ownership 
perspective will be added. Ownership will be used in analysing the climate change component of the pro-
gram. 
The fourth section takes a look at the links between energy and development and utilizes this under-
standing with regards to the EEP. This is done in order to gain an understanding of how the so called win-
win  approach  can  deliver  in  a  development  cooperation  program.  The  role  of  two  key  objectives  of  the  
Finnish Development Cooperation Policy – poverty reduction and sustainable development – will then 
come under scrutiny. Following is a look at the different obstacles identified and the reasons for the possi-
ble short-comings in the program. This part will also identify capacity development needs in the fields of 
RE and EE in Cambodia and Laos from the perspective of the objectives of the EEP. The final section of 
this case study will summarize the findings and insights presented and discuss these points reflecting on the 
role that the EEP can have as a part of Finnish development cooperation.  
Methodology of the case study 
This case study is based on material collected in interviews with the key actors of the EEP Mekong and on 
program and project documents, and their analysis. Earlier EEP experiences, namely from the Energy and 
Environment Partnership with Central America, were initially looked at in order to identify the strengths 
and challenges of the program. The people identified for the interviews in the Mekong can broadly be cate-
gorized into three groups which are: 
i. Donors (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Nordic Development Fund) 
ii. EEP program staff (including members from the steering committee and the regional coordination 
unit) 
iii. Projects that secured funding from the First call for proposals. 
A decision to treat all the material collected with interviews anonymously was made at an early stage in 
order to provide the interviewees a possibility to speak openly about the program.8  
The desk study, which was planned to be conducted before the fieldwork, faced problems due to the 
poor availability of documentation on the program. Although the original research plan acknowledged that 
the EEP Mekong had only been initiated in 2009, the lack of up-to-date information on the program and 
projects at the end of 2010 came as a surprise. The underlying assumption had been that the disclosure pol-
icy would have been decided upon at the initiation of the program and that key documents would be avail-
able online or at least within reach upon request. However, email correspondence with the Regional Coor-
dination Unit (RCU) revealed that this was not the case. 
The regional coordination unit of the EEP Mekong published documents and information on their 
webpage during the implementation of this study and the level of transparency significantly increased. The 
MFA was also cooperative during the research and provided the documents requested concerning the pro-
gram. Specific information about the projects, which are not publicly available, have been used to aggregate 
data and draw conclusion in this research, without identifying the projects in question or revealing delicate 
information. Unfortunately all of the information and documentation on the EEP that are supposed to be 
public and available, were still not been published at the end of 2011.  
                                                   
 
8 Still, as the program is relatively small and at the time of carrying out the fieldwork it was at an early stage of imple-
mentation, it may be possible to identify some of the respondents. However, this issue was clear to the interviewees 
and this may have led to some self-censorship with possible delicate issues. 
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At the point of carrying out this research the EEP Mekong had just recently been initiated and there-
fore results and impacts will not be assessed as none of the projects had yet finished. Instead the analysis 
focuses on what observations can be drawn from the setup of the EEP Mekong. The analysis is limited to 
the projects that were successful at obtaining funding from the First round of Call for Proposals of the 
EEP Mekong. Although this limits the scope of the study, it provided the possibility to get an early analysis 
on the EEP Mekong. This was essential for finding areas that might have been neglected as well as pointing 
out  the strong points  of  the program.  Also,  as  the funding was originally  announced only  for  2009–2012 
the chosen schedule was the only one that enabled an analysis of the program before the funding might 
potentially have been terminated. It must be acknowledged that the structure of the program has been un-
der revision and a great number of projects have received funding since the fieldwork was carried out. As 
such this research reflects best the EEP at its initiation and the situation before the Second Call for Pro-
posals. 
4.2 The Energy and Environment Partnership in the Mekong Region – 
what is the EEP and how does it work? 
The first EEP program was launched during the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg in 2002 and it started running in Central America in 2003. Positive results from the 
program encouraged Finland to replicate the EEP to the Mekong Region, Southern Africa, Indonesia and 
the Andean Region. The focus of this analysis is on the EEP Mekong and all references to the EEP in this 
article refer specifically to the EEP program in the Mekong Region, unless otherwise stated. The countries 
involved in the EEP Mekong are Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam. 
The overall long term objective of the program is: “to contribute to improved access to energy and 
energy services and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.” The key indicators reflect the three main 
parts identified for achieving the overall objective. They are: (i) more people and particularly rural house-
holds should have improved access to modern, reliable energy services, (ii) renewable sources of energy 
should constitute a greater share of the total energy and consumption in the Mekong region, and (iii) the 
growth rate of CO2 emissions is reduced. The EEP Programme aims to achieve these objectives through 
three components which are divided as follows9:  
1. Support to national policy, legislation and institutional framework  
2. Development of renewable energy (RE), waste-to-energy (WTE) and energy efficiency (EE) tech-
nologies and services (through partnership projects)  
3. Information and capacity building for RE, WTE, EE and energy markets.   
The EEP Program has different financing options to support studies, surveys and demonstration pro-
jects, feasibility and pre-feasibility studies, policy development, and the dissemination and exchange of in-
formation. As such the aims and objectives of the program are similar to the REEEP (Renewable Energy & 
Energy Efficiency Partnership) program, but they differ in geographical focus. The maximum amount the 
EEP can provide to a single project is 200 000€. Eligible actors for funding range from companies to re-
search centres and from NGOs to consulting firms.  
The most important decision-making body of the EEP is its steering committee, which consists of a 
representative from the MFA and NDF, two representatives from each participating country and a repre-
sentative from the Asian Institute of Technology, which seems to bring a good level of country ownership 
to this level of EEP decision-making. It is further strengthened by a rotating chairmanship among the par-
ticipating countries in the steering committee and the supervisory board. The role of the Supervisory Board 
                                                   
 
9 EEP Mekong, 2010 
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is to give general guidance while the day-to-day management and operation of the program are run by the 
Regional Coordination Unit (RCU). Each country has its own National Coordination Unit (NCU), which 
manages the program on a country level and each national unit is based in the ministry, which is responsible 
for the operations that the EEP most closely relates to in each country. In Cambodia the NCU is located at 
the Ministry of Industry, Mines and energy and in Lao PDR at the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The EEP 
organization structure is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The organizational structure of EEP Mekong10 
 All project proposals are first checked for relevance to the country’s energy policies by the respective 
national coordination unit and regional proposals are submitted to the RCU directly. After each call is 
closed the steering committee comes together to decide which projects get chosen for funding. The struc-
ture guarantees a level of political commitment from the participating countries as the representatives of the 
responsible ministries have to approve each project before they can receive funding. As such, the final deci-
sion of the funded projects is political as it follows the technical assessment of the projects. This system 
guarantees  a  certain  level  of  country  ownership  for  each  project,  but  on  the  other  hand  this  might  stop  
some projects from being carried forward due to political reasons.  
The evaluation grid for the project proposals and other relevant information concerning the require-
ments  for  the  projects  that  can  receive  funding  were  clear  and  published  on  the  program’s  website.  Still  
some of the applicants for EEP funding were not aware of this. The applications for funding are submitted 
to Calls for Proposals. The EEP is a demand driven mechanism in the sense that it does not specify certain 
activities it will fund, but rather a field of activities and certain criteria that projects have to meet. Countries 
of the EEP can choose their own national priorities for specific calls, but so far only Thailand has used this 
option and has had one targeted call, while other countries have not wanted to limit the scope of eligible 
technologies or choose a field to focus on. The chief technical advisor of the EEP presents the projects to 
                                                   
 
10 EEP Mekong website, accessed 8.5.2011 
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the Steering Committee which then selects the projects to receive funding in each call. According to the 
interviewees the steering committee meets in good spirit and is not strongly influenced by national interests, 
but rather tries to select the best projects overall with regional significance.  
As one of the interviewees pointed out: “I haven’t seen any kind of partisanism, the steering committee 
are playing a very fair game, and they will not necessarily go against a project because it’s not in their coun-
try, or strongly support a project because it is in their country.” The steering committee has also followed 
the program guidelines in ensuring that the projects receiving funding are part of the EEP priorities and 
their sustainability has been evaluated.  
Large scale projects or projects without a replication potential have also been ruled out. As such the 
EEP seems to be doing a fairly good job at selecting projects for funding in terms of trying to fill up fund-
ing gaps in the RE & EE sectors, and aiming to select projects with regional relevance. Five projects11 were 
selected from the First Call for Proposals out of which four are located in Cambodia and/or Lao PDR. An 
overview of these four projects is given in Table 3.1. While most projects involve more aspects than simply 
one, they have here been described by their main focus which is technological in two of them and capacity 
building in the other two.  
 
Table 4.1 EEP projects from the First call for proposals located in Cambodia or Laos 
Name of 
lead or-
ganisation 
Short description 
of the organisa-
tion 
Project name Main activities 
and focus 
Partner organisa-
tions 
Country of 
operations 
Cambodi-
an Cli-
mate 
Change 
Depart-
ment 
Department of 
Cambodian Minis-
try of Environ-
ment 
Energy Savings Siem 
Reap - Promoting 
and Demonstrating 
Energy Conservation 
in Siem Reap, Cam-
bodia 
Aims to promote 
and demonstrate 
energy conserva-
tion and energy 
efficiency. Aware-
ness raising activi-
ties. Solar water 
heaters and com-
pact fluorescent 
lamps. 
1) UNEP Risoe 
Centre (Denmark), 
2) Department of 
Energy Technique 
(Cambodia), 3) Roy-
al University of 
Phnom Penh (Cam-
bodia), 4) Cambodi-
an Research Centre 
for Development 
(Cambodia) 
Cambodia 
Elec-
triciens 
sans 
frontiéres 
A French NGO, 
specializing in 
sustainable access 
to energy 
Green electricity for 
24 villages of the 
Phongsaly district, 
Phongsaly province 
in Laos 
Pico-hydro tur-
bine installation 
and related train-
ing. 
CominKhmere 
(Cambodia) 
Lao PDR 
and Cam-
bodia 
Finland 
Futures 
Research 
Centre 
A Finnish research 
unit of the Univer-
sity of Turku. 
Interlinkages be-
tween energy and 
Livelihoods - Data, 
Training and Scenar-
ios for Sustainable 
Energy Planning in 
Laos (INES) 
Data collection 
and development 
of energy plan-
ning models with 
and for MEM. 
Capacity building. 
Department of 
Electricity, Ministry 
of Energy and 
Mines (MEM), Lao 
PDR 
Lao PDR 
Kam-
works 
A social enterprise 
operating and reg-
istered in Cambo-
dia. 
Improving access to 
solar energy for rural 
electrification in 
Cambodia by remov-
ing financial and 
technical barriers 
Demonstrating 
solar lanterns and 
solar home sys-
tems and intro-
duction of a mi-
croloan scheme. 
1) Cambodia Mutual 
Savings and Credit 
Network (Cambo-
dia), 2) Pico Sol 
Cambodia 
Cambodia 
                                                   
 
11 A sixth project from the First Call was signed after this study was carried out. 
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The partnership concept proved to be particularly successful in the Central American EEP and an in-
ternal identification mission to the Mekong region before the launch of the EEP Mekong found that this 
integral element of the EEP concept was also adaptable for the Mekong region. One reason for the uptake 
of this model is to enhance technology transfer. Secondly, the program document states that: “new and 
innovative energy initiatives and partnerships are necessary if significant increase of renewable energy pro-
duction and improved access to services is to be achieved.”  
The involvement of the private sector in development is not a new phenomenon but it was not until 
the late 1990s that donors started channelling larger amounts of public development finance to support 
private sector development mostly in the form of public-private partnerships. The increase mainly filled a 
gap left by the privatization of state utilities and the underlying rationale was that investment needs in de-
veloping countries could not be covered by public finance alone. This is also the approach adopted widely 
in climate finance where the private sector is given a large role in contributing to the mitigation efforts. Alt-
hough the partnerships may work well in some cases most experiences from the 1990s were not encourag-
ing. The crucial point is that public finance with a clear development mandate is used to support private 
investment, which by definition aims at generating profits. However, the projects analysed in this case study 
did not have a strong role from private actors. It was admitted by most actors interviewed that in an LDC 
context renewable energy technologies still need subsidies to be economically competitive with more pollut-
ing technologies, which have lower initial investment costs.  
4.3 Mitigation potential of small scale electrification 
Achieving the MDGs will improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable communities and individuals. The 
discussion on mainstreaming climate change into development cooperation is based on the idea that human 
vulnerability to climate change is reduced when successful adaptation takes place and climate change is mit-
igated and at the same time the living conditions of those vulnerable are improved (Ayers and Huq, 2009). 
This  is  also the approach adopted in  the EEP.  There is  no real  conflict  between the short  term goals  of  
immediate issues that development policies are aimed at, and the long-term goals of protecting livelihoods 
from the impacts of climate change. (Klein et al. 2005, 584)  
Linking mitigation to development activities carries some risk of trade-offs between the two goals, in 
comparison to linking adaptation with development. (Gupta, 2009, 209) There are also apparent risks that 
the additionality, which climate finance is supposed to have, will not be realized when mitigation activities 
are integrated with current modes of development assistance. This is more apparent with the LDCs that 
have negligible emission compared with the developed countries or emerging economies such as China, 
India or Brazil. The UNFCCC principle that climate finance needs to be new and additional is largely sup-
ported by developing countries in order to guarantee that the industrialized countries fulfil their commit-
ments of reducing their own emissions and funding climate activities in developing countries. (Ayers & 
Huq, 2009, 680) 
While rural energy generation projects can bring real development benefits for the local population they 
are usually not efficient in reducing GHG emissions. This is obvious when one considers that rural house-
holds do not have much energy consumption anyway as long as they are not connected to an electricity 
grid, but rather depend on local small-scale energy production. Large scale emission reduction projects can 
usually be carried out with lower costs for the same level of outcome in terms of emission cuts. To curb 
emissions growth it would be sensible to target middle-class energy consumption in countries that achieve 
the MDGs by introducing efficiency standards and policies once sales of appliances take off. By electrifying 
rural schools and hospitals the same results in this respect cannot be achieved. This shows that climate pol-
icy that targets limiting the emissions of developing countries is most efficient when it targets the middle-
class, as well as countries that have reached a certain level of development. (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 
2007, 12-16) The beneficiaries of climate finance and development aid seem to be different within a nation-
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al  scope  as  well  as  on  an  international  level.  Those  targeted  by  mitigation  are  likely  to  be  high  polluters  
(non-LDC), while those targeted by development aid are the poorer countries. 
Similar ideas are held by a number of the key actors of the EEP, which was obvious when they were 
asked about the amount of mitigation achieved with the program or individual projects. The donors and the 
administrative personnel saw the mitigation component of the program clearly embedded in the program 
design and one of them emphasized that:  
“The two objectives of our programme are to give better access to energy to people and mainly 
rural poor and minorities, and those people who are not having an easy access, […] and then the 
second is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Every project that we implement reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions.”(emphasis added) 
A programmatic approach, where all the EEP projects would be bundled up, was seen as a future pos-
sibility where significant emission reductions could be made. However, at the moment the projects saw the 
mitigation potential negligible, which was clear from some of their answers. The mitigation potential from 
energy in the case of Laos was questioned by a project leader:  
“The mitigation issue in  Laos is  of  course  different  from many other  countries,  because at  the 
moment the emissions in Laos are very small, they are only coming from the transport sector and 
electricity production is totally hydro based at the moment and there's not very much industries 
which are using fossil fuels.”  
Yet another project leader pointed out the focus of their project which is in line with the EEP approach:  
“We are connecting people, poor people, who have low consumption, so that means that savings 
of energy, I doubt that they will be very high. […] So if you want really to save a lot of energy, 
you have to work with either  big  consumers,  one big  consumer it  can work or  very,  very  large 
scale consumers. […] One or two kilowatts is not going very far.”  
And in a sentence regarding the situation of Cambodia and Laos: “we don’t have big mitigation pro-
jects because we don’t have such potential.” The EEP Mekong has an objective of reducing GHG emis-
sions and it will be interesting to see what future evaluations will tell us about how the program has per-
formed. As the projects are relatively small it seems unlikely that significant direct emission reductions 
would take place. This hypothesis is also supported by earlier academic studies on mitigation projects tar-
geting poor people  and LDCs.  Another  curious issue is  how these emission reductions will  be  evaluated.  
Even though the program has a plan for monitoring CO2 emissions no such evaluation plans were in place 
for most of the individual projects at the time of conducting this research. 
4.4 Ownership perspectives in the EEP 
A look at certain perspectives of ownership in the EEP will now be explored in order to find out a) how 
they have been taken into account in the program and its projects and b) to shed light on what implications 
this can have for the results of the program.  
The principle of ownership goes a long way back in the tradition of development cooperation, but its 
importance has become highlighted recently in the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.  In the Paris Declaration of 2005 ownership 
was adopted as the most important principle in improving aid effectiveness in donor – recipient relations. 
In its core, ownership can be defined as practices leading to shared participation and control over the con-
tent of development activities, aimed at also making them work better - a key question in the least devel-
oped countries. Ownership is a multidimensional set of negotiated continuous power-relations, which are 
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never absolutely fulfilled in a recipient-donor relationship, but can rather be seen as commitments benefi-
cially informing the whole institutional network involved in this process (for discussion on practice oriented 
processes see Geiger 2009; Gherardi 2009; for institutions see Ostrom et al 2002).   
Before moving on it is worth pointing out two dimensions of ownership that are significant in the fol-
lowing analysis. First, here ownership on a programmatic level is taken to include the role the recipient gov-
ernments have over, for example, the initiation, objectives, continuance or discontinuance of a program. 
These issues are closely linked with the international context where climate change is discussed. Second, 
ownership within the program refers to the relations and interactions between the donor and the partners 
within the program structure. 
The underlying idea of ownership is that when the recipients of aid have control over their own devel-
opment and can exercise control over development interventions, it is likelier for them to be committed to 
their goals and therefore have a stake over the results. This will also contribute to achieving the goals, given 
the necessary means are present. Here, the focus will be on the ownership of the agenda that governs the 
EEP and as such forms the basis of the approach the EEP has adopted, with its implications for certain 
processes in the EEP structure, current actors of the EEP. The ownership within the projects will also be 
briefly discussed.  
Climate change is the result of the practices of the industrialized countries and it is their shared respon-
sibility to respond to its effects today. The least developed countries have contributed the least to climate 
change but stand to lose the most. According to the principle of the UNFCCC of “common but differenti-
ated responsibilities” the burden of reducing emissions lays mostly in the industrialized countries, with very 
few commitment required from the LDCs. Climate change mitigation is the agenda of the industrialized 
countries with no emission reduction contributions required from the LDCs. From this perspective it is 
quite clear that Cambodia and Laos have very little if any ownership over the agenda of climate change mit-
igation.  
This does not mean that the countries in question are not committed to renewable energy initiatives. 
Rather, their interest in RE is easier to explain through their interest in energy as such, or in trying to attract 
potential foreign investments. This is problematic for a “demand driven” approach to climate change miti-
gation in any LDC country as the demand does not refer to the needs or demands of the recipient country in 
question, but to actors within that country and in the case of the EEP, also to actors outside the countries. 
The demand in the case of climate change mitigation is created outside the context where the process takes 
place. In some cases this can result in the demand being answered by actors with a background and a mind-
set similar to where the demand is created, rather than the geographical place where these activities take 
place. Although the program makes an effort to distinguish projects that truly respond to local needs rather 
than serving only the needs of foreign consultants, this is not what ownership over an agenda means and a 
demand for funding in such case is no proof that it would be otherwise. This is not to say that the projects 
the EEP supports could not be very successful in providing clean energy to rural poor that have earlier 
lacked access to reliable energy, but that if these expected results are fulfilled, it is unlikely due to the RE 
aspect within the project. This would seem to show that the EEP is at odds with the ownership agenda 
concerning its focus on RE, and especially in terms of climate change mitigation. 
The large scope of possible technologies and different types of projects to receive funding were praised 
by all of the people interviewed for this study. The most important reason for viewing this approach of the 
EEP favourably was that it allows for a broad approach to energy issues, where projects with a narrow fo-
cus might have fewer possibilities for success. Related to this the possibility to propose virtually any kind of 
project within the renewable energy and energy efficiency field, which suits the needs of the target coun-
tries, is seen as being very attractive. 
Increased transparency of the selection process would serve well in answering questions about which 
projects get selected as well as providing more information on the funded projects for an external evalua-
tion. This would allow for other actors and donors to learn from the successes and strong points of Finnish 
development programs and projects as well as allow for weaker points to be taken into account in future 
designs.  
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Another issue that should be considered is ownership for whom. A stated key beneficiary group of the 
EEP is  the rural  poor and women (in  the online version of  the program document).  Naturally  they have 
very little options for carrying out projects or making proposals. NGOs that are working closely with rural 
communities were mentioned as actors that are usually most capable of giving a voice to these communi-
ties, although great differences exist between different NGOs in terms of their capacities and whether they 
are of local or foreign origin.  
Out of the four projects analysed in this study two project leaders are European and two local; the 
CCCD and Kamworks, of which the latter is owned and managed by Dutch individuals. The reasons for 
this and its implications are discussed briefly below. If this composition of project leaders is a trend and it 
continues why is it that actors of Western origin continue to win projects from the EEP? One possibility 
would be the lack of ownership over climate change mitigation, as this might lead to seeing renewable ener-
gy as uninteresting. Actors with Western origins, on the other hand, are more socialized to the issue as that 
is where the issues have been created and are widely discussed. Consequently, actors with a Western back-
ground would be more willing to tackle the issue home and abroad. However, a likelier cause for this situa-
tion would still seem to be the lack of capacity on the part of LDC actors to apply for funding successfully 
and carry out projects. 
The individual projects themselves seem to be well designed to answer local needs and have a good 
level of ownership on the part of the beneficiaries. The Cambodian Climate Change Department is a na-
tional actor which is raising awareness on energy efficiency with demonstrations and public information 
dissemination. The primary beneficiary of the Finland Futures Research Centre’s project is the staff of Min-
istry of Energy and Mines who approached the FFRC for the initiation of the project, and who are closely 
involved in the project implementation.12 Both of the technologically focused projects had also elements 
with a strong ownership for the end-users. The solar lanterns that Kamworks is demonstrating and selling 
are designed in cooperation with a village in rural Cambodia and the final concept that was chosen for pro-
duction was selected by the villagers. Kamworks is also assembling the solar lanterns in Cambodia. In the 
ESF project a village committee is set up without guidelines for the composition or procedures, which then 
selects the order of electrification in the village as all houses cannot be connected straight away.  
In effect, what kind of development can we say the EEP promotes? As stated the EEP aims at increas-
ing access to modern energy focusing on rural poor, ethnic minorities and women. It also aims at reducing 
the growth rate of GHG emissions and development through partnerships. There is an underlying assump-
tion that energy is an important factor for achieving development and also that renewable energy and ener-
gy efficiency lead to emission reductions. As such, promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency is a 
win-win solution as they enable both development and mitigation results. Doing this through partnerships 
leads to a win-win-win model where ideally the private sector will also contribute to achieving these objec-
tives with their own part in providing financing towards achieving these objectives. Although the actual 
mitigation achieved might be small in absolute figures, it is still development towards cleaner energy pro-
duction and increased access to energy services in targeted areas. What is a little bit concerning is that the 
announced commitment period of the EEP to the region is very short. The EEP also seems to aim to fund 
a large number of projects for a few years. Achieving sustainable results is usually likelier with a good focus 
and a long commitment. The ownership is taken into account on the national level for project funding and 
also in the projects, but less so in the overall agenda of the program.  
  
                                                   
 
12 The reader should be informed that Finland Futures Research Centre are an institution implementing an EEP pro-
ject, and on the other hand, also carrying out this research. The analysis herein has been conducted by individuals not 
involved in activities related to FFRC’s EEP project. 
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4.5  The win-win approach 
The following section explores how the win-win(-win) approach described above is working for poverty 
reduction  and  sustainable  development  as  well  as  looking  at  the  obstacles  the  program and  RE  face  in  
Cambodia and Lao PDR. As established earlier the EEP’s main objectives are improved access to energy 
and the reduction of CO2 emissions.  
Energy and development 
Poverty reduction and sustainable development are the two key principles of Finnish Development cooper-
ation. While sustainable development is a concept that has been widely discussed and seems to be used 
more as a catch phrase nowadays rather than a concept clearly defining what development should look like, 
poverty reduction is clearly codified in the Millennium Development Goals with a number of qualitative 
and quantitative indicators. Energy is not included as such in any of the MDGs, but there are numerous 
ways in which access to energy can help in achieving the goals. Alleviating energy poverty has been called a 
prerequisite for fulfilling the MDGs for example by DFID (2002) and WHO (2006) (Urban, 2009, 683). 
Clean energy projects can, in addition to reducing emission, create employment opportunities, reduce time 
spent on energy provision or reduce air pollution from traditional fuels. Meeting the energy needs of the 
poor in a carbon-concentrated way presents an enormous global challenge.  
When it comes to the MDGs, apart from MDG 7, which calls for “ensuring environmental sustainabil-
ity", climate change related activities cannot usually be thought as having an important impact on poverty 
(Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007, 11). A key issue in collecting all the benefits from rural electrification is 
to make sure that the required co-factors are present. One interviewee’s opinion was that a village should 
have access by road, health care, education, clean water and electricity to be able to eliminate poverty. While 
in another conversation the link between poverty reduction and energy came up slightly differently:  
“For energy to reduce poverty very essentially is for what purposes the energy is used. Of course 
one important aspect is that the, kind of a survival strategy; that you must have food to eat, to be 
a living poor person and not dead. While of course dying would reduce poverty. But in a way, this 
type of survival and its type of energy use is one aspect which as such does not reduce poverty, 
but it’s kind of a starting point.” 
Taking a full account of the required co-factors is unfortunately where the EEP seems to stop a little 
short. The program document and most actors in the EEP were able to name a number of benefits that 
access to energy can provide in combination with other factors, but the proposal evaluation grid neglects 
many of these factors. Even more concerning is if there will be no account of these links in the monitoring 
and evaluation plan. This was put well into words by an interviewee:  
“When you bring energy you don't believe that all people will be able to study a longer time. Usually 
when you bring energy the first things they invest in is not in books but in a TV. So the creativity is not 
wonderful there. It is much more useful for example for you to bring light to a shopkeeper so they will sell 
longer, during night time as well, so they will improve their income.”  
This is not to say that people getting access to electricity should study, or neither where generated in-
come should be spent. Ownership over people’s own consumption and decisions; this is what many under-
stand development to be. However, one should not expect literacy to improve merely by bringing electricity 
to a village, for example.  
Sustainable development and poverty reduction in EEP 
While the poor, women and ethnic groups are a focus in Finland’s  Development Policy Programme and the 
EEP, there is no mention about how the needs of these groups are taken into account in the program, and 
they are barely visible in project selection criteria. The project proposal evaluation grid for the First Call 
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awarded 0,5% of the total points available when: “The specific impact on gender is taken into account, no-
tably health impact, or time used for energy related household tasks,”(EEP Mekong, 2009) and it was the 
only point in evaluation grid mentioning women or gender13. The same percentage was given to addressing 
local social acceptability and local “ownership” (quotation marks in the original). Both of these issues were 
acknowledged by the MFA and the Second Call awarded 6% where: “the project contributes to the im-
provement of the living conditions of the rural poor, ethnic minorities, women, children, and other margin-
alised groups.” This should be looked at in relation to the overall objective of poverty reduction, and could 
be compared, for example, to a Nordic partner’s participation to a project, which originally accounted for 
10% in first round of EEP and for 5% in the Second Call. Judging by this, at the time of carrying out the 
study the program did seem to be developed to conform better to the objectives set in Finnish Develop-
ment Policy Programme of 2007. 
The poverty reduction aspect of the EEP seemed to be a complementary component in the program 
for some of the donors. It was acknowledged that, in general, renewable energy projects are always quite 
easy to label as mitigation but it is much harder to place them under poverty reduction. The NDF is man-
dated to focusing on climate, which naturally makes it their priority when looking at projects for funding. 
Yet, a focus on economic development was seen as a central component in another interview:  
“The fact is right, I think on paper we are development programme, it’s in fact a programme 
which is in between development and economic cooperation, because they could be commercial 
projects as well. The fact is that it’s a partnership programme, it means that it can be research in-
stitutions, academics, NGOs, private companies, public companies, everyone can be part of it. 
From the line of your previous question [on the role of energy in development] [the objective] is 
to stimulate economic development. To stimulate the development of the area where they are and 
definitely economic development, sustainable economic development.” 
By supporting small scale RE projects the objective of environmental sustainability becomes fulfilled in 
the EEP quite easily, at least as far as this study is concerned. Social and cultural factors and sustainability 
were not largely discussed, but it is worth noting that small-scale energy production usually has a good 
ownership over the production and use of energy. For example, large dam projects are usually more prone 
to causing social distortions than the installation of a pico-hydro. Electrification is also understood as a key 
component in both countries for development. However, the sustainability of the results of the individual 
projects raised more views and opinions. The long-term effects of awareness raising and capacity building 
projects are difficult to measure. Judging by the project designs, the two projects, that fit this category, seem 
to be responding to national needs and demands in the field of renewable energy and energy efficiency.  
The sustainability of the projects, with a clear technological focus, was seen to be based on the costs 
and reliability of the technologies. One key issue seemed to be the high initial cost of RE technologies. A 
project leader noted that: “there is still the problem in their mind that they have to invest more to save 
more money, even with the solution with less than two years of return investment they’re still hesitating, 
still focusing on investment.” Another point raised in a few discussions concerned the life-span of the 
technologies used. Any unexpected issue with the technologies introduced by the first round of EEP could 
easily forfeit the economic sustainability of those projects and only time will tell how they will turn out. The 
main factor contributing to the overall sustainability of the technologically focused projects was seen by 
most actors to depend on the financial benefits they can provide.  
                                                   
 
13  Gender is one of the cross-cutting issues of Finnish development policy. The technological focus of the program 
was identified by many actors and some also pointed out that more consideration should be given to different issues, 
such as how to include, for example, gender aspects in the program. Nevertheless, for the most part of the program, 
gender issues had been taken into account in one way or another. 
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“I think that the level of sustainability of these projects will depend on how much can this project 
demonstrate to potential stakeholder about the benefits, financial mainly. So if we’ll manage to do 
so, show in a very clear monetary term that if you do that you will get benefit out of this.”  
Without the economic benefits it seems unlikely that the use of the introduced RE technologies will 
kick-off and spread. The individual projects do seem to be well designed, but it is unclear what the role of 
the EEP funding for them is? The EEP is scaling up the use of both of the technologies, but can it demon-
strate their potential for the local populations in just a few years? Unfortunately, it still seems unlikely that 
they would really gain much ground without the subsidies. 
Obstacles the EEP faces in Cambodia and Lao PDR 
As was mentioned above, the sustainability and success of RE technologies seem to be mostly dependent on 
the economic benefits these technologies can provide. The high initial cost of most RE technologies slows 
down, to say the least, the adoption of RE technology by local populations. Without a financial support or a 
subsidy from a donor it was doubted if these technologies would be adopted by the majority of the local pop-
ulations for a long time to come. Businesses targeting Western consumers were seen willing to make the in-
vestment, as climate-friendly appeals to Western consumers and can be a selling point. Some specialists famil-
iar with RE technologies also doubted the sustainability of RE in rural use at their current stage. This is due to 
the unreliability of the technologies in remote areas as well as poor maintenance and lack of skilled technicians 
and/or spare parts. Maintenance is especially difficult for household or village projects as it is difficult to have 
skilled technicians in each village. A technician travelling a long distance to a remote village reduces the cost-
efficiency ratio. Further, as it also takes a lot of time it reduces the use-time of the technology in question.  
For the RE technologies to spread widely the reliability of technologies and the long-term financial saving 
they would generate would need to be demonstrated, which is what some of the projects of the EEP aim to 
do. However, changing attitudes and the policy and economic environment in the countries to be more hospi-
table for RE is seen as a long process. At the same time cheaper Chinese RE technologies were seen as ham-
pering the overall reputation of RE technologies.  Energy efficiency initiatives are seen more viable, mostly 
because usually they do not involve changes in energy production, but rather consumption, and people can 
see a smaller electricity bill very soon as a direct result of their changes in behaviour or the adoption of energy 
saving lamps, for example.  
Governments’ priority to provide a grid connection for their populations in both countries means that 
RE is sometimes seen as an interim measure. Unawareness of the governments’ plans for electrification can 
sometimes reduce the incentive to invest in RE of households and villages. Lack of awareness and capacity 
in RE and EE were also singled out as major obstacles in Cambodia and Lao PDR. The general public is 
not well aware of what kind of steps they can take to improve their energy efficiency and the amount of 
money they spend on energy. Neither is the awareness of RE extensive. On the technological front the lack 
of skilled technicians that could maintain and repair RE technologies are seen as an obstacle for the reliabil-
ity and sustainability. On another level, the capacity of many national actors in both countries to write pro-
posals of sufficient quality for donor funded projects seems to be low.  
The projects of the first call aim at answering a number of these issues in a good manner. Unfortunate-
ly, the EEP funding has only been announced for three years, and it can be questioned how much can be 
achieved in such a short time. Also, the overhead costs are likely to be very high if the program will be ter-
minated after only just three years. Many actors suspected the funding to continue after the first announced 
period. Unfortunately hearsay does not equal knowing, and this leaves room for improvement, especially 
from the perspective of predictability, which is said to improve the ownership of recipient countries over 
their own path of development.  
While the win-win approach where poverty reduction is combined with climate change mitigation, and 
seen as an integral element in RE projects, is seen by many as extremely attractive, it seems that in terms of 
outcomes the issue is not that simple. If one considers climate change mitigation to embody the actual re-
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duction of GHG emission and not just the idea of mitigating climate change, then small scale RE projects 
do not seem to be living up to the expectations. Furthermore, mitigation was seen by many as being to be 
the key element of the EEP, with poverty reduction results actually looking like the complementary objec-
tive of the EEP. Contribution towards poverty reduction can only be evaluated after the program has been 
running for a time and as such remains to be seen. Still,  many actors implementing the EEP projects did 
not hold extremely high expectations in this regard.  
4.6  Conclusions 
Promoting RE and EE is a concept, which at the first hand seems very promising in providing pro-poor and 
sustainable development benefits. Unfortunately, collecting all of these benefits seems to be a harder task. The 
EEP is trying to tackle this challenge, but seems to be leaning stronger on mitigation than poverty reduction. 
The LDCs lack ownership of the agenda behind this approach, namely mitigating climate change. Even more, 
as actual emissions reductions seem very small, it seems to be that it’s the idea of mitigation climate change 
that is controlling the agenda. If time shows that the contribution for poverty reduction does not deliver, EEP 
will look like a program where the ownership principle does not inform the process the way it should. The 
LDCs do not have an obligation to reduce their emissions, but they have a right to pursue their own devel-
opment priorities. For Cambodia and Laos both, the national priority is poverty reduction. Energy can play a 
central role in development when utilized properly and all the necessary co-factors are in place.  
For  the  final  beneficiaries,  namely  the  populations  in  Cambodia  and  Laos,  the  biggest  reason  for  the  
adoption of RE is the price of the technologies. At the time RE remains expansive and the technologies 
adopted are subsidies by donors from industrialized countries or multilateral development banks. Industrial-
ized countries have committed to supporting climate measures in developing countries, latest in the Copenha-
gen Accord in the form of Fast Start Finance. The issue is that these committed funds should be, and are 
claimed to be new and additional to development finance. However, the Energy and Environment Partner-
ship in the Mekong Region is ODA-funded and as such seems to represent the diversion of ODA to climate 
change related activities.  
The EEP acknowledges some gender aspects, but in practice it was unclear if gender was really a central 
issue in any of the projects. As a cross-cutting issue of Finnish Development Policy, gender receives little at-
tention in the EEP. Finnish or Nordic added value does not seem extremely high in the projects. Nordic add-
ed value can be seen as promoting Nordic values and/or specific knowledge and technologies. Mostly it might 
be argued to be present in the focus on rural areas and the demand driven approach, the latter receiving praise 
in both countries. Still, it should be remembered to question whether all of the activities are really national 
priorities even if there are a number of private actors willing to carry out activities. From the point of view of 
ownership it is quite satisfying that the EEP does not look like a mechanism for subsidizing Finnish or Nordic 
companies or technologies. Then again some might consider it unfortunate that for example the promotion or 
mainstreaming of gender also receives so little attention. Looking at other climate finance mechanisms the 
lack of gender aspects seems to be more of a rule than an exception.  
Both Cambodia and Laos have very little capacity when it comes to renewable energies. This is where the 
EEP seems to have found a spot where funding is really needed. The sustainability also seems better in these 
projects as the capacity is not tied to a certain process or technology. Enhanced capacity can increase the 
ownership of these countries when it comes to the capability to set their own priorities and agendas for both 
poverty reduction and climate change, and even more in enhancing their power to act independently. 
For Finland it would be important to demonstrate its commitment to these countries and this agenda 
by improving the predictability of funding. It might also be worth considering the focus of this develop-
ment co-operation program. Integrating development outcomes with climate change mitigation is not an 
easy task. As such the justified priority of LDCs and the ultimate of objective of all development coopera-
tion still is poverty reduction. Unfortunately there is a lack of clear signs that this is really what the EEP is 
aiming for at the time.  
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5.  CDM AND ITS CHALLENGES TO DELIVER TO 
THE POOR: THE CASE OF CAMBODIA 
Mira Käkönen  
The Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) is one of the three flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Firstly the aim of the CDM is to give the industrialized countries of the North (more precisely Annex 
I countries) flexibility to meet their binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets by allowing 
them to carry out emissions reductions projects in developing countries. From these mitigation activities 
Annex I countries (and actors authorized by countries with emissions reduction targets) can acquire certi-
fied emission reductions (CERs). The credits can also be sold further in the compliance market.   The sec-
ond objective of the CDM is to contribute to sustainable development in the host countries and communi-
ties through creation of environmental, social and economic benefits. 
The range of possible projects is diverse including renewable energy, gas or methane capture projects 
and the destruction of powerful GHGs such as hydro fluorocarbons (HFC).  If the North (or more precise-
ly the Annex I countries of Kyoto Protocol) is to benefit from cheaper emission reductions, the South is 
expected to benefit from access to new sources of investment and from clean technology transfer. In this 
way the CDM has been seen also as ‘a way to enrol the Southern countries into efforts to address GHG 
emissions without reduction obligations’ (Newell and Paterson 2010) and to set up institutional infrastruc-
ture for monitoring the emissions.  
In short, the CDM is supposedly a win-win mechanism in terms of GHG emission reductions and sus-
tainable development. It is meant as a way to manage a global problem and also benefit local people. The 
relatively short history of CDM projects has been accompanied with criticism especially over the CDMs 
potential to bring about meaningful change in terms of required mitigation efforts and sustainable devel-
opment. Now that decisions over the post 2012 period of Kyoto need to be taken, plenty of discussions are 
going on about the future of CDM and carbon markets in general. One of the discussions around the 
mechanism has been the unbalanced regional distribution of CDM projects. China especially, but also India 
and Brazil, have taken a lion’s share of the projects. So much so that some have dubbed the abbreviation of 
CDM to stand for ‘China Development Mechanism.’ Especially the least developed countries (LDCs) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa have a miniscule share of current projects.  Cambodia is an interesting case as at the 
moment it tops the LDC chart with 5 registered projects. This chapter explores the constraints and chal-
lenges of CDM projects in the least developed countries. Could the CDM be rendered from a ‘China De-
velopment Mechanism’ to a ‘Cambodia Development Mechanism’ that actually brings local environmental 
and social benefits to the LDCs at a reasonable scale?  This chapter addresses the issue by evaluating the 
suitability  of  the  CDM  specifically  for  the  LDCs  such  as  Cambodia.  Official  Development  Assistance  
(ODA) has been seen as one way to level the playing field for the different developing countries and actors 
in developing countries to develop CDM projects and as a way to steer the CDM to deliver better to sus-
tainable development objectives and to the poor. At the same time there has been a lack of clarity over 
how, when and where ODA should be used in CDM projects. For a discussion on how ODA is used for 
CDM capacity building see Box 3.1. This chapter highlights some aspects of the dilemmas in the CDM re-
lated ODA use.  
The chapter is based on research work that has included literature review as well as empirical work. The 
empirical work consists of key informant interviews and group discussions that have been carried out main-
ly in Cambodia in May-June 2011. The empirical material also includes project documents like the Project 
Development Documents (PDDs) of the Cambodian CDM projects. In Finland two key-informant inter-
views were made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Altogether 14 key-informant interviews and 6 focus 
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group discussion (4-8 participants in each group) were carried out. All interviews were recorded and tran-
scribed. 
In Cambodia the interviewed informants consisted of:  
· Staff of the Climate Change Department in Ministry of Environment, which is the Desig-
nated National Authority (DNA) of Cambodia 
· Representatives from the donor and INGO community (UNEP, UNDP, KfW and 
NEXUS) 
· Local NGOs (NGO Forum on Cambodia and ADHOC) 
· CDM developers or implementers of three different CDM projects 
· Focus groups (6) in host communities of three different CDM projects  
The topics of the expert interviews related to the informant’s views on  
· the opportunities and challenges of CDM projects in Cambodia 
· the interests of different stakeholders in Cambodia 
· the reasons for success and failures for the CDM projects in the pipeline and for the pro-
jects that have not entered the pipeline 
· CDM’s pro-poor and sustainable development potential 
· the role of national authorities and DNA 
· the role of donors, ODA and other development actors 
Three CDM projects, ABC, Samrong Thom and Siang Phong were visited directly. In Samrong Thom 
also three group discussions were carried out in the host community. In addition visits were made to Kam-
chay hydropower project and K-Cement but due to difficulties in arranging an official visit it was not pos-
sible to enter the actual project sites or interview project developers. Instead group interviews were carried 
out in the host or near-by communities of these projects. The topics of the focus group discussions related 
to the possible positive and negative impacts of CDM projects and to the experiences with the project con-
sultations. 
5.1 CDM succeeded in taking off but how is it delivering in terms of its 
twin objective? 
The CDM is still relatively young. The decision for flexibility mechanisms was done in Kyoto 1997 but the 
main operational guidelines for CDM were agreed upon in 2001. For the UN climate change secretariat and 
many national governments, CDM has created enthusiasm as it has expanded much faster than its designers 
anticipated. One reason for the rapid expansion of CDM was the decision in 2004 to link the CDM to the 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) market by enabling companies to meet some of their commitments 
by investing in CDM projects. The CDM has managed to generate interest among investors, project devel-
opers as well as carbon traders. Nowadays CDM has grown into a multi-billion dollar business or industry 
that reaches over 80 countries. Especially China, India and Brazil have been highly successful in attracting 
new investments to their countries. At the moment there are 4044CDM projects registered and 4193 at a 
validation stage. More than 895million certified emission reductions have been issued to 1491projects 
(UNEP/Risoe May 2012).   
While succeeding in its appeal for investors and project developers, the CDM has also received severe 
criticism since its very early stages. The discussion around the mechanism is understandable as like Boyd 
(2009) has noted the schemes are implemented under conditions of scientific uncertainty and with limited 
knowledge of the impacts on local well-being. Complaints have been raised e.g. on the cumbersome and 
expensive approval procedures. More substantially several NGOs, civil society groups as well as policy-
makers and scientists have questioned whether the CDM has really managed to steer investments to where 
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they are most needed and where they can really make a difference (Bakker et al. 2011).  This relates to the 
unbalances in the sectoral distribution of projects and to the problems of so called low-hanging fruits. In 
terms of created CERs around 75% has come from projects that eliminate powerful greenhouse gases like 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) making this type of projects highly over-represented.  There have also been 
several large hydropower projects in China which probably would have gone forward anyway, with or with-
out the CDM, but which nonetheless were accepted as CDM projects. With regards to hydrofluorocarbon 
(HFC) projects, concerns have been raised that the CDM has created perverse incentives to over-produce 
HFCs so that companies would get paid to stop doing it. 
 
 
Table 5.1 CDM projects in Least Developed Countries. Source: UNEP Risø CDM/JI Pipeline 
Analysis and Database, October 2011 
The CDM’s performance in terms of sustainable development benefits has been also widely debated. 
The expected sustainable development benefits have included employment and health benefits, reduced 
expenditure on energy and improvements in local infrastructure. In their early study of first registered CDM 
projects Sutter and Pareño (2007) observed that while a majority of the purported GHG reductions were 
reliable in scientific terms, only less than 1% of the projects contributed significantly to sustainable devel-
opment. Also more recent studies have similarly concluded that the sustainable development objectives 
have been secondary and often overlooked (e.g. Boyd et al. 2009, Teräväinen 2009, Newell and Patterson 
2010). Quite wide agreement exists that expectations on CDM’s potential to deliver to the poor have not 
CDM projects in Least 
Developed Countries 
(LDC) 
 
    
Countries Number 
of 
projects  
in 
pipeline 
Number 
of 
projects 
registered 
kCERs 
expected 
by the 
end of  
2012 
LDC Total 77 30 13373 
Bangladesh 4 2 1381 
Bhutan 3 2 503 
Cambodia 7 5 1226 
Lao PDR 9 1 1331 
Nepal 6 4 1062 
LDC Asia & 
Pacific 
29 14 5503 
Cape Verde    
Congo DR 4 2 1118 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
   
Ethiopia 1 1 179 
Lesotho 1  79 
Liberia 1 1 187 
Madagascar 3 1 138 
Mali 1 1 94 
Mozambique 1  63 
Rwanda 4 3 135 
Senegal 5 1 786 
Sudan 2  367 
Tanzania 7 1 1771 
Togo 1  5 
Uganda 14 5 2024 
Zambia 2   
LDC Afrika 47 16 6946 
Yemen 1  924 
LDC Middle 
East 
1  924 
Projects rejected by DOEs or EB or 
withdrawn are not included. 
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been met (Newell et al. 2011). The synergies between the two core objectives of CDM have proven to be 
far from self-evident. It has been noted that the considerable economic value of CDM finance leads to the 
maximization of CERs and not to the maximization of sustainability benefits to the host country and host 
communities (Boyd et al. 2009). Projects that would have the most potential in poverty alleviation, like rural 
renewable energy provision have thus far been the rarest ones (Newell et al. 2011). It is simply economically 
more viable to target big polluters such as large cement factories than poor villagers using biomass or fossil 
fuels in relatively small quantities.  In addition, project developers that are interested in pro-poor rural ener-
gy projects have often found out that the high transaction costs and complex methodologies of CDMs 
make it too difficult for these projects to be economically viable.   
The  more profound criticism of the CDM has suggested that the mechanism creates new North-South 
inequalities by using the South as a sink for Northern emissions, obscures the differences between emis-
sions for luxury and emissions for survival and  with all the complex methodologies and new institutional 
infrastructure created to produce flexibilities in emission reductions distracts attention and human capaci-
ties away from the more fundamental changes that are needed in societies to leave fossil fuels in the ground 
(Lohmann 2006; 2008; 2010, Böhm & Dahbi 2009).  
The criticism has  resulted in  different  attempts  to improve the governance of  CDM (Paulsson 2009,  
Newell and Paterson 2010). These include stricter monitoring of the additionality of the projects which is 
the main concern in terms of achieving true emission reductions14.  As one result stricter rules were set in 
place for HFC projects and in future HFC-23 projects will become ineligible e.g. in the EU. In hydropower 
projects the position of third party evaluators has become stricter and after 2008 a majority of projects fail-
ing to progress past the initial validation stage have been hydropower projects. (Newell and Paterson 2010.) 
In a recent commissioned study by the EC additional quality criteria were suggested for hydropower pro-
jects and even banning of credits generated by large hydropower projects was recommended to be consid-
ered (SEI et al. 2011).  
To tackle the problems of unbalances in the sectoral distribution of projects and the inefficiencies of 
the project-by-project approach there are new proposals to expand the range of possible investments from 
individual projects towards sectoral reform and even whole policy reform programmes. Sectoral approaches 
have been seen as  a  way to reduce transaction costs  and enable  more actors  to participate  also from the 
public sector. These scaled-up mechanisms are expected to be more environmentally robust than the cur-
rent CDM, and to give incentives for more holistically planned climate policies and implementation 
measures. They are also expected to reach sectors like transportation that have not been previously ad-
dressed by CDM approaches. 
There have also been attempts to develop international voluntary standards that would create more in-
centives for and more comparability to the sustainable development benefits. The main example so far is 
the CDM Gold Standard that privileges more stringent sustainable development criteria. At the moment 37 
of the registered CDM project fulfil the Gold Standard (UNEP/Risoe 1st April 2012). 
  
                                                   
 
14 Projects  that  would  be  built  regardless  of  the  extra  financial  support  provided  by  the  sale  carbon credits  do  not  
comply with the CDM’s essential additionality requirements. That is if projects would go forward also without finance 
trough CDM they are not additional. Additionality is one of the cornerstones of the mechanism. Each project allowed 
to  register  under  CDM allows  an  industrialized  Annex  I  country  to  emit  an  equal  amount  that  the  CDM project  is  
counted to reduce. If the project is not truly additional there is no offsetting taking place.  
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5.2  CDM projects in the least developed countries 
The flow of carbon finance mirrors the flows of finance in general: private investors are attracted to areas 
where they can make the highest profits with the lowest risks and where the physical and institutional infra-
structure is reliable. Attracting CDM investments in LDCs is difficult because of political and economic 
instability, lack of capacity in administration, low availability of skilled staff and technical equipment and 
lack of data (De Lopez et al. 2009). Also the complexity of the approval process and the high up-front costs 
have been among the challenges for actors in LDCs to create CDM projects15. Possibly even more im-
portantly as LDCs are also the least emitting countries the emission reduction potential in these countries is 
relatively low.  
In October 2011 only 1.1% of projects registered or at validation stage are located in Least Developed 
Countries amounting to 77 projects in total. Cambodia and Uganda have the highest number of registered 
CDM projects. (See Table 5.1) 
There are some improvements made to enable LDCs and smaller projects to better participate in 
CDM. Among the LDCs Cambodia has been very active in these initiatives. Cambodia e.g. made a proposal 
that led to abolishment of registration fees for LDCs and it has also pushed for further improvements like 
assumption of automatic additionality of certain project types and shortening registration procedures for 
projects in LDCs.  
The creation of a programmatic CDM or Program of Activities (PoA) has been an attempt to allow 
smaller and more dispersed projects to access CDM finance and it is thought to be suitable especially for 
LDCs. The PoA has raised expectations that it could enhance chances for projects with quite low emission 
reductions potential but high sustainability benefits, such as small-scale renewable energy projects that fo-
cus on solutions on the household or village level. But even the methodologies of PoA are still often con-
sidered as too high-cost and cumbersome in LDCs. So far China, India and South Africa have the highest 
share of PoA projects that have entered the project pipeline.  
Another relevant initiative that aims to tune CDM for smaller technologies (that have high scale-up po-
tential) and to the needs in LDCs relates to standardized baselines. For example Müller et al.  (2011) have 
tried to demonstrate that standardised baselines could improve access to CDM for currently underrepre-
sented project types such as water purification, efficient charcoal production and rural electrification which 
would have high relevance for LDCs and also potential for pro-poor benefits (see e.g. Müller et al 2011).  
The most important thing that may change the course of the CDM’s regional distribution is that it seems 
also that the “one size fits all” approach in mitigation mechanisms has come to its end (Bakker et al. 2011). 
As already stated above there are several new compliance market mechanisms on the table such as sectoral 
crediting, sectoral trading, and crediting Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) that take 
moves beyond single project based approaches.  
                                                   
 
15 This is not to say that it would not be important to guarantee the additionality and environmental integrity of the 
projects which easily result in complex regulatory arrangements. However, for many LDCs these arrangements require 
capacities and resources that are often in short supply.  
48 
 
Figure 5.1 : EU’s vision for carbon market transition (From EC 2012, presentation ‘The role of in-
ternational credits in the EU ETS after 2012’, 21.2.2012, http://www.ji-cdm-
austria.at/blueline/upload/peterzapfelaustrianjicdmws2012.pdf) 
Many of the Annex I countries expect that this is a way how to enrol the more developed developing 
countries to certain mitigation obligations. For example, the EU wants to see significant mitigation com-
mitments from emerging economies. CDM has been a way for developing countries to address GHG emis-
sions without reduction obligations but now EU wants to see the emerging economies to address GHG 
emissions with reduction obligations (see Figure 5.1). EU has preferred that the mechanisms concerning 
‘large segments of the economy’ would to some extent be seen as part of the host country’s own contribu-
tion to mitigation, and then some of the reduced emissions could be sold as credits to industrialized coun-
tries and offset markets. This is also why it is thought that the new sectoral approaches would be tailored to 
more developed countries whereas the mitigation mechanisms for LDC’s would still be more close to pre-
vious CDM approaches and LDCs are not expected to have mitigation oblications.Especially the program-
matic  approach  of  CDM has  been  seen  as  suitable  for  LDCs.  EU’s  current  position  is  that  credits  from 
CDM projects in non-LDC countries registered after 2012 are not eligible under the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme.. Thus the current EU vision of future carbon markets includes a reformed CDM that increasingly 
shifts its focus to LDCs. This makes it very topical to discuss the experiences so far in the LDCs and as 
Cambodia is one of the leading CDM country among the LDCs the lessons from there are worth exploring. 
5.3  Cambodia: leading the way for LDCs?  
Cambodia had at the time of the fieldwork in May 2011 and still  in October 2011 7 CDM projects in the 
pipeline (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3), making Cambodia a leading CDM country amongst the LDCs. Five 
of the projects have been registered and two are still at validation stage. However, one registered project i.e. 
TTY Cambodia biogas project, has faced such financial problems that it has been practically terminated.  
Also other projects have faced challenges that have led to delays. Only one project, the Kampot Cement 
Waste Heat Power Generation Project has successfully already issued CERs (on May 2nd 2011). Angkor rice 
husk cogeneration project (ABC) has been the most delayed project but it is finally quite near to issuance 
stage. W2E Siang Phong biogas project is the most recent project. It is also the first Gold Standard project 
in Cambodia. It has advanced rapidly and it might be able to sell CERs soon, but as the carbon prices have 
been low it might still wait before doing that.  The biogas project of Samrong Thom Animal Husbandry has 
successfully made its biogas plant operational but the project has faced some drawbacks in the monitoring 
process and thus it may not be selling CERs in near future.  
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Table 5.2 Registered CDM projects in Cambodia. Source: UNEP/Ris October 2011, Climate 
Change office of Cambodia and IGES May 2011 
  
The two projects at validation stage (see Table 5.2) include a Korean biogas project attached to a MH 
Bioenergy cassava ethanol plant in Kandal province and a Chinese large-scale hydropower project Kamchay 
in Kampot province. Especially the latter one has been controversial and its chances to get registered may 
not be so obvious. In addition to the projects in the pipeline, one project which was fostered by World 
Bank has been rejected by the Executive Board (see Table 5.2). 
  
Title Type Annual 
emission 
reduction 
ktCO2e/yr 
Credit 
start to 
2012 
ktCO2e 
Issuance 
delay 
(months) 
Project 
Participants 
Credit buyer 
Angkor Bio Cogen Rice 
Husk Power Project  
(ABC) (attached to a 
rice mill) 
 
Biomass 
energy 
52 293 54,2 Angkor Bio Co 
LTD.  
 
Mitshubishi UFJ 
Securities 
Japan 
(Mitsubishi UFJ 
Securities) 
TTY Cambodia Biogas 
Project 
(attached to a cassava 
starch factory)  
 
Methane 
avoidance 
waste 
water 
 
50 217 37,5 TTY Agricultural 
Plant 
Development 
IMEX Co Ltd 
Carbon Bridge Pte 
Ltd 
n.a. 
Methane fired power 
generation plant in 
Samrong Thom Animal 
Husbandry, 
Cambodia+C15 , 
(attached to a pig farm) 
 
Methane 
avoidance, 
manure  
5,6 23 34,5 Samrong Thom 
Animal 
Husbandry 
Japan 
(Mitsubishi UFJ 
Securities) 
Kampot Cement Waste 
Heat Power Generation 
Project (KCC-WHG)  
(attached to a cement 
factory) 
 
EE own 
generation, 
cement 
heat  
17 61 23,3 Kampot Cement 
Company Co. Ltd. 
Denmark 
(Nordjysk 
Elhandel) 
W2E Siang Phong 
Biogas Project 
Cambodia (attached to 
a cassava starch 
factory) 
 
Methane 
avoidance, 
waste 
water 
 
27 42 4,1 W2E Siang Phong 
Ltd 
n.a. 
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Table 5.3: CDM projects at validation stage and rejected projects. Source: UNEP/Riso October 
2011, Climate Change office of Cambodia and IGES May 2011 
 
The national climate change department in the Ministry of Environment, which is the DNA of Cam-
bodia has been active in creating an enabling environment for the CDM projects. It has 15 staff members, 
of which around half dedicate their time to mitigation issues, but some of them are also involved in moni-
toring adaptation processes.   
Half of the CDM projects have been developed in relatively close cooperation or frequent communica-
tion with the DNA. These include projects such as the Samrong Thom pig farm’s biogas project and also 
the TTY and Siang Phong biogas projects. The Angkor rice mill cogeneration project has been developed 
quite independently but still the staff in the climate change department noted that they have been quite co-
operative and joined, for example, the workshops on the CDM organized by the DNA. In turn the big in-
ternational companies have developed their projects very independently. K-Cement is a joint venture of 
Thai Siam Cement. MH bioethanol project is developed by a Korean company and Kamchay hydropower 
project is under Chinese Sinohydro company. These companies seem to be well aware of how the CDM 
functions and their communication with national authorities has been very minimal. 
A common nominator for the projects in the pipeline is that they are carried out by industries that in 
their respective sectors are the biggest ones on the Cambodian scale. At the same time all except the Kam-
chay hydropower project are according to the CDM methodology considered as small-scale projects. From 
the beginning the DNA, however, has tried to promote also smaller scale projects. The initial list of poten-
tial CDM projects developed by the national Climate Change office actually included also projects that 
build on small technologies like a national biodigester program that supports the extension of household 
biodigesters. These projects, however, have turned to the voluntary markets because the methodology re-
quirements in the VCM are more flexible to small technologies and the transaction costs lower. In addition 
before 2008 the DNA has tried to assist Cambodian swine farmers to develop CDM projects and in acquir-
ing methane capture and combustion technologies, but most of the farms with their 5000-10 000 tonnes 
CO2 equivalents per year were below the limit of simplified small-scale technologies.  Also because the re-
quired technology was not available in domestic market only the largest producer, and not the community- 
and family-based entrepreneurs, could contract the services and purchase the required technologies. The 
situation has been the same with other producers. The only cassava factories that have had the chance to 
develop a CDM project have been the biggest players with best international contacts in their field and yet 
e.g. the TTY project failed. 
In recent years the programmatic approach, PoA, has been promoted by some actors. For example, the 
German development bank KfW and the Japanese research institute IGES have held workshops together 
with the Cambodian climate change office on PoA. UNEP, following the request of the Cambodian Cli-
Title Type Annual 
emission 
reduction 
ktCO2e/yr 
Credit start to 
2012 ktCO2e 
Project Participants 
Kamchay Hydroelectric BOT 
Project  
 
Hydro: new 
dam 
370 432 Synohydro Corporation Ltd 
and The Royal Government 
of Cambodia, Electricite du 
Cambodge 
Biogas Pr oject at MH Bio-
Ethanol Disti llery 
Methane 
avoidance, 
waste water 
53 158 MH Bio-Energy Co. Ltd. 
 Cambodia- r ural 
Electrification and 
TRansmission Project – 220 
kV Interconnection between 
Cambodia and Vietnam 
Energy 
Efficiency: 
Supply side 
54  - In Cambodia: Electricite du 
Cambodge (EDC), 
 
In Vietnam: Electricite of 
Vietnam (EVN) Power 
Company 2 (PC2) 
 
IBRD (World Bank) as 
trustee of Carbon funds  
 
2 projects 
at 
validation
1 project 
rejected
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mate Change office, has conducted a feasibility study of PoA (UNEP 2010). Several potential projects were 
identified, like a household biodigester program and a solar lantern programme but so far no PoA projects 
are under development. To a great extent this is because even in the PoA the monitoring methodologies for 
projects that use small and dispersed technologies are considered as too complex and costly.  
The delays that the current pipeline projects have faced have related to fluctuating markets in such 
products as cassava and pigs. For example the situation for the swine farmers has been very unstable e.g. 
because cheaper meat imports from Vietnam and also the economic crisis in 2008 affected the swine pro-
ducers. After 2008 many smaller farms had to stop their operation and also the biggest producer like the 
Samrong Thom farm reduced the number of pigs from 10.000 to 5000. Similarly the markets for cassava 
have been unpredictable. One of the main reasons why the TTY project had to be halted was that the busi-
ness of cassava went down and the biogas component was not fed with enough waste.  
Another key factor is the non-existence of local markets for required technical equipment and lack of 
skilled technical workers. The installation of the ABC’s rice husk co-generation plant was almost dependent 
on Thai engineers. One cause for ABC’s delay were the border conflicts between Cambodia and Thailand, 
as this has affected the availability of technical staff and the supply of technical equipment from Thailand.  
5.4  Sustainable development benefits falling short of promises but still 
“better than the baseline” 
The UNFCCC has outlined in the Marrakesh Accords of 2001 that host countries themselves set the defini-
tion of sustainable development and are responsible for its governance. This acknowledges that there is no 
“one size fits all” policy, and thus sustainable development criteria must be set in accordance with national 
development goals. This differs greatly from the governance of GHG emissions reductions which are strict-
ly monitored at the international level. There are clear differences between the countries in their set devel-
opment goals regarding CDM. For example, Brazil has been observed to pursue employment and to some 
extent income distribution objectives, China aims to advance its energy policy whereas Peru is focusing on 
more general local community needs (Boyd et al. 2009, Cole 2007). There are also different regulatory ap-
proaches. India, South-Africa and Brazil have developed very generic criteria and apply a desk-based check-
list approach whereas in some countries DNA actually visits project sites and asks local communities about 
their expectations, needs and concerns (Boyd et al. 2009).  
In Cambodia, the DNA has developed evaluation criteria for sustainable development benefits that has 
4 pillars or categories: environmental benefits, social benefits, economic benefits and technology transfer. 
Under each category there are several indicators that are all based on government development priorities 
(e.g. National Poverty Reduction Strategy or the current Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan), 
environmental legislation (e.g. Sub-decrees on Air Pollution or Solid Waste Management), and other legisla-
tion such as labour or investment law. Each indicator under the four categories is evaluated according to 
three ratings: positive, neutral or negative. The evaluation scheme is built in such a way that negative results 
are not allowed in any of the indicators. Thus a negative outcome in one indicator or category cannot be off-
set by a positive outcome in another indicator or category. Their regulatory approach is close to the desk-
based checklist approach, but with some projects the DNA has managed to build more close communication. 
The Cambodian DNA is quite proud of the developed criteria and assessment framework and it is con-
sidered as an advanced one in the region. There have been some visits by Lao officials to learn from the 
Cambodian experience of setting and using the assessment framework. But as one interviewed person from 
the climate change office stated: “This is our principle, but we must be flexible. In practice you don’t easily get an ideal 
project.” Overall the CDM projects now in the pipeline have performed quite modestly in terms of sustaina-
ble development benefits, some projects have fallen short of their promises and some projects have also 
had some negative impacts. The table below summarises the main observations of the registered projects. 
The  projects  that  are  still  at  validation  stage  have  so  far  had  more  problematic  sustainable  development  
outcomes. 
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Table 5.4 Summary of observations regarding the sustainable development benefits and impacts of 
the registered and still operating CDM projects in terms of the main four elements of Cambodia’s 
sustainable development criteria 
 ABC Samrong Thom Kampot Cement heat 
project 
W2E Siang 
Phong biogas 
project 
Local environ-
mental benefits 
No concrete local 
environmental bene-
fits 
Improved water 
quality and preven-
tion of odours. 
No concrete local envi-
ronmental benefits. 
Complaints from local 
communities that the 
host factory of the CDM 
component has caused 
local environmental 
problems, such as wors-
ening of ground water. 
Improved water 
quality and pre-
vention of odours 
Social benefits Promises in PDD to 
electrify near-by vil-
lages have not materi-
alised 
Promises in PDD to 
electrify near-by 
villages have not 
materialised. 
 
Benefits local com-
munity by providing 
a shop of cheap 
battery caching. 
No promised social bene-
fits in PDD 
No promised so-
cial benefits in 
PDD 
Economic 
benefits 
Benefits one of the 
largest rice mills in 
Cambodia enhancing 
its economic perfor-
mance  
Benefits the biggest 
pig producer in 
Cambodia enhanc-
ing its economic 
performance 
Benefits the biggest ce-
ment factory in Cambo-
dia enhancing its eco-
nomic performance 
Benefits the cassa-
va factory that is 
among the biggest 
cassava producers 
in the country 
in terms of 
employment 
Staff, especially the 
technical staff are 
employed from Thai-
land. Angkor rice mill 
however is a signifi-
cant local employer.  
The biogas project 
has generated a few 
new jobs.  
 
Local community 
members com-
plained that the 
farm in general has 
hired staff only from 
other provinces. 
There were also 
worries about the 
workers’ rights: the 
workers lived inside 
the farm and 
seemed to have re-
stricted possibilities 
to go out from 
there. 
The CDM component 
has possibly been devel-
oped by foreign staff. 
The factory as such is a 
big employer in Cambo-
dia. The local communi-
ties complained that lo-
cals have been hired 
mostly in the construc-
tion work but the perma-
nent staff is principally 
from cities and else-
where.  
The staff required 
for the CDM 
component is 
small but the fac-
tory as such is a 
significant em-
ployer. 
Technology 
transfer 
First time the tech-
nology was applied in 
Cambodia 
 
The chosen technolo-
gy is not easily repli-
cated in other Cam-
bodian rice mills.  
 
Promised technical 
trainings for local 
workers have not 
materialized. 
First time the tech-
nology was applied 
in Cambodia but 
currently does not 
seem to be replica-
ble to other produc-
ers in the country 
because they operate 
in smaller scale. 
First time the technology 
was applied in Cambodia, 
but currently K-Cement 
is the only large cement 
factory in the country. 
First time the 
technology was 
applied in the 
treatment of 
wastewater of Cas-
sava and other 
similar factories. 
Possibilities for 
replication exist. 
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The projects that have offered the most clear direct benefits are the biogas projects. Both the Siang 
Phong cassava factory and the Samrong Thom pig farm used to have an open waste pond, which produced 
a lot of smell and contaminated the local environment. By covering the ponds and by better treatment of 
the waste water these problems have been solved. The other CDM projects have not presented such direct 
local environmental benefits.   
In regard to social benefits there have been some unfulfilled promises at least partly due to the delays 
and changing circumstances. For example, the Angkor biomass project signalled in its PDD that it would 
probably have the capacity to produce more electricity than what the Angkor rice mill requires, enabling it 
to contribute to the electrification of the neighbourhood area by selling them reasonably priced electricity. 
However, as the project is nearing completion, the villages nearby have already been connected to the grid. 
The company does not want to go into difficult procedures to get the license from the Electricity Authority 
of Cambodia (EAC) to try and sell electricity with a cheaper price. Also Samrong Thom biogas project 
promised to electrify the near-by villages. However, after the project started the production capacity of the 
farm went down almost 50% due to fluctuations in the markets. Thus it is not producing significant 
amounts of extra energy. With the extra-electricity produced the farm has set up a new business: ice-
making. Also it has a small shop for battery charging. The latter was the only positive contribution that the 
interviewed host community members commented to have received from the project as the battery charg-
ing shop charges only half of the price compared to the normal shops.  
The technology transfer of CDM projects has been significant in the sense that all of the projects have 
been pioneer implementers of the respective technologies and at the same time they are significant and in 
the case of K-Cement the only actors in their respective fields. However, the chances for replications or 
scale-up are limited. The projects are large-scale in the Cambodian context (although according to CDM 
criteria all except Kamchay dam are small-scale projects), whereas most actors for example in the agricul-
tural sector that could benefit from methane capture or biomass energy are small or medium scale enter-
prises  who  are  too  small  to  develop  a  project  alone  and  for  whom it  is  difficult  to  acquire  the  required  
equipment and services. It is actually quite ironic that methane capture from wastewater ponds that is con-
sidered in Cambodia’s neighbouring countries i.e. in Thailand and Vietnam as simple technology is current-
ly “a guarded secret and a competitive advantage for those businesses with access to it” (Lopez 2011). Also 
the co-generation technology that ABC opted is such that for the smaller-scale mills it is not viable to con-
sider it.  Also the transfer of knowhow has been quite limited. The skilled labour used in the projects has 
mainly been from Thailand or other countries. Some projects like the Angkor cogeneration project did 
promise in its PDD technical trainings for local workers, but these never materialised.  
The economic benefits seem to be significant for the host companies of the CDM component or project 
and the host companies as such are significant employers although the CDM projects in themselves have 
not offered many new job opportunities. At the same time the companies often hired people from other 
provinces so the host communities of the projects have not received many new employment opportunities.   
Some projects had actually also detrimental impacts. The two projects still at the validation stage seem 
to be the most problematic ones. There have been losses accounted in local fisheries adjacent to the MH 
bioethanol plant. Whether the losses are due to chemical substances discharged in waste water by the plant 
or changes in water temperature is still under investigation.  In the case of the K-cement factory the CDM 
component as such has probably not caused negative impacts. The operation of the factory itself, however, 
was received by interviewed villagers in the vicinity of the factory with several concerns and complaints. 
The largest issue was the worsening of the quality of ground water.  
The most controversial case is the Kamchay dam run by the Chinese Sinohydro company. The pro-
posed dam will flood 2000 ha of Bokor National Park, an area rich in biodiversity. As such, it will not cause 
the usual dam-related problems of displacement and re-settlement. However, the project has been criticized 
from a wide range of actors, and it has incited already three public demonstrations. NGOs have complained 
about the lack of public consultation and information disclosure, with severely restricted access to the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment and the Environmental Management Plan of the project. The protests have 
circled around issues concerning the local communities. At least four communities in the vicinity of the 
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dam are almost entirely dependent on non-timber forest produce from the area. Access to the parts of the 
forest that are not to be flooded is restricted by the project and villagers have not been compensated for the 
livelihood losses caused by this. This has caused several demonstrations. Another type of protests was 
evoked by the effects of the project’s rock blasting, which showered local farms with chunks of rocks. The 
company agreed to pay compensations only after the villages blocked the road and did not let the company 
enter the blasting site (Phnom Penh Post 11 March 2009). The third protest related to supposed local em-
ployment benefits from the project. Local workers complained about low wages and delays in wage pay-
ments. While most of the workers were brought by the company from China, the most low-skilled workers 
were first locals. After the protests, the company hired workers from other Cambodian provinces.  
The project, however, is supported by the Cambodian government officials who stress that the benefits 
overshadow these negative incidents. As a country dependent on energy imports, the project has the im-
portant benefit of securing a national electricity supply. Whether the project should qualify for CDM based 
on this, however, is questionable. It is possible that the project will face difficulties convincing the CDM 
EB of its additionality16 as the project was initiated well before its CDM application. Finally, critical voices 
have questioned the 44 year built-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement, claiming it will be more profitable for 
the Chinese company than Cambodia. One interviewed expert from the international donor community of 
Cambodia commented that if Kamchay gets approved, it would “serve as an example of CDM as the ‘Chi-
na Development Mechanism’ even outside of China”.  
As many of the project participants in Cambodia are foreign companies also the revenues from selling 
CERs do not really benefit the actors in the host country. In some cases the issue of CER profits has creat-
ed tensions.  One potential  CDM project  in  Cambodia  has  been a  methane recovery  project  from a solid  
waste dump site in Stung Menchay. Several private sector companies from e.g. Korea, Germany and Italy 
have discussed developing a project with the municipality but without any successful agreements. One of 
the issues has been that the municipality wants to negotiate and have a share of the project or of the CER 
revenues. So far Cambodia has not considered taxation options to be the way forward. As one interviewed 
official stated: 
“We don’t know yet whether we could consider carbon as imported goods. If we impose tax on 
carbon or claim a share in CER it might be a kind of discouragement for all private companies to 
invest in CDM. So I think we are at a phase where we just have to encourage and try and pro-
mote the CDM. We are not like China where government gets shares from some CDM projects 
and still investors don’t mind because the business is so lucrative.” 
Generally, despite shortcomings of the CDM projects and their co-benefits, the interviewed staff 
members of the Climate Change department considered the current projects as beneficial and important for 
the country. A comment from one interviewed official summarises well the perception of the DNA staff:  
“Even if they [the CDM projects] do not deliver in all possible ways and some contributions fall short, we still encourage the 
CDM projects to go forward because at least they are better than the baseline would be”.  
It was viewed as positive that the sustainable development criteria is determined nationally and, at least 
in theory, the DNA can act as a gatekeeper and decide which projects can move forward to the CDM pipe-
line. The main source of frustration in the climate change department was that there is no real monitoring 
system in place on the compliance of environmental and social benefits. The staff of the department ex-
pressed  that  all  in  all  they  were  not  in  an  easy  position  to  deal  especially  with  the  “big  business  actors”.  
Without a clear mandate the possibilities to check whether the promises for economic, environmental and 
social benefits or technology transfer given in PDDs are met and to influence the projects to actually keep 
their promises are limited. As one interviewed official said “Well our communication with the project normally ends 
                                                   
 
16 About additionality see page 44. 
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when we issue them the approval letter to go forward. So after that, yes maybe we can request a visit, but that’s it. This is pri-
vate sector you know.” 
Thus part of the governance challenges regarding the sustainability benefits of CDM projects can be 
traced back to the fundamental governance architecture of the CDM. Whereas the compliance monitoring 
is relatively strict with emission reductions, there is no standardized monitoring for sustainable develop-
ment benefits which is the other part of CDM’s twin objective. The loophole is that the actual issuance of 
CERs  is  decided  purely  on  the  basis  of  emission  reductions  monitoring  and  verification  and  there  is  no  
monitoring or verification of the sustainable development benefits that the project state in their PDDs (cf. 
Olsen and Fenhann 2008).  
If the government officials find it challenging to influence the project design and foster approaches that 
would bring more benefits for the host communities, other stakeholders have even more difficulties to fol-
low the project activities. The highly technical and closed nature of CDM procedures does not make it easy 
for civil society actors to meaningfully participate in them. Studies elsewhere have shown that stakeholder 
consultations related to CDMs are also often conducted in a selective manner, so that critical views are un-
der-represented (Cole 2007, Corbera and Brown 2008). This seems to be the case in Cambodia as well. The 
interviewed local NGO representatives complained especially about the exclusive stakeholder consultations 
by the most controversial of the projects, the Kamchay hydropower plant.  
5.5  Development finance, CDM and Cambodia 
ODA has been seen as one tool to foster the CDM projects in LDCs that have limited resources for the 
DNA and lack of data, skilled staff etc. Development finance could be used to close off capacity and insti-
tutional gaps related to CDM procedures in LDCs. It could also be a way to strengthen sustainable devel-
opment benefits. An interesting observation from the Cambodian case is that it seems that projects with a 
closer relation to the climate change department were also the ones that had somewhat more concrete ben-
efits to their host communities. In comparison, the big international companies that developed their pro-
jects independently had more limited and in some cases even detrimental impacts. This suggests that an 
important element for projects that benefit the host country and communities is a well-functioning gov-
ernmental agency that has been able to set up meaningful criteria and regulatory approach for sustainable 
development benefits. One part of CDM related ODA has been precisely the strengthening of capacity and 
resources of local administration. 
In Cambodia the DNA has received support from three different projects so far. The EU EcoPro Asia 
project supported mainly in analysis on national greenhouse gas emissions and emission reductions poten-
tial. The UNEP/Risø centre has given support to institutional strengthening and capacity building. The 
most long term supporter has been Japanese IGES which is funded by Japanese Ministry of Environment. 
UNEP/Risø and IGES have both contributed to the setting up of the Cambodian DNA. They have helped 
in disseminating CDM awareness to the private sector and encouraged domestic actors to develop CDM 
projects. Importantly they have also assisted in developing assessment guidelines including the sustainable 
development criteria. In addition IGES has assisted Cambodia to take part in international climate change 
negotiations and supported Cambodia to submit proposals to the CDM Executive Board on how the CDM 
could be made friendlier to LDCs. Cambodia has made a proposal on the abolishment of registration fees 
for projects hosted in LDCs which was accepted and proposed shortening the period of registration proce-
dures for small-scale CDM project activities.  
Dilemmas of CDM related ODA 
CDM related ODA can also be problematic. Researchers such as Michaelowa and Michaeolwa (2007) have 
pointed out that donors often act out of self-interests that do not necessarily match with the priorities of 
the recipient. The fostering of co-benefits or more balanced and pro-poor distribution of projects is not 
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always  the main motivations for  CDM related ODA. Also the export  interests  of  clean technologies  and 
better out-sourcing possibilities for mitigation activities have been motivating factors (e.g. Matthews and 
Paterson 2005, Gupta 2009). This is why the danger in ODA use for CDM is that aid gets diverted to re-
gions, sectors and projects with the largest and easiest mitigation potential from the sectors where the most 
depressing needs for development and poverty alleviation may lie (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2007, 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007). There have been attempts to regulate the use of ODA and to rule out 
the possibility to use ODA to pursue CERs for the donor (see OECD/DAC 2004) but the regulatory 
framework  is  still  partly  unclear.  Especially  Japan  has  often  managed  to  buy  credits  from projects  it  has  
funded with ODA. Also Denmark has used its development projects in its own CDM purchasing program. 
In Cambodia  there  have not  been cases  with this  kind of  problematic  ODA use even though some self-
interest from the donor’s side has been observed.  
In Cambodia the assistance from IGES for example was very much appreciated in the climate change 
office.  IGES has  been a  key supporter  for  assisting Cambodia  in  influencing the CDM procedures  to be 
simplified and made easier for LDCs. At the same time the Japanese are buyers for the CERs in at least two 
CDM projects,  i.e.  almost  in  half  of  the  registered  projects  and  they  are  waiting  for  the  first  issuance  of  
credits. One Cambodian official, however, viewed the situation very pragmatically: “We value very much their 
support. At the same time we understand they want to provide technical assistance. Because at the same time they are interested 
in purchasing CERs as well.” In the case of IGES it has to be also noted that the support has not been ODA 
money but money from the Japan’s Ministry of Environment.   
One of the expressed concerns in capacity building related support was the so called boomerang aid ef-
fect. This was described by one official as follows  
“I think that should be ok…using ODA to implement capacity development projects but my 
view is that any capacity building projects should be designed as part of a bigger project, you 
know, developing capacity to do something else. Because capacity building project on its own will 
not have much impact on performance of institution or country. But overall I think it’s ok to use 
ODA money to do capacity building activity as long as not big channel of money will go to back 
to the donor country like kind of boomerang. You know a big per cent of the fund go to consult-
ants  for  example,  especially  if  the  bidding  process  is  not  stringent  then  the  money  just  pass  to  
your account and go back to your own country. This is called boomerang aid.” 
According to the interviewed officials the most problematic experience thus far related to CDM related 
support have been with development banks that have tried to turn already existing projects in their pipeline 
into CDM projects. Especially the ADB funded program PREGA (Promotion Of Renewable Energy, En-
ergy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Abatement) that terminated in 2007 apparently in some disagreement 
was perceived to have dubious CDM interests. One interviewed official described this experience stating 
“They wanted to include all kind of projects that already existed in their portfolio, even coal plants as CDM. We said no, that 
this is in your portfolio already and that this is just a normal investment project. It’s not really CDM. But they wanted to 
make everything CDM. We disagreed with that.” World Bank in turn tried to take forward a transmission line 
project between Vietnam and Cambodia. At the same time the plans for regional grid have been part of 
ADB-led Greater-Mekong Subregion (GMS) Plan since the 1990’s. GMS had been supported also by the 
World Bank. To a significant extent it is based on the establishment of a regional electricity-grid based mar-
ket (Yu 2003). The project was rejected by the CDM Executive Board, possibly because of difficulties to 
prove the additionality. The World Bank was viewed critically also in terms of the sustainable development 
aspects of the CDM. “In World Bank they are not interested in small projects. They want big projects with big investments 
with multimillion US dollars. So to be honest I think that they are really, not very interested in a kind sustainable develop-
ment aspect of GHG mitigation projects.” 
At the same time there has been ODA funded initiatives in Cambodia that try to help starting pro-poor 
projects and get them “packaged” for the carbon markets, both for voluntary as well as compliance market. 
The main example thus far  has  been a  network called NEXUS that  is  based in  Cambodia  (although it  is  
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registered in Singapore). They see their role as setting better standards for carbon markets including the 
CDM. An interviewed staff from NEXUS stated: “We want to say, hey, this is good kind of energy access program, 
it’s sustainable, it’s clean energy, it’s reliable technology, it’s appropriate. And these are now available in carbon markets. It’s 
kind of showcasing and putting forward initiatives and ideas and maybe some of the CDM projects can learn from it as well.“ 
The work of NEXUS is discussed in more details in Chapter 6. 
Main concerns: diversion of aid and ownership 
In general the main concern among the Cambodian officials of the Climate Change Department seemed to 
be that donors have s strong preference on mitigation over adaptation. So far there had not been cases of 
clear diversion of aid but worries were expressed that this could be a problem in the future.  According to 
an interviewed Cambodian official “Annex 1 countries should provide funding to mitigation that is new and 
additional. They should not be allowed to recycle the same money as ODA and climate change assistance. 
This is highly challenging as there is yet no firm mechanisms to verify what is ODA and what is not. Espe-
cially as long as 0.7% of GDP is not achieved”. The preference for mitigation funding is well manifested 
for example in Japan’s new climate initiative that allocates 80 per cent of the initiative’s funds to mitigation. 
Another official commented the Japan’s interests for funding mitigation: “Most of that money for mitiga-
tion will be used to support promotion of Japanese technology... But this is very difficult for us as a recipi-
ent country to have a firm position on this, because you need to balance your views very well with the do-
nor.”  
Still technology transfer was viewed as important. Some concerns were, however, expressed that recipi-
ent countries could be used as dumping sites for out-dated technology or as a testing ground for new and 
unproved technology. The challenges in technology transfer were seen to lie at the heart of the ownership 
question in very concrete terms, that of property rights. One interviewed official stated that it is not that 
difficult to own the idea of the need for clean technology. Instead, the main question is who will benefit 
from the CDM type mitigation projects if they are designed by the donor country’s technology promotion 
interest. The market mechanism in the CDM as such does not seem to be the best way to deliver technolo-
gy transfer but then again it was seen probably as the only realistic way to go forward:  
“We need this technology, but it is expensive. How can we afford it? If our potential for CERs 
and profits are low, who wants to invest in here? The discussions on global fund on technology 
transfer are fine of course but it will be difficult. The intellectual property rights will be the prob-
lem. No one is willing to give the technology just like that right away. And if we want to create a 
global fund to support technology transfer, fine, but who will give the money to this fund?” 
5.6  Conclusions and future steps 
The future for the CDM looked highly uncertain before the Durban Summit. Even though the number of 
projects in the CDM pipeline increased rapidly in 2011 this was mainly because many latecomers wanted to 
ensure their registration prior to the end of the Kyoto period in 2012.  There have also been gloomy signs 
of record low carbon prices. The Durban agreement did support and now facilitates the continuation for 
the CDM even though the precise details of how the Kyoto Protocol will be extended are still to be final-
ised. There are also on-going efforts to strengthen confidence around the future of the compliance markets. 
For example the World Bank has tried to signal confidence by extending the Prototype Carbon Fund until 
2023.  
What seems to be happening is that the CDM will continue to be reformed and the focus will shift in-
creasingly to the LDCs. EU’s current position is that credits from CDM projects in non-LDC countries 
registered after 2012 are not eligible under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Effort Sharing Deci-
sion. Also the World Bank considers setting up a new post-2012 carbon fund for mitigation activities that 
focus on low-income countries and LDCs. An important question thus is how to make the CDM suitable 
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for countries with relatively low emission reduction potential and high sustainable development and poverty 
reduction needs. In addition if CDM entrepreneurs turn their eyes more towards the least developed coun-
tries the importance of strengthening the ownership of the CDM in LDCs comes to the fore as well as the 
importance to strengthen the capacity and resources of LDCs to have more influence over CDM invest-
ments. 
Development finance has been seen as one way to foster more balanced regional distribution of CDM 
projects, to strengthen the required capacities in LDCs and to improve the performance of the CDM in 
terms of sustainable development benefits. With development assistance many DNAs for example have 
been established, supported and trained. So far Cambodia has been one of the leading countries among 
LDCs in terms of CDM projects. Active national authorities have been an important ingredient of this suc-
cess. Still  the sustainable development benefits of Cambodia’s CDM projects have been very modest and 
some of the promised benefits outlined in the PDDs have not been met. CDM developers are often not 
too eager to work closely with the governmental planning agencies because their interest is to find the least-
effort means to earn money (Whitington 2011). In the case of Cambodia the large international companies 
had the most limited contributions to local social and environmental benefits.  
An area for ODA-supported capacity building lies in the environmental and social regulation of CDM 
projects. Governments that have difficulties in attracting investments are often not likely to lay down 
strong conditions for investment in general or for CDM investments in particular. In addition most of the 
local DNAs, especially in LDCs like Cambodia, have no concrete tools or resources to continue communi-
cation with or monitoring of the projects after they have received an approval letter from the DNA. A lack 
of resources can also easily result in difficulty to screen and follow up on the applications. Ideally the DNA 
should have enough resources to actually visit project sites and consult local communities about their de-
velopment needs and concerns. This approach could enable more comprehensive ownership of the CDM 
projects also by the local communities (Cole 2007, Boyd et al. 2009). Development finance e.g. in terms of 
capacity  building and support  for  DNAs could be used to enable  this.  In addition it  could be considered 
whether the sustainable development benefits that have been promised in the PDDs could be somehow 
monitored and verified before the issuance of CERs. To ensure wider ownership the capacity building pro-
jects could also consider targeting civil society and NGO participation in addition to supporting the capaci-
ties of government and business actors.  
For the use of CDM-related ODA, certain principles deserve to be highlighted. A guiding principle for 
donors and development assistance should be placing the priorities of the recipient country and its poorest 
communities first. Technology exportation interests or out-sourcing of emission reductions should not be 
the driving interests of mitigation-oriented aid. What is still missing is a strict policy framework that would 
really limit these potentially counter-productive self-interests of donors. 
When discussing the prospects of the CDM in LDCs it is important to consider also the very structure 
and logic of the mechanism itself. The LDCs simply have a limited supply of large-scale emission reduction 
projects,  as  they are  not  big  emitters  in  the first  place.  The same applies  with the question of  how CDM 
could better deliver to the poor. Therefore, it may be important to admit that there have been overly opti-
mistic expectations of the CDM’s potential to produce multiple benefits and especially benefits for the 
poor. There should be more consideration of other types of finance and mechanisms for the countries with 
relatively low emission reductions and high development needs. In terms of aid used for activities related to 
CDM (e.g. capacity building) this could mean that aid would often be better spent if it was directly chan-
nelled to projects that aim to enhance rural energy provision with sustainable renewable energy than for 
projects that enhance the development of CDM projects, which in LDCs like Cambodia often benefit the 
largest industrial actors of the country. This idea is similar to Bruggink (2012) who has stated that there is a 
fundamental difference between “solving problems related to rising affluence (energy infrastructure and 
mitigation) and problems related to persistent poverty (energy access and adaptation)” and following from 
this suggested that ODA funding should focus on the latter one where as new additional climate change 
funding could target the former ones.  
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6. VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET: UNTAPPED 
POTENTIAL OR RISKY BUSINESS FOR  
PROJECT DEVELOPERS?  
Hanna Kaisti  
6.1 Introduction 
Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) refers to carbon markets outside the compliance markets. VCM has de-
veloped separately from the Kyoto process, and independently from governments’ emission reduction tar-
gets and policies. VCM was originally initiated by companies and individuals in countries where govern-
ments were against joining the Kyoto Protocol, including the United States. The concept of a voluntary 
carbon market rose from frustration with the lack of state action, or in the situation where governmental 
policies were perceived to be slow, inadequate, or non-existent (Bumpus & Liverman 2008, 132).  
There are two types of Voluntary Carbon Markets: legally binding and non-binding systems. In the le-
gally binding Voluntary Carbon Market members join voluntarily, receive certain amounts of allowances 
and agree to legally binding emission reduction targets. An example of a binding cap-and-trade system is the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which operated in North America from 2003 to 2010.17 The focus of 
this chapter, however, is the Over-the-Counter (OTC) voluntary market which is not driven by any emis-
sion caps and is not legally binding. Outside of the Chicago Climate Exchange, there is a wide range of vol-
untary transactions that make up a voluntary market. Since this market is not part of a cap-and-trade sys-
tem, where emission allowances can be traded, almost all carbon offsets purchased in this voluntary market 
originate from project-based transactions. (Hamilton, Sjardin, Peters-Stanley and Marcello 2010, 7–8). 
Like other carbon finance mechanisms, also the VCM has relatively short history. The first VCM pro-
ject was implemented in 1989 in Guatemala. At the beginning VCM was considered to be the Wild West of 
carbon trading because it lacked regulation. Voluntary markets attracted controversy as all sorts of rogue 
traders started to enter carbon markets, trying to make easy profit. As a result, many dubious claims about 
offsetting projects and their emissions reductions and contribution to sustainable development were made. 
In response to these carbon cowboys (see Box 5.1) a range of different standards, or certification schemes, 
have been developed to introduce regulation and quality control. The Gold Standard and the Voluntary 
Carbon Standard are the two main certification schemes in the VCM, but numerous new third-party stand-
ards and registries have been introduced over the last couple of years and the competition among carbon 
offset standards has increased dramatically since large financial institutions, businesses and industries have 
gotten involved in the carbon trade. (Kollmuss et al. 2008, 14)  The market can thus still be seen as young, 
unstable and very much emerging.  
                                                   
 
17 In 2010 the CCX ended emissions trading when IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) acquired the Chicago Climate Ex-
change parent company Climate Exchange Plc, along with the European Climate Exchange. ICE now administers the 
CCX registry and offset protocols under the CCX Offsets Registry Program. The operation ended in 2010 partly be-
cause the U.S. did not enact carbon cap-and-trade legislation. There were also reductions in the carbon trading activity. 
(Peters-Stanley et al. 2011) 
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Emission reductions in voluntary markets are called Verified (or Voluntary, depending on the source) 
Emissions Reductions (VERs), or simply carbon offsets or carbon credits.18 Each carbon offset is usually taken 
to be equivalent to a ton of carbon dioxide. Carbon offsets occur when one actor (individual, company, 
NGO or state) invests in a project which results in a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that would 
have not occurred in the absence of the project. (Bumpus and Liverman 2008, 135; Böhm and Dabhi 2009, 
11)  Voluntary Carbon Markets operate on project-based reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (see Fig-
ure 6.1 below). Projects generate emission reductions by reducing, capturing or storing GHG emissions. At 
the very general level the offset projects can broadly be split into three categories: renewable, energy effi-
ciency and sequestration. (Strickland, Bumpus and Lovell 2007; Peskett et al. 2007) More specifically, offset 
projects could for example involve installing renewable energy technologies (e.g. biogas), implementing en-
ergy efficiency measures (e.g. by capturing and using heat from electricity generation for other purposes) or 
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through carbon sequestration (e.g. by enhancing tree cover) 
(Böhm and Dabhi 2009, 14; Bumbus and Liverman 2008, 133). Many offset projects which are unsuitable 
to be registered as CDM projects can however enter the voluntary carbon market. For instance, the CDM 
has limited forestry activities to only afforestation and reforestation, ruling out a majority of forestry activi-
ties under REDD+. A large part of the voluntary projects in the developing countries are REDD+ pro-
jects, typically in areas with high conservation value. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Project-based carbon offsetting in Voluntary Carbon Market 
Buyers in the voluntary market cover a range actors, including individuals, corporations, non-
governmental organizations, local municipalities, public sector actors, and universities. Companies often 
buy their offsets either directly from project developers or from resellers. Typical motivations for private 
companies include corporate social responsibility and other public relations-related reasons, as well as gain-
ing experience of the carbon market to better influence future policy setting on regulatory requirements. 
Public sector institutions may hope to be seen by electors as a leading actor in climate change mitigation. 
Other reasons for buying include seeing the market as a useful mechanism to address environmental prob-
                                                   
 
18 In this chapter VERs, carbon offset, carbon credit and carbon unit are used as synonyms concepts. Kelly (2010, 1) 
defines carbon offset as “a unit of carbon-dioxide-equivalent that is reduced, avoided or sequestered to compensate 
for emissions occurring elsewhere”.  
 
61 
lems and public sector actors wishing to attract more private investment for the cause (Bayon, Hawn and 
Hamilton 2007, 34–35). 
Many companies, events and even countries have set targets to become carbon neutral. Carbon neutral-
ity refers to achieving net zero carbon emissions by balancing a measured amount of carbon released with 
an equivalent amount sequestered or offset, or buying enough carbon credits to make up the difference. 
Carbon neutrality is often achieved by buying carbon credits from voluntary markets. Companies like 
Google, Dell and Pepsi have self-proclaimed carbon neutrality and climate neutral initiatives. Several coun-
tries, e.g. Norway, Iceland, New Zealand and Costa Rica, have pledged carbon neutrality. (Kirby 2008) Also 
different events and publications can announce their climate friendliness. Even bands such as Coldplay and 
Pink Floyd have produced carbon neutral albums by planting enough trees to offset the CO2, and the Roll-
ing Stones have made carbon neutral tours (Geoghegan 2005; Robbins 2006).  
Individuals buy offsets to reduce their carbon footprint, caused for example from flying or heating. In-
dividuals that buy small quantities of carbon credits for a higher price are often called boutique shoppers. 
Numerous offsetting websites have made it easy for Northern consumers to offset their emissions. The 
easiness of buying carbon offsets at the same time as purchasing your airline flight online can be seen as 
part of the growth of online activism, or clictivism. (Goodman & Boyd 2011, 107) Frequent flyers, for exam-
ple, who would like to do something about their carbon emissions (without changing travelling habits) can 
calculate and buy offsets on-line with a credit card. A return flight from Helsinki to Bangkok causes about 
2.24 tons of CO2 emissions and would cost, depending on website, about 20 € to offset. This money would 
then be spent for a green project such as tree-planting, wind or solar energy production, improved cook 
stoves etc. somewhere around the world. Figure 6.2 below shows an example of an on-line carbon calculator.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 An example of an on-line carbon calculator. (Source: www.climatecare.org) 
Carbon offsetting has been criticized for enabling the use of fossil fuels in the industrialised countries. 
Voluntary Carbon Market will not help us to reduce our addiction to fossil fuels, but in fact, they seem to 
provide an incentive for business-as-usual production and consumption patterns, and the continued growth 
of fossil fuel usage. (Böhm & Dabhi 2009, 20) The process of buying offsets actually encourages further 
consumption in industrialised countries, as the buyers can ease their guilt without making fundamental 
changes in behaviour, such as reducing flying. (e.g. Strickland 2007; Lovell et al. 2009). 
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6.2 Research questions, material and methods  
Whereas most literature concerning the VCM usually concentrates on offset consumers, this chapter anal-
yses the Voluntary Carbon Market from the perspective of offset project developers in Laos and Cambodia, 
and discusses the possible linkages between development assistance and the voluntary carbon market. The 
focus of this chapter is on development organisations and non-governmental organisations working in re-
newable energy or energy efficiency projects in Laos and Cambodia that have received – or tried to receive 
– both development funding and income from selling voluntary offsets. These organisations can be seen as 
nodes where the practices and realities of commercial market mechanisms meet the goals of development 
cooperation.  Therefore, the analysis concentrates on the options and obstacles faced by the project devel-
opers to receive funding from the VCM in order to upscale, extend and lengthen projects that have been 
started with development assistance. The VCM is believed to be more accommodating for smaller scale 
carbon offset projects in the South, and to provide more direct benefits for communities and for the poor 
than what e.g. the CDM could offer. Compared to the CDM, which is often described as hierarchical and 
highly regulated, the VCM is based on horizontal networks and local project implementers that create and 
sell carbon credits. In principle, the VCM thus seems more accommodating for smaller scale projects than 
e.g. the CDM, which has increased the project developers’ interest towards the VCM. However, as dis-
cussed below, this is not necessarily the case.  
The primary research material consists of semi-constructed interviews conducted in Cambodia and 
Laos in 2010 and 2011; offset certification databases; offset companies’ portfolios; and email correspond-
ence with organisations. The desk study phase of the research began with an analysis of existing academic 
and non-academic research on the VCM. The second step was to identify the main VCM actors in Cambo-
dia and Laos, especially those organisations that are already getting funding from VCM. The research pre-
sented here focused only on renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) projects in the voluntary 
markets of Laos and Cambodia. Both countries also had several REDD+ schemes applying for certification 
with VCM standards, which are briefly outlined in Table 6.1. The REDD+ cases, however, were not ana-
lysed here. The VCM actors in Laos and Cambodia were identified through the analysis of the information 
obtained from the international carbon certification databases and off-set companies’ project portfolios. 
VCM projects have to be certified in order to sell carbon offsets in the voluntary carbon market. All certifi-
cation schemes keep a database of the verified projects. Off-set companies are usually middle-men who buy 
offsets from organisations and sell them to companies. They keep project portfolios in their websites to 
advertise their activities and to introduce the projects that produce carbon offsets to clients. Offset compa-
nies included here were Carbon Fund, Climate Care, Atmosfair, Carbon Neutral Company, Co2balance, 
Climate Friendly and Sustainable Travel International. The databases included Voluntary Carbon Standard, 
Standard for Verified Emission Reductions, Voluntary Offset Standard, Climate, Community and Biodiver-
sity Standard, Plan Vivo System, Green-e Climate, and Social Carbon.  
Furthermore, Cambodia and Laos based organizations that referred to carbon finance in their websites 
or project brochures were contacted by email in order to double-check the current status of the different 
organizations in the VCM. During the fieldwork phase in February-March 2011 interviews were made in 
Cambodia and Laos in three types of organisations; organisations that are already selling carbon offsets, 
those who are in the process of certification, and an organisation that provides capacity building in  the cer-
tification and verification processes. Interviews made in the same organisations a year earlier related to oth-
er research (2010) were used, which increased the number of respondents and enabled to follow the organi-
sations for a longer time.   Interviews lasted about an hour each and were recorded. Topics of the thematic 
interviews were: (i) Certification process, monitoring, and reporting; (ii) expenditures and gains from the 
Voluntary Carbon Market; (iii) the use of carbon finance in the projects; (iv) Voluntary Carbon Market and 
Official Development Assistance; (vi) ownership of projects funded by revenues from VCM in the least 
developed countries; (vii) the future of carbon finance. 
Due to the VCM mechanisms and the actors in the voluntary market are perhaps lesser known than 
carbon finance mechanisms related to the Kyoto Protocol, the analysis begins with a general description of 
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how VCM operates. The following section introduces VCM offset providers and project developers from 
Cambodia and Laos. The aim is to look how relevant a source of funding carbon finance is for small pro-
ject developers, which are often also using development assistance or other project funding. Also, this sec-
tion discusses the reasons why so few organisations are receiving carbon finance from the VCM in these 
two countries. The chapter ends with a look at the future of the voluntary carbon market. 
6.3 VCM actors, standards and project cycle 
Voluntary Carbon Market connects the developing countries and the industrialized countries. VCM pro-
jects can take place anywhere in the world, but they are often implemented in developing countries where it 
is usually cheaper to reduce emissions due to lower labour and land expenses, less efficient industrial pro-
cesses, and unused resource-related sinks. The offset buyers, resellers, consultants and certification schemes 
are mostly from industrialized countries. Offset sellers can be divided into four categories. There are project 
developers – the main focus of this chapter - who implement offset projects and sell offsets either directly to 
final customers, or to resellers. If the buyer purchases offsets from the project developer, also the money 
goes directly to the project. Often, however, the project developers sell all their offsets through different 
resellers, and therefore get a lower price. Offset resellers, who are often from North, include wholesalers that 
only sell offsets in bulk and often have ownership of a portfolio of credits; retailers who own and sell small 
volumes of carbon credits to individuals or organisations, usually online; and brokers who do not own cred-
its, but facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers. (Peters-Stanley et al. 2011, 12) Carbon consulting 
firms as well as the offset certification standards are dominated by actors from the North, which leaves very 
little room for organisations, companies and NGOs from the South. Figure 6.3 below shows the actors and 
supply chain in the VCM. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Simplified supply chain of the retail carbon market (Bayon, Hawn and Hamilton 2007, 
18) 
In 2009 the highest prices, above 8 USD per credit, were paid for the solar, biomass, energy efficiency, 
wind and other methane projects. However these projects are also more expensive to implement and have 
higher transaction costs than for instance the destruction of industrial gases. Moderate prices, 4–8 USD, are 
applied to landfill and forestry-related projects. Avoided deforestation, agricultural land-based, wastewater, 
large hydropower, enhanced oil recovery and industrial gas projects had the lowest transaction prices, under 
4 USD.  In the VCM offset projects implemented in Cambodia the price was 12-15 USD per credit in 2011. 
(Interviews, March 2011) 
The price of the sold VER depends on various issues, including how the project appeals to the poten-
tial buyers. Consumers prefer projects, which are associated with sustainable development and pro-poor 
and environmental benefits (Hamilton, Sjardin, Peters-Stanley and Marcello 2010, 36–37). In the Over-the-
Counter voluntary market there are no obligations to buy offsets, and therefore offset sellers have to con-
vince the buyers to purchase the offsets. Sellers often emphasize the synergies between climate change mit-
igation and poverty alleviation. They underline different positive side benefits of carbon offsetting imple-
64 
mented in developing countries, such as poverty reduction, health impacts such as reduced indoor air pollu-
tion, and environmental issues like the preservation of forests. Projects with a storytelling appeal are selling 
best and for a better price, referring to carbon projects that bring development benefits in addition to emis-
sion reductions, such as sustainable development, poverty alleviation or ecosystem benefits. (Lovell, Bulke-
ley and Liverman 2009; Hamilton, Sjardin, Peters-Stanley and Marcello 2010, 58–59).  
Also the certification has an impact on the price. Certification refers to the written assurance of a des-
ignated operational entity (DOE) of a certification scheme (e.g. the Gold Standard or Voluntary Carbon 
Standard) that during a specific period of time, a project achieved the reductions in emissions. Certification 
is also a quality label for the projects, because the implementation of the projects and the offsets produced 
by the project are under constant monitoring.  There is variation between standards: some, like the Gold 
Standard, are stricter than others. However, if the project gets through the Gold Standard certification, it 
has better chances to sell offsets for consumers. The Gold Standard’s certification process is presented in 
Figure 6.4 below.  
 
Figure 6.4 The Gold Standard (GS) Certification Process 
The Gold Standard is supported by a large number of non-governmental organizations and it requires 
that offset projects bring sustainable development benefits. The Gold Standard only accepts energy effi-
ciency and renewable energy projects, and explicitly excludes large hydropower projects, which often may 
harm local communities’ access to land, water and livelihoods, while also having a serious impact on the 
environment. It is often considered as the most rigorous standard in the carbon market, requiring that off-
set projects fulfil CDM method requirements, but also additional methods are included. An interviewee 
described the Gold Standard like this: 
“The Gold Standard really demands sustainable development benefits.  I mean that compliance 
buyers, especially if they got a big debt, will just go whatever: “I want cheap carbon to cover 
this”. They don’t care what they buy. But people who are buying for corporate image reasons will 
definitely look for some, some sexy development sort of benefits as well (laughter). And in fact 
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you can fetch a very, very high prices, higher than CDM prices if you’ve got a very, very good 
project and with a good name like the Gold Standard attached to it.” (Interview, February 2010) 
All project developers wishing to register with the Gold Standard prepare a Project Design Document 
(PDD) as for CDM projects. To satisfy CDM criteria for carbon offset projects, evidence must be provided 
demonstrating that the project will: 
· Deliver reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
project activity 
· Undertake pubic consultation and provide assurances that there will be no significant adverse 
environmental impacts 
· Comply with sustainable development criteria of the host country and receive host country ap-
proval 
· Provide real, measurable and long-term mitigation benefits, using an approved baseline and 
monitoring methodology 
· Avoid diversion of Official Development Assistance 
However, as one interviewee pointed out, the Gold Standard has sustainable development criteria, but 
no poverty alleviation principles. Development practitioners have criticized the Gold Standard for this, and 
called for the inclusion of pro-poor criteria. (Email correspondence, January 2012)  
The Voluntary Carbon Standard, which is regarded as less rigid by its environmental and social re-
quirements than the Gold Standard, accepts all project types except the ones “that can reasonably be as-
sumed to have generated GHG emissions for the purpose of their subsequent reductions”, which applies 
for instance to new facilities generating industrial gases. (Kollmuss, Zink and Polycarp 2008, 25) However, 
the Voluntary Carbon Standard can be combined with other carbon standards. For example in projects re-
lated to land-use, the Voluntary Carbon Standard can be combined with the Climate, Community and Bio-
diversity Standard criteria. Thus, at least in theory, the combination of standards can result with more sus-
tainable development benefits than the Gold Standard. (Email correspondence, January 2012) 
The steps of the Voluntary Carbon Market project cycle may differ depending on which VCM standard 
is applied.  The standard will provide the exact steps. The timeline for each step of the VCM cycle varies 
greatly but the process takes at least one year. After registration and commencement of the operation of a 
project, monitoring is often done for one year prior to the verification and issuance of VERs.  Typically, 
verifications and issuances are then completed on an annual basis. The project type as well as standard has a 
significant effect on the price of the carbon credits. A simplified picture of the offset project cycle is pre-
sented in Figure 6.5 below.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Simplified picture of the whole voluntary offset project cycle. 
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6.4 Project Developers’ Perspective from Cambodia and Laos: Options 
and Obstacles 
The voluntary carbon market is still quite a new field in general and in particular in Cambodia and Laos, 
where many organisations have tried to enter the Voluntary Carbon Market, but so far only a few have suc-
ceeded. Several Laos and Cambodia based organisations have been planning to sell offsets in the near fu-
ture. Some have had tried but withdrawn later from the certification process. Table 6.1 below lists projects 
in Laos and Cambodia that have been certified, are at the moment in the process of certification, or have 
considered it  but  dropped the plans.  The table  shows that  many organisations are  interested in  the VCM 
but most have dropped the plan to sell offsets in the voluntary market.  
So far (as of January 2011) only two organisations in Cambodia are actually getting revenues from the 
Voluntary Carbon Market. Neither of them is a Cambodian organisation. The successful organisations are 
French non-profit organisation GERES (Groupe Energies Renouvelables, Environnement et Solidarités) 
and Dutch development organisation SNV. GERES is selling offsets from its improved cook stove pro-
gram and SNV has a National Biodigester Program. Until now there has not been any project in Laos that 
would have been able to get funds from the Voluntary Carbon Markets. However in Laos there are several 
REDD+ projects, which are aiming to receive a Voluntary Carbon Standard and Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Alliance Standard and entering the voluntary market.   
 
Table 6.1 Projects that have already been certified, are at the process of certification or have con-
sidered certification but have for different reasons discontinued the process. (As of Dec. 2010) 
Country Organisation and Part-
ners 
Project(s) Certification status  
(as of Dec. 2010) 
Cambodia GERES, Ministry of In-
dustry, Mines and Energy 
of Cambodia, 
Improved cooking stove 
producers and distributors 
association of Cambodia 
(ICOPRODAC) 
Dissemination of improved 
cooking stoves in Cambodia 
(Phase 3) 
(i) New Lao Stove Project 
(NLS)  
(ii) Neang Kongrey Stove 
(NKS), cheaper version of 
NLS 
(iii) Vattanak Stove (Palm 
Sugar Stove) 
Voluntary Carbon Standard for NLS, the 
other stove projects have not been certi-
fied  
 
 
Cambodia SNV (Netherlands De-
velopment  Organiza-
tion)and Ministry of Agri-
culture, Fishery and For-
estry of Cambodia  
National Biodigester Pro-
gramme Cambodia (NBP) 
The Gold Standard  
 
Cambodia Nexus and Hydrologic 
Cambodia 
Ceramic Water Purifier 
Project 
Project has not been certified   
Cambodia SME Renewable Energy 
Ltd. and  SME Cambodia 
& E+Co 
Power generation by Bio-
mass gasification  
 
Project has not been certified  
 
Cambodia Cambodian Rural Devel-
opment Team (CRDT) 
Biodigesters Project has not been certified  
 
Cambodia PACT ,  Terra Global 
Capital,  
the Royal Government of 
Cambodia and Forestry 
Administration,  Commu-
nity Forestry International 
Oddar Meanchey REDD 
Project 
 
Project has not been certified  but is in 
process of  applying for Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity Alliance Standard 
and Voluntary Carbon Standard 
Cambodia Wildlife Conservation 
Society of Cambodia, 
Government of Cambo-
dia 
Seima Protection Forest 
REDD Project 
 
 
Project has not been certified  but is in 
process of  applying for Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity Alliance Standard 
and Voluntary Carbon Standard 
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Laos SNV  Improved cooking stoves; 
Biodigester program 
Projects have not been certified. For bio-
gas the certification plans were dropped 
but for improved cooking stoves the cer-
tification process is beginning 
Laos Sunlabob Solar Lantern  Rental Sys-
tem program; Solar Home 
Systems 
Projects have not been certified. Certifica-
tion plans were discontinued with solar 
home systems. 
Laos Helvetas Micro-hydro project Certification was considered but the off-
sets would have been too small 
Laos USAID, FAO 
 Government of Finland 
through one partner, 
SUFORD 
REDD+ Project has not been certified. Project in 
the process of applying for Voluntary 
Carbon Standard and  Climate, Commu-
nity and Biodiversity Alliance Standard 
Laos Wildlife Conservation 
Society 
REDD project in 
Bolikhamxay province in 
Nam Kading National Park 
REDD Project in national 
park areas of Nam Et and 
Phou Louey (NEPL) 
Project has not been certified  but is in 
process of  applying for Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity Alliance Standard 
and Voluntary Carbon Standard (feasibil-
ity stage) 
Laos CLiPAD  
Financed by the German 
Government GTZ and 
KfW 
 
Climate Protection through 
Avoided Deforestation 
Program (CLiPAD) 
Project has not been certified  but is in 
process of  applying for Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity Alliance Standard 
and Voluntary Carbon Standard  
6.5 Barriers faced by the offset project developers 
Project developers listed several barriers why the projects have not entered the voluntary market. For many 
projects the certification process has been too complicated and expensive, or the carbon credits too small 
to make the projects feasible and profitable in the Voluntary Carbon Market. A project developer from 
Laos listed the following reasons for the disruption of the certification process in their project:  
“Projects in Laos often aren’t big enough to justify the expense of getting certification i.e., there’s 
a cost barrier. There’s also a lack of internal manpower/experience/knowledge to initiate the 
process to begin with. Also lack of confidence that applications will be successful/there will be a 
market for it afterwards. Lack of historical data, maps and existing examples to help in developing 
a methodology, Also difficulty in obtaining “auditable” monitoring data once projects are imple-
mented.” (E-mail correspondence with a project developer who has withdrawn from the certifica-
tion process, November 2010) 
Also cultural gaps between the worlds of development and finance can be a barrier. (Interview, Febru-
ary 2011) This means that the project developers that have earlier received funding from development assis-
tance do not know how to act in the world of carbon finance. Due to the lack of capacity, the certification 
documentation is usually done by international consultants professionalised in carbon finance, which in-
creases the costs. The certification process, including all documentation and application, can take up to a 
year and cost tens of thousands of dollars. One interviewed project developer described the long and com-
plicated certification process where different standards, and both the CDM and the VCM, were considered. 
In the end the organisation ended up paying 100.000 € for all certification and verification processes:   
“We began the process in March 2006 and we had a CDM base line study done by another organ-
isation. We were thinking of going for CDM but decided that it was too time consuming and ex-
pensive. At late-2006 the consultants advised us to postpone CDM process and to voluntary 
market instead. Late-2007 we were contacted by an NGO interested to buy offset from the pro-
gram. In April 2008 we made a contract according to which they will buy offsets 10 years’ time. 
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Price  is  good,  and  they  also  do  the  monitoring.  But  in  2009  there  was  an  economic  crises  and  
carbon finance news began to appear  in  newspapers.  The voluntary  market  was not  as  good as  
CDM. Economic crises affected the voluntary buyers, especially retail. Then this NGO suggested 
that we would go for the Gold Standard. Gold Standard! It is even worse than CDM!  [i.e. strict 
standard to implement and monitor] (Interview, March 2011)  
However, the expenses are not always that high. GERES was one of the early actors in the VCM (since 
2003) and it opted for the only certification possible at that time, the Voluntary Carbon Standard. It used 
about 50 000 USD for the certification. GERES also had in-house experts and was not forced to use ex-
pensive consultants which reduced the costs significantly. 
6.6 Success stories 
What is common for SNV and GERES, which have been able to access the VCM in Cambodia, is that they 
have a long experience from biogas and improved cook stoves, and in this respect, the projects had ma-
tured and were working well when they began the carbon trade. The projects have been going on for years 
either with development assistance funding or other project finance before the VCM. These projects may 
be described as boutique offset projects in the sense that they provide also development and environmental 
benefits.  
Improved cook stove program 
Even for the two successful offset project developers, the road from starting the project to the selling of 
offsets is a long one. For example GERES, which has been one of the first carbon offset providers (from 
2003), has worked in Cambodia since 1994 and in 1997 it launched a project to improve the efficiency of 
the cooking stoves. The first four years were spent on designing, testing and facilitation to establish a na-
tional network (GERES 2009, 15). By 2010 already one million improved cook stoves (New Lao Stoves) 
had been sold in  Cambodia.  These stoves  are  22 % more energy efficient  and they last  2-3 times longer  
than the ordinary stoves. GERES has calculated that the use of improved cook stoves has reduced more 
than 500,000 CO2 emissions and consumers have saved 9,000,000 USD since 2003. Additionally, the New 
Lao Stove produces less indoor air pollution compared to the traditional stove. (GERES 2010) The carbon 
finance is used for funding for research and the development of other improved stoves, as well as for moni-
toring and quality control, which are required by the standard.  
At the very beginning the European Commission funded the program, but when that funding ran out, 
GERES had to look for different sources of funding. It also received funds from other sources, including 
UNDP/GEF. Income from the VCM became an alternative to other project funding. If the income from 
other  sources  would have been steady,  GERES perhaps would not  have begun selling offsets  in  the first  
place, at least not in this scale.  
“The [European Commission’s] funding ran out years ago! And so that’s why we turned to car-
bon finance in order to keep funding the project so it could be upscaled and basically set a new 
baseline for  cook-,  cooking stoves  of  that  calibre  in  Cambodia.  So,  yeah,  I  mean if  we had the 
funding we wouldn’t have gone to carbon finance, basically.” (Interview, February, 2010)  
Carbon finance capacity-building 
In  2008,  based  on  its  own  experiences  from the  VCM,  GERES incubated  an  organisation  that  provides  
capacity development in carbon finance for grassroots organisations that have projects that both mitigate 
climate change but also have poverty alleviation and/or environmental conservation element in it. The or-
ganisation was first called Carbon Solidarity Asia, but later renamed as “NEXUS – Carbon for Develop-
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ment”. NEXUS is a non-profit global alliance of non-governmental organisations and eco-businesses and it 
aims to overcome the barriers that stop grassroots organisations and local project practitioners to get their 
share of the offset market. (Interview February, 2011). It focuses on scaling up best practices that contrib-
ute to climate change mitigation, environmental management and poverty alleviation. 
National Biodigester Program  
SNV has also successfully implemented biogas programs in many countries, including Nepal and Vietnam. 
In Cambodia, the National Biodigester Programme (NBP) is a joint venture intervention of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries of Cambodia and SNV. Family size biodigesters produce biogas from cow 
and pig dung and other organic material and the gas can be used for cooking and lighting. The main bene-
fits from the program are (SNV 2006):  
· Reduction in the rate of deforestation and environmental deterioration by substituting fuel wood 
with biogas 
· Improvement of hygiene and health of the rural population, especially of women and children, by 
elimination of smoke produced during cooking on fuel wood and by stimulating better manage-
ment of dung by the attachment of latrines; 
· Improvement of the financial situation of households by eliminating the need to buy expensive 
fuel wood. On average 2000 kg of fuel wood and 50 litres of kerosene will be saved annually per 
household; 
· Increasing agricultural production by using the biogas production residue for an organic fertilizer. 
In Cambodia SNV was using carbon finance to cover part of the costs of the program. Financing was 
also received through development funds from the Netherlands. The income from the offsets was used to 
provide subsidies for families that purchase a biodigester.   
For those project developers who manage to sell their offsets in VCM it can be a good source of in-
come. Revenue from VCM can be significant and for certified projects the funding can last for a relatively 
long time. Certified offsets from a project can be sold for 10 years, or two times 7 years if the certification 
is renewed after the first term. The revenue depends on the price of Verified Emission Reductions and the 
amount sold. The price of the offsets is usually closely linked to what certification the project has. For ex-
ample, for SNV the total revenue has been 300.000€ (as of March 2011). GERES, which has been in the 
market for nine years, sells an average of 180.000 tons annually for a 10-year period for 10-15 USD per ton, 
implying an annual income of between 1,8 and 2,7 million USD. In both projects the storytelling appeal is 
high, and therefore the price of the carbon credit is comparably good.  
6.7 Development assistance and pro-poor VCM projects 
A common factor for the two Cambodia-based VCM projects is their original initiation with development 
assistance funding. For SNV’s gasifier project, both ODA funding and revenue from the VCM are still used 
at the same time. In general, revenue from the VCM has become a complimentary source for project fund-
ing: “ODA funding does not cover all project costs, you know, you have to have other source of funding as 
well.  We  use  VCM finance  to  cover  the  gap.”  (Interview  March  2011)   On  the  other  hand,  for  projects  
which already sell significant amounts of carbon offsets in voluntary markets, the carbon finance gives pro-
ject developers autonomy from donors and reduces dependence from ODA funding. Carbon finance in-
come can also last for a longer time than the typical donor funding cycles admit. Therefore, from the pro-
ject developer’s point of view carbon finance can increase the sense of ownership towards the project. 
“One of the benefits of having carbon finance is the fact that that’s your money and you don’t 
have to go through all the bureaucratic accounting, budgeting and reporting that you have to for 
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donors. They sometimes say ‘you can have this money on the condition that you spend it on this’. 
You don’t  have this  stress  of  looking for  funds,  when as  soon as  that  runs out  in  two years  or  
whatever. You’ve got this that you more or less know, will be coming in every year for X amount 
of time, you know, fingers crossed, anything can go wrong still. (...) Provided that the organiza-
tion in  question has  the right  ideas,  it  is  liberation from donor funding.”  (Interview,    February  
2010) 
VCM funding for certified projects lasts a maximum of 10 years (or two times seven years if the certifi-
cation process is renewed) after which it cannot sell certified offsets from the same project.  Therefore, to 
some extent the ownership of the recipient government (e.g. the Ministry of Energy in the respective coun-
try) is necessary to ensure the political-level sustainability of the program. Also other stakeholders need to 
be empowered, like the efficient stove producers’ and retailers’ association ICOPRODAC in GERES’ im-
proved cook stove project. With such a project cycle a whole value-chain of producers might be able to join 
in on a sustainable basis: 
 “The lifetime of the project as a carbon finance project is only 10 years. We started in 2003, so 
after 2012 we can get no more carbon finance for it. But the idea is that by that stage we won’t 
need it because it will be a self-sustaining project. So the Producers’ Association will be taking 
care of everything, like quality control, monitoring, credit and saving - everything. So we (GER-
ES) should theoretically be able to step away from the project by then [and to let Producer’s As-
sociation take care of it. ” (Interview February 2010)  
However, some interviewees emphasised that even though the VCM can be a good source of income 
for at least some project developers, carbon finance is risk funding because it is very dependent on global 
markets. For example in 2009, during the global economic crises, many companies stopped buying carbon 
offsets from the Voluntary Carbon Market. Also carbon credit prices easily fluctuate, and therefore it can 
be difficult to plan the project activities in longer perspective.  
The question is how to include pro-poor criteria into the VCM projects in the least developed coun-
tries. Even the most rigid standards like the Gold Standard do not yet have pro-poor criteria for projects, 
and many development practitioners have criticised this approach. The result of the exclusion of pro-poor 
criteria from the certificates has led to the situation where the pro-poor impact of projects is rarely consid-
ered or monitored across the lifetime of a carbon project. Many respondents hoped that development assis-
tance funding could in the future be used for the expensive certification phase for example in small scale 
renewable projects. In the first years of project development, carbon finance transaction costs are an addi-
tional burden to projects that aim at scaling up their operation. 
“The main issue for pro-poor projects to scale-up, is the fact that they can’t cover their cash flow 
requirements in the first years. This situation has actually worsened by climate finance. If ODA 
could be used to provide soft loans to project in the first years, or a combination of grant and 
soft loan, this barrier could be alleviated.” (Email correspondence, January 2012) 
Traditionally project developers have tackled this issue by negotiating down payments for the future 
sale of carbon credits. This approach is known as pre-finance. It leads to low carbon prices (up to 50% dis-
count), and is not appropriate for pro-poor projects. Carbon prices under pre-finance agreements are often 
too low for pro-poor projects to reach financial profitability. The interviewees believed that the high risk 
profile of these projects also significantly reduces the number of investors ready to enter into pre-finance 
agreements because there is no track record of systematic delivery of projects. Carbon finance capacity-
building organisation NEXUS suggested that regional incubators (either non-profit organisations or social 
ventures) should be established to provide technical assistance and capacity-building, and to assess the po-
tential for carbon finance and other climate finance schemes available. This would help to support prices by 
creating demand for pro-carbon credits. The regional incubators would need grant funding in the early 
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stages, and this is where ODA funding could be used. Grants could be used in different ways, for example 
to cover project registration costs, provide capacity-building etc. (E-mail correspondence, March, 2012) 
6.8 Hopes and Fears: The Future of the Voluntary Carbon Market?  
The future for the compliance mechanisms is uncertain in the post-Kyoto era, but the interviewees saw the 
future of the VCM promising. However, the stagnation of the Over-the-counter voluntary market in 2009 
due to global  financial  crises,  the CDM by 40 % in 2010,  and the closing down of  Chicago Climate  Ex-
change in 2010 indicated that the future would not be very bright. Currently the volume of carbon credits 
transacted in the voluntarily market represents only a fraction, less than a 0.1 per cent, of the global carbon 
markets. Still,  the relevance of the voluntary carbon market may in the future be more important than its 
current size suggests. The private sector’s share of the Voluntary Carbon Market has risen significantly 
since 2003.  It  increased sevenfold from 2006 to 2008,  when it  was  worth 728 million dollars.  This  rapid 
increase was mainly due to increasing public awareness and corporate interest in climate change. However, 
due to financial crisis, the value declined by nearly 50 per cent in 2009. The prices of the credits dropped 
due to low demand caused by financial crisis and uncertainty. In 2010, when the world was slowly recover-
ing from global financial crisis, the value of VCM was $424 million, and the volume was 131.2 million tons 
CO₂e. This is 34% higher than in the previous year, which meant that when the economy stabilized, volun-
tary buyers restarted buying carbon offsets from the voluntary markets. (Peters-Stanley et al. 2011, 10)  
There is an increasing interest in VCM, because it is seen as a useful way to finance experimentation 
and to enable further up-scaling of projects. However, as discussed above, a lot of uncertainties remain re-
lating to its sensitivity to the changes in the global economy, as well as the consultant-driven, expensive and 
time consuming certification process. If new certificates are initiated constantly, it will be expensive and 
time consuming for organizations to apply for new certificates, and confusing for buyers to know which 
carbon offsets to buy. Despite the confusion created by the new standards, it is necessary that already exist-
ing standards such as the Gold Standard and the Voluntary Carbon Standard should be developed to in-
clude pro-poor criteria. 
Despite the challenges, the vision of the non-profit carbon finance capacity development organisation 
Nexus is that the carbon market will be the biggest commodity market worldwide after 2020: 
“Carbon credits will be traded more than oil! Everybody wants a share of the cake. And we want 
grassroots organisations, local development practitioners to have their share of the cake and make 
to make sure that their interests are protected in this environment.” (Interview February, 2011). 
The next few years will show what the future of the voluntary carbon market will be. A key question is, 
if  the  markets  are  stable  and  mature  enough  to  be  able  to  control  the  damage  of  carbon  cowboys  and  
through certificates build a certain amount of trust in the Voluntary Carbon Market. The potential im-
portance of the voluntary markets relates to the educational impact of carbon offsets and how we come to 
realise that all our actions have a carbon footprint. Broekhoff (2007, 5), for example believes that buying 
offsets can make people more aware of climate change which translates into positive actions in other areas 
of their lives. If climate worries continue to grow among the public, there is a huge potential for expanding 
the market towards individuals willing to do their share. According to one interviewee, the carbon finance is 
likely to grow, “as soon as the climate change problem is becoming more apparent in the West. If there will 
be more [climate change related] catastrophes and a clear linkage anthropogenic emissions, people will be-
come more interested in climate change mitigation.” (Interview March 2011). Critics, on the other hand say 
that the voluntary market enables the continuation of the unsustainable consumption patterns in the indus-
trialized countries, and that carbon finance will not change that.  
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7. EXPECTATIONS MEETING THE REALITY ON  
THE GROUND – TWO CASES OF REDD+  
IN CAMBODIA 
Try Thuon and Kamilla Karhunmaa  
“We did not know clearly what is carbon credit initiated by project staff, but we did realize that we have been 
trained to protect forest and land where carbon can be sold. We do not know what is carbon look like. The ex-
pected benefit from this selling included money used for village road construction, develop forest fire routes in order to 
protect forest fires, while additional budget are expected to help vulnerable people in village such as widow, amputee 
persons.” 
Villager in Mondulkiri  
The forest carbon initiative REDD+ (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) is 
aimed at providing opportunities for developing countries like Cambodia to preserve their forests in return 
for carbon credits from key industrialized and developed countries. Forest carbon projects have been ar-
gued to combine livelihood benefits through carbon credits, monitoring labour tasks and non-timber forest 
product health, while sustaining key forest ecosystem functions, including climate mitigation, watershed 
management functions and biodiversity protection (Wunder 2008). Cambodia, together with its develop-
ment and conservation partners, is attempting to build forest carbon projects, with clear verifiable emis-
sions reductions in comparison to a business-as-usual scenario. The idea is to link up these initial pilot pro-
jects under national coordination later on (MAFF 2011). The structure of REDD+ as a forest and climate 
governance mechanism remains an area of contestation and heated debates both internationally and in 
Cambodia.  The  REDD+  framework  is  still  in  the  making  and  debates  circle  around  issues  such  as  the  
sources of credit and local decision-making principles, the rights of indigenous communities and ensuring 
secure and long term access to forest resources. At the same time, however, on the ground preparation for 
forest carbon projects has already commenced with early financing and activities with communities, as well 
as the passing of national legislation in Cambodia. This chapter aims to review the evolution of forest man-
agement and current practices and expectations related to REDD+ projects in Cambodia. The chapter pro-
vides a brief review of two projects currently working with the Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCM) and the 
actors involved in these. The focus is particularly on the expectations and local perspectives from commu-
nities within the proposed REDD+ schemes.  
Historically, Cambodia has had a larger forest cover than many of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. In 
the 1960s, the forest cover in the country was 73% of the total territory (180,035km2) but fell to 56.95% by 
2010 (or 10,339,826 ha) (FA 2008, MAFF 2011). The Cambodian government has set a target of maintain-
ing forest cover at 60% of the total land area. REDD+ is seen as one of the methods by which this target 
could be achieved. However, the forest area in Cambodia, and the communities adjacent and within it are, 
under severe pressure from various sides, such as economic land concessions (ELCs) and large-scale devel-
opment projects. Another tension arises from local communities experiencing frustration at living in areas 
demarcated as forest protection zones, and having restrictions in their income-generating and livelihood 
activities within these zones.  
The Cambodian REDD+ process began on the local level with two national pilot projects: Seima Bio-
diversity Conservation Area (SBCA) and Oddar Meanchey Community Forestry program (OM-REDD+). 
Cambodia’s first REDD+ activities began in the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area in 2008. The na-
tional coordination for all of Cambodia’s REDD+ activities has only been built after these projects were 
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initiated. Current fears and tensions of local communities are the fear of encroachment, economic land 
concessions, illegal logging and military infringement. REDD+ is Cambodia is currently being imposed on-
to this challenging background. This chapter brings to the fore the tensions between conservation projects, 
increasing investments in economic land concessions and local livelihood effects. After presenting the 
REDD+ setup in Cambodia and the two pilot projects some comparisons and conclusions are drawn for 
development policy in the complex situation where conservation, livelihood and large-scale development 
needs meet.  
7.1 Methods and overview on the research cases  
The research carried out consisted of a literature review, key-informant interviews and fieldwork with focus 
group discussions in both REDD+ areas, in Oddar Meanchey and Seima Biodiversity Conservation area. 
The key documents included reports and policy papers from the World Conservation Society (WCS) , Pact 
Cambodia, RECOFTC (the Centre for People and Forests), UNDP, Children’s Development Association 
(CDA), Groupe Energies Renouvelables Envrionnement et Solidarités (GERES), and Forestry Officials 
from the Forestry Administration (REDD+ Focal persons). The key informant interviews were carried out 
with representatives from the same organizations. The site visits and focus group discussions with ethnic 
minority groups, community facilitators, and members of the forestry community were carried out during 
March and May 2011.  In total, 6 focus group discussions (3 in Mondulkiri and 3 in Oddar Meanchey) and 
10 key informant interviews were carried out.  
The guiding questions of the fieldwork interviews were the relation and expectations of the local com-
munity towards the proposed REDD+ projects, the role of institutional arrangements at the village level as 
well as land tenure arrangements.  
7.2 Historical overview of forests in Cambodia  
Over the past three decades, the forest in Cambodia has been a scene of revolution, guerilla forces and in-
tense political contestation. In the 1960s-1970s the forest remained a key area for political refugees and 
guerrilla forces. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, during the civil war, forest remained a key zone of 
protection for the Khmer Rouge regime soldiers. The signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 was a sig-
nificant step for Cambodia and its forests. It also had impacts for economic policy: with the support of de-
velopment institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank the country turned from 
an autarchic socialist state into an evolving market economy and from a single to a multi-party political sys-
tem (Peou, 2000). These changes affected the forests and forest communities as well. From 1995-1999, the 
political contestations between the ruling parties and the Khmer Rouge Soldiers (who were often thought 
to be hiding on in the forests) led to favouring economic land concessions (ELCs) on forest land.  
Logging was widespread and affected local livelihoods, for example, through the cutting of resin trees 
providing important income to communities. In the early 2000s, almost all logging concessions were seized 
due to high tax prices from the government. The 2003 Sub-Decree on Community Forest Management 
established a framework through which communities could apply for and manage community forests, espe-
cially in areas designated for production forestry. Figures (see Table 7.1 on forest cover in Cambodia vary 
and are disputed, but few would deny the fast deforestation taking place. Therefore REDD+ has been met 
with enthusiasm by groups worrying about the state of the Cambodian forest.  
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Table 7.1 Evolution of forest cover in Cambodia 
Year Total forest cover (ha) Percentage  Change in forest cover (ha) 
1965 13,227,100 73.04 - 
1973/76 12,711,100 70.02 -516,000 
1985/87 11,852,400 65.29 -1,374,700 
1992/93 11,378,664 62.68 -1,848,436 
1996/97 11,134,615 61.34 -2,092,485 
1993 (JAFTA) 11,961,815 63.30 - 1,265,267 
1992/93 (GTZ) 10,859,695 59.82 - 
1996/97 (GTZ) 10,638,209 58.60 -221,488 
2002 (FRM) 11,104,293 61.15 + 244,598 
FA (2006) 10,864,186 59.80 -240,107 
MAFF 
(2010/201)19 
10,339,826 56.94 -390,955  
Sources: FA (2008) and MAFF (2011)   
 
The Forest Law of 2002 defines all forests as belonging to the state of Cambodia. The forests are managed, 
however, through different public and private tenure systems. Cambodian forests, termed permanent forest estates 
can be divided into three categories: permanent forest reserves, private forests and protected areas (see Figure 7.1).  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Forest Tenure Regimes in Cambodia (from Yeang 2010; 31) 
                                                   
 
19 By 2010, Forestry Administration has evaluated forest cover by using LANDSAT (USA) covering 104 areas in 13 
provinces. As the result, the preliminary findings shows forest cover in Cambodia remain 10,339,826 ha equaling 
56.94% (decreased 2.15% equals 390,955 ha). 
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Forests are the single most important sink of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in Cambodia. A recent study 
estimates that 2.96 Gt of carbon (or CO2 equivalent)  is  stored  in  Cambodia’s  ecosystems,  of  which  one  
third is stored in the country’s evergreen forest (Leng et al. 2010). The forests in the Southwest of the coun-
try, where also the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area is, are found to have particularly high carbon den-
sity. The different forest management arrangements have the following capacities for carbon storage:  
· 30% of forest carbon stock is estimated to be in the Forestry Concessions [Production Forest, 
permanent Forest Reserve (PFR)] managed by the Forestry Administration. 
· 26% in the Protected Areas managed by the Ministry of Environment. 
· 12% under Conversion Forests also termed Economic Land Concessions owned by the land 
concession owners, and  
· 19% in other Forests (private forests, or plantations) for which management responsibility is 
unclear20.  
Of the two case studies in the two selected REDD+ project sites, Oddar Meanchey REDD+ is a pro-
duction forest under community forestry, while Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area REDD+ is titled as a 
protection forest. Both areas belong to the state, and fall under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Administra-
tion (FA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF).  
The forest conservation context has been severely altered during the last few years. Firstly, the land in-
vestment boom during the last decade, especially since 2007, has had a significant impact in the rural areas 
(Barney 2010). Economic land concessions are blocks of land leased by the state to third parties (conces-
sionaires) for the purpose of agro-industrial development. Agro-industrial plantations in economic land 
cocenssions (ELCs) include rubber, cassava, jathropa, cashew nuts, and other cash crops. ELCs can also be 
leased for mining purposes. According to Leng et al (2010) Cambodia now has over 160 economic land 
concessions, located mostly in the Northeast and Southwest regions, covering an area of 17770 km2 (almost 
10% of the total land area). In March 2011, more than 100,000 ha of mostly protected areas were granted to 
ELCs. Further, in mid-2011, more than 60,000 ha were also granted to ELCs in Mondulkiri province, most-
ly in Koh Nhiek district close to the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area.   
Rubber plantation is the most common form of ELCs. The Cambodian Prime Minister has shifted his 
position on the amount of rubber plantations from first declaring a roof at 100,000 ha and then increasing 
this to 300,000 ha, although independent monitoring reports suggest figures are higher than this21. The cur-
rent value from rubber yields is estimated by MAFF (2011) to be over 3000 dollars/ton, which remains very 
high compared to income that could be attained through other plants or conservation activities. The price 
of rubber and its increased global demand explain why rubber is so popular both for large scale develop-
ment and for contracted small-holders or for family scale farmers.  
Critics often raise a number of issues related to the expansion of economic land concessions. These in-
clude the lack of studies on land suitability and availability in the communities, lack of investment in social 
and environmental impact assessment, the misleading or absence of consultation with local communities 
and the fact that the uncontrolled concession process creates conflicting and overlapping boundaries, where 
lands are given to two economic land concessions simultaneously (WFF 2009). ELCs are often justified by 
claiming employment benefits to local communities through, for example, work at plantations. In reality, 
however, employment often consists of migrant labour from outside. The land concession context differs 
greatly from other forest management arrangements also in terms of length of tenure. With ELCs, the gov-
ernment leases the land for 99 years. In comparison, in community forestry, communities sign a manage-
ment agreement for the forest areas with the government for 15 years at a time.  
                                                   
 
20 Cambodia REDD++ Roadmap, revised draft 27 September 2010, version 3.0. , pp. 12-13 
21 sithi.org independent mapping 
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In Cambodia, REDD+ has been surmounted on a challenged context of insecure land tenure and in-
creasing competition over land. Cambodia’s first REDD+ project commenced in 2007, and evolved into 
the Oddar Meanchey REDD+ program in 2008. The second national pilot project, Seima Protection Forest 
in Mondulkiri, gained official sanction by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) in 2008. The Forest-
ry Administration has been assigned as the official seller of forest carbon credits generated from these pro-
jects and as the regulator of forest carbon trading. Further, the Forestry Administration has the responsibil-
ity of assessing national forest carbon stocks.  
Cambodia was accepted into UN-REDD+ and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) in 2010, and Cambodia’s REDD+ readiness roadmap was approved in early 2011. The preparation 
of the roadmap has received US$6 million in support. Cambodia’s REDD+ actors include AusAID (fund-
ing a National Carbon Accounting System), DANIDA, NZAid, DFID, Blue Moon Fund, and the Clinton 
Foundation. USAID Cambodia’s new HARVEST22 program will also have activities supporting reduced 
emissions from land use. 
Table 7.2 Overview of REDD+ provinces 
Province Oddar Meanchey  Mondulkiri  
Population in 2008 185 44323 60 81124 
Province area  6 158 km2  14 288 km2 
Deforestation rate  2.1%25 0.5%26 
Area dedicated to REDD+  
activities  
68 029 ha in Oddar Meanchey 
REDD+ project 
187 00 ha in Seima Biodiversity 
Conservation Area  
 
Examining REDD+ at the local, especially community, level allows for the comparison of two differ-
ent REDD+ strategies in two very different settings and contexts. Oddar Meanchey province is located in 
the northwest of Cambodia, bordering Thailand. During the Cambodian Civil War, the area was used as a 
base by Khmer Rouge soldiers. The tensions from the civil war are still present in the area and encroach-
ment by military families to occupy land is a serious threat to local communities. Mondulkiri province is 
located in the northeast of Cambodia, bordering Vietnam. It is one of the most sparsely populated provinc-
es of Cambodia despite geographically being the largest province. The majority of the population of Mon-
dulkiri consists of ethnic minorities, mainly Pnong.  
The two Cambodian REDD+ pilot projects were at the time of research (May 2011) in the early stages 
of carbon verification. Oddar Meanchey REDD+ has submitted its project document for validation in 2009 
for dual verification by the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate Community Biodiversity 
Alliance (CCBA). The VCS is a voluntary carbon market standard, which verifies climate change mitigation 
projects and accredits them with verified emissions reductions to sell on the voluntary carbon markets. The 
buyers of VERs include, for example, companies, individuals, and not-for-profit organizations. The CCBA 
standards are aimed at voluntary land-based climate change mitigation projects, which should deliver signif-
icant benefits for local communities and biodiversity conservation. The CCBA is deemed by many as the 
toughest standard for forestry and other land-based projects in the voluntary field. The CCBA is often 
sought in conjunction with other carbon market standards, such as the VCS.  
                                                   
 
22 A USAID initiative project on Helping Address Rural Vulnerabilities and Ecosystem Stability started from October 
2010-2015 in Cambodia.  
23 Cambodia Census 2008 
24 Cambodia Census 2008  
25 Poffenberger et al 2009  
26 Ratanakoma 2009 
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7.3 The Community Forestry approach in Oddar Meanchey  
The Oddar Meanchey REDD+ project was Cambodia’s first national REDD+ pilot project. The commu-
nity forestry approach was initiated in 2007, and the REDD+ component in 2008. The area is located in the 
northwest of the country, bordering Thailand. As the first REDD+ pilot project, there are a lot of expecta-
tions  with  regards  to  the  project.  OM-REDD+  is  expected  to  set  a  precedent  for  REDD+  projects  in  
Cambodia, in terms of, for example, benefit-sharing mechanisms. It will also be valuable for delivering les-
sons learnt in project implementation and capacity development. The project covers 13 community forestry 
(CF) groups and an area of 68 029 ha, which is around 31% of the province’s total forest cover. There are 
15 villages with a population of 24 951, who are expected to benefit from the REDD+ activities related to 
the community forestry model in Oddar Meanchey.  
The idea of the community forestry model is to engage local stakeholders into forest protection, while 
also  securing  their  access  rights  and  livelihoods  (Bradley  2012).  In  the  legal  tenure  system of  Cambodia,  
community forests are termed as production forests, where local communities sign a 15-year management 
agreement with the Cambodian government. In Oddar Meanchey, community forestry is managed through 
elected Community Forestry Membership Committees (CFMCs). The CF model in Oddar Meanchey has 
been supported by an international NGO, Pact, and local NGOs Children’s Development Association and 
Monk’s Community Forestry, together with the Forestry Administration. 
Threats to forest area  
The key challenges for the forest areas of Oddar Meanchey include economic land concessions (ELCs), ill-
defined tenure systems and border conflicts. The area suffered from the military tensions between Cambo-
dia  and  Thailand  in  2011.  Oddar  Meanchey  was  an  important  location  for  the  Khmer  Rouge  during  the  
Cambodian civil war, and disputes between the military families and local communities are still relevant. 
Thus a source of conflict has been the encroachment into forest areas used by local communities by these 
military families, who wish to control access to resources in the area. The military families have since been 
ordered to villages outside of the community forestry project area.  
During the fieldwork, several different economic land concessions were announced. At least nine min-
ing exploration companies are proposing ELCs, of which most overlap geographically with the areas desig-
nated for community forestry. Additionally, eight more ELC companies are active in the provinces, with 
areas overlapping CF boundaries. Table 7.3 below identifies the ELCs in the region and Table 7.4 the min-
ing concessions in the region. Overall, up to late 2012, there are 20 ELCs with 135,669 ha and five mining 
concessions covring 67,823 ha based on Open Development Forum data base 2013. 
Table 7.3 ELCs in Oddar Meanchey 
Name Area 
(ha) 
Contract 
signed 
Purposes 
Unknown 8 200 17.08.2012 Agro-Industrial 
(Cambodia) Cane and Sug-
ar Valley (t) 
6 595 24.01.2008 Sugar plantation and construciton processiong 
factory 
Angkor Sugar(t) 6 523 24.01.2008 Sugar plantation and construciton processiong 
factory 
Best Royal (k) Co., Ltd 6 500 23.11.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Crystal Agro Compan Lim-
ited (t) 
8 000 17.07.2006 Cassava and agro-industry plantation 
Data Rubber (Cambodia) 
Co., Ltd 
7 700 14.06.2011 Agro-industrial 
Data Rubber (Cambodia) 
Co., Ltd 
7 700 06.06.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
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Hout Mean Rita Co., Ldt 1 195 13.03.2012 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Hout Mean Rita Co., Ldt 3 000 11.08.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Khun Sear Import Export 
Co., Ltd 
8 200 06.07.2012 Agro-Industry and rubber plantation 
Lon a grid thaek invest-
ment company 
4 095 28.03.2012 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Nature Planation (K.H) 
Co., Ltd 
9 020 04.11.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Real Green Co., Ltd 8 000 09.06.2006  
River Sugar cane 6 618 24.01.2008 sugar plantation and construciton processiong 
factory 
Samrong Rubber Industries 
Pte., Ltd 
9 658 12.04.2006 Rubber and other trees plantation 
Se Hong Plantation Com-
pany Limited  
9 700 06.07.2012 Agro-Industry 
Sok Samnang Development 1 865 13.03.2012 Agro-Industry and rubber plantation 
Tay Ninh Siem Reap 
Aphivath Caouchouch Co., 
Ltd 
7 600 23.11.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Tomring Rubber Co., Ltd 7 750 06.06.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
Tomring Rubber (Cambo-
dia) Co., Ltd 
7 750 06.06.2011 Agro-Industrial and Rubber plantation 
TOTAL 135 699   
Source: Open Development Forum database  
Table 7.4 Mining concenssions in Oddar Meanchey 
Minings concessions Area(ha) Location 
Angkor Wat Cement Ltd 3 150 Beng, Banteay Ampil 
Cambodia Mineral Devel-
opment Co., Ltd 
11 700 Phnom Kambot in Pongro, Chong Kal Don Sok commune, 
Chgkai district 
KD Power Group Co., Ltd 29 823 Trapeang Prasat district 
Neoneer 8 750 Banteay Ampil district 
Ratanak Stone (Cambodia) 
Development Co., Ltd 
14 400 Trapeang Prasat district 
TOTAL 67 823  
Source: Open Development Forum database  
ELCs have been a source of conflict and tension within the community forestry area in Oddar 
Meanchey, as demonstrated in a focus group interview:  
Growth Wealth Bright Co., Ltd who obtained license from provincial office with 10,000 ha has 
overlapped  with  CF  areas  of  1779  ha.   In  addition  in  2001,  there  were  land  speculation  from  
companies  who come to persuade and hire  local  people  to cut  forest  with $200 ha (forest  land 
cost  $100  and  forest  clearance  cost  $100).  They  threatened  that  even  you  do  not  sell  the  land;  
they still take away the land as they got the silent approval from the government. The activities 
took  place  from early  to  January  to  14  March  2011.  It  was  estimated  200  to  300  ha  had  been  
cleared.  The economic land overlaps with one village (Trapaing Kao Chas) and around 1,000 ha 
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of forest land. Some part of the forest land is under a logging concession and some part is under 
ELC which is around 2,000 ha. Villagers explained that first they cut forest27 and then they take 
the land.  
A particular problem relates to the unclear boundaries of the community forestry areas. Some land-use 
mapping has already been done. The aim is to map out what areas are used for different purposes, such as 
rice farming, agriculture, and forestry. Once these areas have been demarcated, the aim is to maintain the 
size of the areas as the same and to ensure community access to them. However, the concept of community 
forestry and its boundaries has not been fully understood, and community members have allowed outsiders 
to come into the community, cut forests and clear land. These practices have implied ownership of the land 
by outsiders. This is especially troublesome for the one of the 13 communities, which is located close to the 
border of Thailand.  
A household survey conducted on the project site in late 2010 indicates that 88% of the population liv-
ing within the project site is involved with farming, agricultural activities and NTFP collection (Blackburn, 
2011). Under the OM-REDD+ scheme there is no restriction on the existing livelihood activities of the 
communities, such as timber collection and NTFP collection. Timber collection is, however, restricted to 
collecting  household  materials  used  for  building,  and  it  must  be  approved  in  advance  by  the  respective  
Community Forestry Management Committee. Logging and clearance is restricted, as well as the commer-
cial use of forest resources.  
The 13 communities participating in community forestry in Oddar Meanchey are supposed to have le-
gally-granted use and management rights in the project areas. While the forest remains state property, a 15-
year co-management agreement is signed between the state and the forestry community. However, there 
have been significant challenges in practice with the land demarcations and ensuring the access and man-
agement rights in the community forestry areas in Oddar Meanchey. Although the CF areas have been 
mapped with geographical information system (GIS), it is difficult to delineate areas on the ground, unless 
they coincide with natural borders, such as rivers (Bradley 2012). In practice, it has been unclear where the 
specific CF borders lie.  
The community forestry network developed in Oddar Meanchey has been the principal forum for deal-
ing with the local land conflicts. The network consists of the different community forestry management 
committees (CFMCs) and is facilitated by a local NGO, CDA. The network has monthly meetings for the 
local community to share information and concerns. In addition, the network is able to raise these issues to 
the national level through the national Land Network and also share experiences from community forestry 
cases in other provinces. A major achievement of the network in Oddar Meanchey has been the filing of up 
to five legal cases against forest crime since 2007. These have included a complaint against local soldier vio-
lence, a complaint against a chief of a commune encouraging local people to sell land to outsiders, and a 
complaint against a local NGO confiscating logs from the village population.  
Another successful complaint has been against companies28 who received 30 000 ha of land, of which 
2 874 ha overlapped with the current CF areas. Following a complaint to MAFF in 2008, communities have 
received back 1 207 ha, covering 16 villages and two communes were over 10 000 people are beneficiaries. 
However, problems still remain with the local authorities and chiefs of the different communes. The issues 
have related to the chiefs taking over land designated to community forestry for private purposes.  
                                                   
 
27 Note: Under economic land concession, valuable forest will be cuts and sell out by forestry administration based on 
inventory and agreement prices before starting to clear land for plantation. Some villagers might be confused on this 
process (the appearance of logging for domestic consumption or supply, but actually it is the process of economic 
land concession). 
28 Lyong Phat and Ratana Rokakam 
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Benefit Sharing 
The benefits from REDD+ activities in Oddar Meanchey include benefits derived from securing forest 
livelihoods and tenure rights as well as monetary income obtained from selling carbon credits on the volun-
tary market. OM-REDD+ will be setting a precedent for how revenues from REDD+ are distributed. The 
Government Decision no. 699 of 2008 has set out the legal framework for the distribution of REDD+ rev-
enues. It states that all revenues are to be channeled through the Technical Working Group on Forest and 
Environment of the MAFF. In the Oddar Meanchey REDD+ project at least 50% of the revenues ac-
quired from selling carbon credits are to go directly to local communities through the community forestry 
management committees, whereas the other 50% will be managed by the TWG-F&E and shared with key 
development partners, such as Global Terra and PACT.  
It yet remains unclear how the 50% of money administered by the TWG-F&E is to be spent, but sug-
gestions include focusing on capacity building, forest management, local livelihood improvement, and ex-
panding REDD+ to other areas. Additionally, the actual revenues will depend on how much the carbon 
credits sell for on the global voluntary carbon market. Due to the uncertainty of carbon credit prices on the 
global market, a reserve of 10-30% of the revenues is proposed to be set aside each year (Yeang 2010). This 
would serve as a buffer mechanism to compensate incomes in years that carbon credit revenues are not high.  
The communities interviewed involved in the REDD+ activities were not expecting much in terms of 
revenues from carbon credits. The benefits of the project were viewed more in terms of better forest man-
agement practices. The first priority has been to secure land tenure by legalizing community forestry areas 
and securing collective land ownership and access rights. Secondly, communities aimed to stop illegal forest 
logging, and protect the land from ELC enclosure.  
Challenges for REDD+   
The communities have expressed that with increased funds from REDD+ they will be able to better patrol 
and monitor the forest areas themselves against illegal logging and clearing (Bradley 2012). At the same 
time, however, there are several issues that are out of their control of local communities, such as economic 
land concessions and issues arising from the border tensions between Cambodia and Thailand. Illegal log-
ging and forest clearance seem to be aggravated by the fact that REDD+ as a concept is still quite unclear 
to several of the villagers participating in community forestry. This has led to ambiguities about the border 
of the area demarcated for community forestry, and villages allowing outsiders to cut forest and clear land 
in these areas. Another challenge will be defining tenure in an area with many potential sources of conflict, 
arising from the proximity and tensions related to the disputed Thai border.  
7.4 The conservation approach of Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area   
The Seima REDD+ project is based in the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area (SBCA) in the north-east 
of  Cambodia,  bordering  Vietnam.  The  area  covers  295  451  ha  in  two  provinces,  Mondulkiri  and  Kratie,  
however, the larger part of the areas are in Mondulkiri. The core areas of Seima Biodiversity Conservation 
Area designated for the REDD+ pilot project covers only 180 000 ha. The Seima area gained conservation 
status by a government sub-decree in 2009, which designated it as Seima Protection Forest. The forest area 
is owned by the Royal Government of Cambodia and managed by the Forestry Administration together 
with the international NGO Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Previously, the area had been designated 
for a logging concession that failed due to the Malaysian logging company being unable to meet the gov-
ernment’s  royalty  requests.  The  population  living  in  the  areas  of  and  surrounding  SBCA  has  evolved  
through migration in the late 1990s, and was especially impacted by the building of a road connecting 
Kratie to Mondulkiri province. The amount of villages in the SBCA has increased from 30 in 2006 to 43 in 
2008, with a total population of 29 396 (FA/WCS 2008). A majority of the population belong to the Pnong 
ethnic minority, with small concentrations of Stieng, as well as Raong and Karol people.  
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The conservation area is separated into three zones: the core zone where villager economic activities 
are not allowed, the buffer zone where economic activities are allowed and the multi-purpose zone that is 
dedicated to local community activities. In the buffer zone, local communities are allowed to carry out cus-
tomary practice and activities based on community based forest production (CBFP), which was initiated in 
2009. No activities by local communities are allowed in the core zone that is dedicated only for scientific 
research. However, some villages are still located in the core zone, which is problematic.  
The aim of CBFP in Seima is to go beyond the community forestry (CF) model and actively attempt to 
create alternative livelihoods for local communities. The CBFP model aims to promote social issues such as 
decentralized decision-making, customary use of forests and local tenure while at the same time taking into 
account the more commercial aspects of forestry, such as scale, volume and market preferences. For exam-
ple, animal-raising in the buffer and multi-purpose zones has been introduced to decrease the pressure on 
hunting wildlife in the conservation area. This model of community based forest production is practiced in 
three villages within SBCA: O’Chra, Pu Kong and Pu Char, which are located in the district of Keo Seima.  
Threats to forest area   
The major current threats for the forest according to the local communities and project managers of the 
protection forest in SBCA are road construction, economic land concessions (ELCs) and increased defor-
estation. The road construction has facilitated illegal logging into the protected forest area. The road expan-
sion towards the SBCA protected areas produces a serious threat to local livelihoods, especially resin tap-
ping, in the area. As the village chief commented:  
Illegal logging still continues, especially the luxury timber is still logged. Especially we want to 
protect the area around the resin trees. And we go there often so we can observe and inform if 
anything happens there. And people use telephone to announce if they see people coming to do 
illegal activities from the town.  
Based on the interviews carried out with key informants, SBCA has also received several proposals for 
ELCs, particularly in the areas that have been proposed for community based forest production (covering 
approx. 12 000 ha). The proposed ELCs for the province of Mondulkiri are outlined in Table 7.4 and Table 
7.5.  
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Table 7.5 List of ELCs in Mondulkiri province 
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Table 7.6 Mining concessions in Mondulkiri province 
 
  
Interest in ELCs has arisen especially from Vietnamese companies, due to the proximity of the area to 
the Vietnamese border. The proposed economic land concessions would have direct impacts on the liveli-
hoods of local communities. Especially the proposed rubber plantations in the villages of O’Chra could 
decrease local incomes dependent on resin tapping, as rubber plantations overtake the areas with resin 
trees. The rhetorical promise of ELCs bringing employment benefits to the local populations at the mo-
ment seems unlikely, as the ELCs proposed by Vietnamese countries have expressed that they will bring 
their own labour to the area.  
Proposed areas of 10 000 ha and 5 000 ha for ELCs are within the wildlife sanctuary areas, and have 
met strong local resistance. In addition, some of the ELCs have currently been progressing without official 
licensing permitting this. A representative of the project management of WCS argues that revenues from 
REDD+ could facilitate the fight against ELCs, by increasing the operative funds of the Forestry Admin-
istration. However, these funds would need to be in the domain of US$1 million per annum, which can be 
challenging to achieve and very difficult to predict due to the uncertainty of the voluntary market for car-
bon credits. The project management and forestry administration have been active in opposing the pro-
posed economic land concessions to the area, and have had some success. As the project administration 
described:  
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“I think FA [Forestry Administration] is going to win that battle. But next year there will be an-
other  battle,  and  the  year  after  that,  there  will  be  another  one…  It  is  a  big  worry.  We  keep  
fighting, and the REDD+ revenues will help to shift the balance more towards [protection]. In 
some cases, that might make the difference. In some cases, we still won’t win. Cause the REDD+ 
money is not always enough to compete with rubber, in some places. But sometimes it will help.” 
 
Livelihoods 
The most important source of local cash income has been resin tapping and non-timber forest product 
(NTFP) collection. The incomes per families for resin tapping have ranged from US$299-377 per year, with 
a mean of US$340 per year. Most of this income has been used to buy rice for the family. The forming of a 
cooperative in 2008-2009 has enabled the resin tappers to sell directly without having to deal with an inter-
mediary. This has enabled the resin tappers themselves to raise prices, with average annual incomes from 
resin tapping now around US$ 400-500. The cooperative has enabled local resin tappers to double their 
prices (from 30 000 riel per liter of resin up to 80 000 riel per liter).  
The project management of SBCA has also been active in creating and promoting alternative livelihood 
activities for villagers in the buffer and multi-purpose zones. These include crop production (cashew nut, 
cassava), animal-raising, and community commercial logging. The community commercial logging is the 
first of its kind and would set a precedent. The idea is to provide better quality forest goods to local com-
munities and increase their monetary incomes. However, the proposed area overlaps with the current area 
of resin trees, which might cause some problems.  
Tenure 
Donors, among them Finland, have supported the Cambodian land tenure reform. It has, however, been 
under heavy critique and not yet reached the most remote areas, such as Mondulkiri province. The area of 
SBCA is classified as property of the Royal Government of Cambodia, and the project management includ-
ing the Forestry Administration and WCS have been working to complete formal tenure registration for the 
local communities. This would enable them to gain the economic benefits produced by any REDD+ activi-
ties. At least five villages29 have applied for communal land ownership, and several more villages are in the 
process of applying. Andoung Kraloung became the first village in Cambodia to receive communal land 
registration in  2010.  The area  of  15 000 ha is  to  be divided by the 114 families  so that  each family  could 
expect to have 5 ha for their own livelihood development, as is the common procedure in communal land 
registration. Areas are also to be officially demarcated as communal. While the communal land ownership 
of the area has been granted, the handing over of the certification has been postponed without explanation 
since mid-2010, and had not proceeded at the time of fieldwork (May-June 2011).   
Interviewees identified the higher likelihood of achieving land ownership through communal, rather 
than individual applications. However, to get collective ownership, communities have to demonstrate 
themselves as a common ethnic group, with differentiated traditions, customs and language from the main-
stream society.  As many have already adapted to mainstream Khmer society, self-recognition as an ethnic 
minority might be challenging. The longer term benefits of collective ownership, which cannot be sold by 
an individual, might in some cases be overrun by the short term benefits of individual ownership.  
                                                   
 
29 O’Chra, Pu Kong, and Sre Ampel in the buffer zone; Gati and Andoung Kraloung in the core zone 
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Benefit Sharing  
The discussion over the benefit sharing system of SBCA incorporates several elements besides monetary 
benefits. REDD+ has the potential to formalize forest management practices, such as community based 
forest production and non-timber forest product collection, which create  monetary benefits. Further, se-
curing land tenure is also seen as an important benefit by the local community. As such, however, the bene-
fits created by the REDD+ element in the project are unclear. Thus expectations at the village level related 
mainly to the benefits derived from the REDD+ activities. As the village chief said:  
“The villagers acknowledge that there benefit […] from forest conservation, but they could not 
see any carbon (like air, and cloud). And activities to improve livelihood, agricultural diversifica-
tion, access to market and inputs. However, the villagers suggested that the immediate future is to 
speed up land titling as it takes too long now. Up to now, there is no final land titling for each 
family who expect to get 5ha/family. There are completed demarcation and but still wait for final 
IP land registration as the whole. And forest protection is also important. There was one group 
that came from Kratie, to clear land. And we noticed that and they went somewhere else. They 
wanted to cultivate cassava.” 
With regards to the monetary benefits of REDD+ credits, WCS and FA staff have attempted to keep ex-
pectations low, due to the uncertainty of the global voluntary carbon market. REDD+ was explained to 
communities as forest conservation, with benefits derived from NTFP collection. The concept of carbon 
was unclear to most villagers, yet they understood the benefit of forest protection and how carbon could be 
sold: 
“We did not know clearly what is carbon credit initiated by project staff [WCS/FA] but we did 
realized that we have been trained to protect forest and land where carbon can be sold. We do 
not know what carbon look like. The expected benefit from this selling included money used for 
village road construction, develop forest fire routes in order to protect [from] forest fires, while 
additional budget are expected to help vulnerable people in the village such as widow or amputed 
persons.” 
Challenges for REDD+  
 Despite being the focus of conservation efforts, the area of Mondulkiri faces high land use pressures from 
both deforestation and land concessions, due to its proximity to Vietnam and its fertile lands. The previous-
ly sparsely populated province is facing increased population growth and migration, as well. Currently, at 
least three economic land concessions are being proposed in the area of SBCA. The FA and WCS staff 
have managed to stop one, and are in the process of negotiating to stop two. However, the inability to con-
fidently guarantee REDD+ funds to the government decreases the leverage of the MAFF staff in opposing 
land concessions within the central administration. The economic value of rubber plantations is so high 
that forest conservation efforts have difficulty to compete with it. The situation has led to low expectations 
at the local level for any monetary income from REDD+ projects directly reaching local communities. As 
seen in the interviews, villagers are more concerned with securing land titles and speeding up the process of 
communal land registration. Equally relevant is the concern over the ability to secure incomes from com-
munity based forest products and non-timber forest product collection. The money from sold carbon cred-
its generated by the REDD+ project has the potential to contribute to and hasten these processes.   
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7.5 Two cases of REDD+ in Cambodia: Conclusions 
The first two national REDD+ pilot programs in Oddar Meanchey and Mondulkiri provinces will serve as 
important examples for Cambodia’s and other countries’ future REDD+ policies and projects. The verifi-
cation of both projects for the voluntary carbon market by the Voluntary Carbon Standard and the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance was anticipated eagerly by project staff during the fieldwork. Both 
projects are nationally significant, yet vary in their approaches to local livelihoods and forest protection. 
While OM-REDD+ is based on promoting community forestry in a production forest area, Seima 
REDD+ is focused on finding the balanced between zoning areas for land concessions, conservation and 
community forest practices.  
Both areas face similar challenges, which have been met with different approaches. Based on the exten-
sive fieldwork, the threat of economic land concessions arose as the most pressing concern of local com-
munities in both Oddar Meanchey and the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area. Both areas had been 
proposed for several economic land concessions, from diverse sectors such as mining and plantations, es-
pecially rubber plantations. The challenge for projects such as those in Oddar Meanchey and Seima lies in 
demonstrating that REDD+ can actually compete with the monetary gains attained from economic land 
concessions. This is a challenge for the Forestry Administration to demonstrate to the central government 
as well. A second task for both areas lies in restricting illegal logging, which has expanded to a great extent 
due the construction of roads intro previously inaccessible areas. While road access has brought opportuni-
ties, such as increased access to markets, it has also increased commercial interest in the forest areas.  
The fieldwork indicates that local communities in Oddar Meanchey and Mondulkiri REDD+ areas 
have similar priorities and expectations to some extent from the REDD+ activities. The actual revenue 
from selling carbon credits was not a priority or likely outcome for the majority of communities inter-
viewed. Partially this can be attributed to project staff deliberately keeping expectations of carbon revenues 
low, due to the uncertainty of the voluntary carbon market. However, interviews indicate that the commu-
nities are much more concerned and interested in the side benefits that could be hastened by REDD+ con-
tributions. The primary concern was securing land titles and tenure, thus permitting longer term livelihood 
security and planning possibilities for the local communities. While this process is under way in both Seima 
REDD+ and OM-REDD+, there have been severe delays in the issuance of land titles. Another concern, 
linked to establishing tenure rights, was securing livelihood activities. This concern is linked to the threat 
presented by economic land concessions, which could displace local forest-based livelihoods. The OM-
REDD+ project provides alternatives for livelihoods through the community forestry model. The Seima 
Biodiversity Conservation Area project has attempted to delineate the areas where livelihood activities are 
allowed and provide alternatives, such as animal-raising, to activities that were previously carried out in the 
core zone, such as wildlife hunting. The two cases of REDD+ pilot projects in Cambodia demonstrate that 
these projects do not exist in isolation, but are essentially tied to social, economic and political realities at 
the local level, as well as influenced by global and regional processes. This research has highlighted the im-
portance of REDD+ projects not only as mechanisms of climate mitigation that creates revenue through 
selling carbon credits, but as forest management practices. As such, the importance of land use planning 
and establishing tenure rights and access rise as the most significant factor for local communities. This ena-
bles communities to better plan their livelihoods in a longer timeframe. Thus also any funds arising from 
REDD+ are expected to be geared towards improving livelihoods and increasing land security and titling.  
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8. LAOS FORESTS AND THE ENTRANCE OF 
REDD+: CONTESTED SYNERGIES  
Otto Bruun 
"The holy grail of forest and development has talked about poverty reduction - that link is however yet to be demon-
strated" (interview with World Bank representative 6/2011).  
“ … In the long term, sustainable forest management strategy aimed at maintaining or increasing forest carbon 
stocks, while producing an annual yield of timber, fibre, or energy from the forest, will generate the largest sustained 
mitigation benefit.”  (IPCC: 4th assessment review 2007) 
In 1990–2000 land-use change, most notably due to tropical or subtropical deforestation represented 
roughly 20 per cent of global GHG emissions, in the first decade of this century this figure had been low-
ered to approximately  12%. The lower percentage is  mainly  due to the global  growth of  emissions from 
fossil fuels (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). While this is not the first time a worry about tropical forests in 
developing countries surfaces, the big contribution to climate change has led to an initiative for new large 
scale support through a seemingly simple  idea known as REDD+. The novelty and purpose lies in giving 
financial and other incentives to protect carbon dense forest, improving forest carbon stocks and sustaina-
ble forest management, a framework is supported by governance reform. This is expected to tilt the balance 
in favour of forest conservation and thereby mitigate significant amount of global GHGs.   
Forests are not, however, only a carbon stand. Figures from the World Bank estimate that globally 1.6 
billion people “rely heavily” on forests for their livelihoods and over 2 billion people use forests for fire-
wood and energy and over 60 % gain medical plants from the worlds´ forests (World Bank 2004 cited in 
Kanninen 2009). These are people that development policy would consider a target of its poverty reduction 
effort almost everywhere and who have a significant livelihood-based interest in the healthy state of the 
world’s forests.  
While few fail to acknowledge the importance of forests for both environmental and livelihood-related 
reasons, forest development co-operation has historically had difficulties reaching sustainable results. Previ-
ous disappointments with industrial scale forestry and environmental concerns led in the 1980s to Tropical 
Forestry Action Plans (TFAPs) under the World Bank and in the 1990s development co-operation focused 
on integrating conservation and development projects. Despite the logic of synergies the livelihoods of the 
poorest and forest conservation were merged with mostly modest success (Brandon and Wells 2009). These 
disappointments form the background on the REDD+ initiative or Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (the plus indicating forest conservation, sustainable forest management and the en-
hancement of carbon stocks). While there is nothing new in an initiative supporting both social and envi-
ronmental goals the idea here includes novelty, as it aims to create “performance-based” mitigation, which 
pays forest users to protect an ecological service or global carbon sink, compared to a pre-established emis-
sions baseline. It has been decided that the approach be leveraged by large-scale funding: and mitigation is a 
key target.  
After being left out of treaties in the 1990s due to political sensitivity and national sovereignty reasons, 
forests resurfaced in the multilateral climate negotiations at the Montreal Conference of Parties in 2005. In 
the meeting in Bali 2007 a decision and plan to include forests in the UNFCCC agreements as a mitigation 
scheme was made. While there has since been a conviction that reducing carbon emissions from the forest 
and land use sectors might benefit many actors, several key issues have remained. Firstly, the environmental 
and social safeguards to be employed have been disputed. Developing countries have been unwilling to 
commit to any binding safeguards that go very far. These are required to make sure that the mitigation ef-
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forts in the Reduction of Deforestation and Forests Degradation (under REDD+) or afforestation of cur-
rently non-forested areas (under the Clean Development Mechanism) do not lead to carbon conservation 
“land grabs”, loss of indigenous rights or a loss in biodiversity (e.g. through replacing natural forests with 
fast-growing tree plantations) (Schoneveld 2011). Chattre and Agrawal (2009) have pointed out that 
REDD+ implies added monetary benefits, which is problematic if previous rent-seeking behaviour by de-
veloping country state or other elites continue, which might potentially lead to a problematic slowing down 
of reform for best-practice community based forest management. Ideally REDD+ would lead to benefits 
foremost between biodiversity, climate mitigation, adaptation and community benefits (see Anglesen 2009) 
to reach national development policy targets and the Millennium Development Goals in a sustainable way.  
No final decisions on REDD+ funding have been made, but readiness efforts of one or another kind 
are already on going in most tropical forest countries. For example in autumn 2011  the World Bank 
warned about a general collapse of the carbon market being eminent (Vidal 2011) while other actors still 
highlight the potential. The Durban COP 17 conference in 2012 established, that there will be a future for 
REDD+, provided that current disagreement can be overcome. The estimated annual funds needed to 
halve deforestation have been estimated at 17 to 33 billion USD, leading to claims that it is the fairest, 
quickest and cheapest source of emissions reduction. These figures were based on opportunity cost calcula-
tions, but this approach has since questioned, as the real costs are significantly higher (MacKinsey company 
2010). Global analysts have already noted, that the costs will be significantly higher than first expected due to 
high technical requirements and the high costs of acquiring reliable carbon data. Carbon accounting is report-
ed to dominate project developing costs and accurate methods are reported to be so costly, that present and 
future carbon market prices are feared to be too low to cover the cost. (The Munden Project 2011: 9) 
The funding is to come from part of the 100 billion annual means of the Green Climate Fund that was 
decided on in the UNFCCC framework in 2009 and 2010, which was operationalized at COP17.30 These 
figures can be compared to the financial flows (ODA and investments) annually in the forest sector in de-
veloping countries, which are estimated at the level of 12 to 24 billion USD per year. The annual forest sec-
tor ODA in 2007 was about 0.5 to 1.7 billion USD before the entrance of REDD+, representing about 
0.5% to 1.5% of the total annual ODA (El Lakany et al., 2007: cited in Kanninen 2009). Plantation forestry 
dominates both public and private sector investment, thus reflecting the increasing importance of tropical 
fast-growing plantations in industrial forestry production, especially in Southeast Asia (see Anglesen & 
Kaimovitz 1999; Barney 2008) Both international and Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs experts doubt 
that there is little on this scale necessary to be expected without private (or innovative financing through 
new taxation of private actors) involved (interview with FORMIN staff 6/2011). There are actors, especial-
ly the state of California, driving the inclusion of forest carbon sinks into global offsetting arrangements 
(Schoneveld 2011), while these schemes remain criticized by Brazil and a number of other countries, who 
claim that they are inadequate with the present climate crises, as they do not reduce emissions but rather 
only shift them from the global North to the global South.  
While these discussions remain and will continue REDD+ has already been established on a national 
and local scale facilitated by the World Bank, FAO and the UNDP. As long as no global registration proce-
dures and funding have been agreed, credits from REDD+ projects with high standards are typically sold 
to the Voluntary Carbon Market, using the Voluntary Carbon Standard in parallel with the Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA),  which aims to ensure positive net impacts on different fronts in 
projects involving land-use change.   
                                                   
 
30 About US 5.5 billion has already been committed by countries, of which a majority by Norway and Australia, as well 
as multilateral agencies to fund the preparation and implementation of REDD+ in developing countries.  
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This chapter looks at the entrance of REDD+ pilot projects, finance, governance reforms and forest 
carbon measurement projects in Lao PDR during 2008–2011. What approach are early REDD+ projects 
taking and what realities do they face? Especially, what kind of expectations are present and for whom? Further, 
what type of framework is used in combining mitigation and development? The chapter does this by focusing on the 
ownership and capacity building dimensions of the early REDD+ efforts. The chapter is structured as fol-
lows: after the preceding general introduction the dynamic of negotiating the global REDD+ into Laos is 
looked at. Following this the national level is looked at before moving on to the local level. The section 
concludes with a look at the rather diverse dimensions of Laos REDD+ preparations and discuss; what 
kind of issues might arise when trying to reach the twin targets of climate mitigation and poverty reduction 
simultaneously.  
The material of this qualitative case-study chapter is based on interviews. Relevant actors in the 
REDD+ framework in Lao PDR were interviewed between March and July 2011. All in all 29 expert inter-
views with government staff at different ministerial provincial and district level actors, donor representa-
tives, International NGOs and private sector were conducted by the team including Dr. Sithong Thong-
manivong, Otto Bruun and field assistant Douangta Buaphavong. The target informants were selected on 
the basis of key high-level actors representing different sectors of society and early respondents were asked 
to direct us further within the vast network of different stakeholders. Additionally, province, district and 
village level visits to Khammuane (in the central part), Salavan (South) and Huaphan (North) provinces 
were made to sites that are or have been discussed as the sites of REDD+ activities to identify and com-
pare how individual approaches or projects were proceeding. Interviews were conducted with an anonymity 
principle, although actors in individual cases may be traced down due to the need to bring out the institu-
tional context where actors speak: these actors were aware of this condition. To complement the research 
material,  newspaper  articles,  policy  briefings  and  presentations  of  REDD+ at  different  fora  in  Laos  and  
beyond between 2007–2011 were used. In terms of statistical evidence existing research, reports and the 
interviewees provide the basis. The target villages were selected on the basis of two criteria. Firstly, the tar-
get villages were selected based on suggestions of interesting or telling cases. Additionally, they were villages 
where no research to the knowledge of the research team had been conducted shortly before. In this report 
they serve as examples of the evolving REDD+ framework. Generalisations from individual cases or com-
ments are made to illustrate the more general framework of interviews, which have been systematically ana-
lysed. 
8.1 REDD+ entering the stage in Laos  
Over 70 per cent of Lao PDR climate emissions have their origin in deforestation and forest degradation 
(Chokkalingam 2010). The climate mitigation agenda in Laos does not however stem from concerns within 
Laos, but rather from the international policy framework, and it is this potential funding that has awoken 
the broad interest within Laos.  
However, in the forest sector targets are optimistically in line with the official policy to raise the forest 
cover from the present 40 per cent to 70 per cent of the land area by 2020 (GOL 2005). There is some op-
timism in the country among actors that REDD+ can bring enough momentum to turn the trend of fast 
and uncontrollable deforestation under control while bringing development benefits with it for people liv-
ing  in  or  near  forest  areas  (MAF  2010).31 Forest conversion to agricultural needs and planting of fast-
                                                   
 
31 Cerbu et al. (2011) review 79 REDD+ readiness activities and 100 REDD+ demonstration activities developed as 
of October 2009 and show an uneven distribution of activities across tropical countries. They highlight that the largest 
share of REDD readiness and demonstration activities were implemented in Indonesia and Brazil, which is in turn 
related to these countries’ greatest forest-based emission reduction potential. Although LDCs are again surpassed, it 
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growing trees is very much an on-going issue with the recent investment boom in Lao PDR and there is 
thus some urgency in addressing what are usually defined as the drivers (or indirect and direct causing fac-
tors) of deforestation (Barney 2011; Anglesen 2009; Anglesen & Kaimovitz 1999).  
The Lao forest administration has had limited possibility to participate in the negotiations in the UN-
FCCC. With ODA funded support the forest administration and other stakeholders have participated in the 
COP meetings during the last few years. The participation has been considered highly useful for the 
strengthening of the capacity to understand and implement REDD+. As one participant from the forest 
administration states: (interview 5/2011):  
“For Lao I think we are part of LDC group, G-77 with China, and then that´s all. We cannot par-
ticipate in the forestry sector, we are only able a bit to focus on the REDD+ issues. Sometimes 
we try to go around a bit in the groups to look, for example the Rainforest Alliance…. We are not 
active there, and there are many meetings, and it is not possible to get a full picture of the confer-
ence, as there are so many meetings. […] It is good to attend the conference, you are exposed to 
many things, when you attend the meeting […] It takes years to build this capacity”  
The capacity and commitment of some leading figures in the administration is strong, whereas the 
knowledge on REDD+ is only little by little being spreading out to the areas where activities will begin. 
Other areas of the country will only be included in later stages of the process. Managing the simultaneous 
capacity  building,  the governance process  and all  the pilots  is  however  putting severe  strains  on the Lao 
PDR foreign-educated and comparably competent but rather thin (in terms of high-capacity staff) forest 
administration. (interview 4/2011).  
REDD+ and the support pledged with it offers a possibility for the forest administration to find ex-
tended funding and political momentum nationally for reaching targets stipulated in the National forestry 
strategy 2020 (GoL 2005). These targets include raising forest cover, as argued by one forestry official: “this 
is an opportunity for us to finally reach our targets”. Similarly, the administration does not seem to have 
much of an option as most forest sector development assistance, traditionally important as a source of ex-
ternal funding in Lao PDR, has been realigned in line with or to support REDD+, see Figure 8.1 below 
(interview with Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs interview 6/2011; GOL 2010). The goal of climate 
change mitigation is thus present through the target to restore the nationally (and economically) important 
forests and the political ownership exists for some of the key targets and means. However, the concepts of 
forests as a carbon sink or the carbon market are unclear. As an academic researcher within the country 
argues: “we were once taught to identify valuable species for commercial forestry: now we should suddenly 
see the forest as a carbon stock. It is a big change” (interview 4/2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
seems like Laos (and Cambodia) are considered an interesting site for REDD+ because of biodiversity co-benefits, 
while most of Africa might again be surpassed. 
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Figure 8.1 Source: SUFORD-project. Indicating the considerable amount of ODA-pledges that are 
currently forming the momentum around REDD+ 
 The climate change office of the Water Resources and Environment Agency (WREA, in late 2011 in-
cluded in a new large ministry for natural resources) argues that “if Laos mitigates part of its emissions through 
REDD+ and does adaptation as committed to in Kyoto protocol, also other countries should be able to do their part, we are a 
very poor country” (interview, WREA 4/2011).  The following section looks at how REDD+ is being con-
structed from global to local.  
REDD+ national institutions take shape 
Worldwide national REDD+ efforts have been supported mainly via the World Bank and its Forest Car-
bon Partnership Facility or the FAO/UNDP coordinated UN-REDD. Thomson et. al (2011) describe how 
the United Nations REDD+ framework UN-REDD and the World Bank´s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility have been at the centre of supporting the activities and readiness of developing countries to 
REDD+. Finland has been financing this global effort with a combined over USD 14 million. 
 To tackle deforestation through REDD+ Lao PDR joined the World Bank co-ordinated Forest Car-
bon Partnership Facility (FCPF) early in 2009, and in 2010 it was selected as one of eight countries as a pi-
lot in the Forest Investment project (FIP) with a pledged amount of 20-30 million dollars. Most of these 
funds are counted as ODA-eligible (interview with MAF). FIP funds will be leveraged with Multilateral De-
velopment Bank grants (involving Finnish funding), thus creating an additional effect. Whereas FCPF funds 
are building REDD+ readiness, FIP is supposed to support "action in one form or another: measures going beyond 
readiness, real investments" (interview with WB staff 5/2011). Though pilot projects have taken off later than in 
several other countries, for some frustratingly slow (interviews with administrator at Department of Forest-
ry [DoF] 4/2011), pilot projects are being planned in at least four different locations by international devel-
opment and conservation NGOs, and feasibility studies are being conducted by at least a dozen companies. 
(GOL 2010).  
To the FCPF Lao PDR has submitted a Readiness Preparedness Proposal (R-PP) in October 2010, the 
single most important document of REDD+ governance in Lao PDR so far. The proposals have been 
submitted to the FCPF Facilities Management Team and are reviewed and approved by the Participants 
Committee that is comprised of 14 REDD Country Participants and 14 Donor Country and Carbon Fund 
participants (FCPF, 2010). Thus, any country’s framework for REDD+ implementation has to be validated 
multiple times by international organizations and their designated experts. (Thompson et. al 2011).  Follow-
ing critical comments from the Participants Committee, FCPF country ownership has been highlighted in Lao 
PDR. In 2010 the organisation of the co-ordinating Lao PDR REDD+ steering committee was reshuffled, 
removing foreign and International NGO staff and introducing key high-level staff from different sectors 
of administration, with all sectors considered relevant for forest carbon included either directly or indirectly, 
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such as mining and energy. Through FCPF USD 3,4 million has been pledged for building preparedness in 
Lao PDR, although the funds are still “disbursing” as of March 15 2012. A key early result is, that REDD+ 
has increased the national and international transparency of the Lao PDR forest sector, e.g. the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and World Bank supported SUFORD-project has assisted the Ministry in compiling an an-
nual report on REDD+ in Lao PDR, which serves broadly assisting the aims of distributing general infor-
mation on action in the Lao forest sector.   
 
 
Figure 8.2 Institutional arrangements of REDD+ in Lao PDR 
Considering the small size economy of the Lao PDR country co-ordination between donors is a feasi-
ble task.  According to one project executive: “it is a major opportunity, which is as of yet not fully seized” 
(interview at REDD+ implementing agency 4/2011)." The role of the World Bank through FCPF has been 
strong in facilitating the process but also in assisting the government. However, the situation of the 
REDD+ setup is somewhat challenging as one informant argues (interview. 4/2011):  
“We are now in the ´let the thousand flowers boom´ phase. Government says yes to everything. 
Partners, schemes, private, public... There is a need for something more structured and rational-
ised.”32 
 
                                                   
 
32 A number of pilot projects in Laos have been initiated. The main ones are connected to national protection areas. 
These involve projects by WWF in Sekong province in the South of the country, CLIPAD projects in two regions 
(Bolikhamxay and Huaphan provinces), of which we visited Huaphan. There is also a community forestry REDD+ 
project by JICA in Luang Prabang. Additionally the Finnish SUFORD program for Sustainable Production Forest 
Management is involved in REDD+ preparation, and might due to surprising convergence be the first project to gen-
erate actual credits (interview 2/2012: Suford project) 
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Box 8.1 Carbon cowboys and the difficulty of offset regulation 
 
 
The  selection  process  is  driven  by  donors  or  private  groups,  while  the  forest  administration  tries  to  
maintain a right to veto any individual project. SUFORD project has been able to assist their Laotian part-
ners also to exclude partners that are not serious and avoid projects driven by speculative or short sighted 
private interest in the carbon market, also known as carbon cowboys (see Box 8.1). 
The private sector however, does express concern on the end market of carbon credits: and pose a 
question whether all the effort is really worth it. The private actors that have signalled an interest (see Table 
8.1) in REDD+ projects include companies with different backgrounds and interests. At least one of them 
have demonstrably been part of cutting primary forest for eucalyptus plantations, as in the case of OJI Pa-
per in central areas of the country (see Barney 2008)  
 
The concept of “carbon cowboys” gained public attention when in 2007 a hedge fund manager remarked in the 
Financial Times: “there are plenty of carbon cowboys out there, looking to make a quick buck” (Harvey, 2007). 
The  term refers  to  individuals  or  organizations  attempting  to  gain  personal  financial  advantage  of  the  swiftly  
growing carbon offset markets by creating or selling forward unsubstantiated carbon credits from the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), REDD+ or Voluntary Carbon Markets. Within this field lie several opportu-
nities and incentives, as identified by the Transparency International (TI) “Global Corruption Report: Climate 
Change” of 2011. The following examples refer to forest governance, yet they can also be partially extended to 
other fields of offsetting,    
· approving  projects  that  should  not  qualify  for  emissions  reductions  or  do  not  fulfill  additionality  re-
quirements  
· overestimating climatic benefits by skewing data or analysis 
· verifying fictitious projects, such as forests that do not exist 
· being unable to secure permanence of carbon offsets 
 
(TI, 2011; 335-338)  
Most  of  these  threats  exist  due  to  limitations  in  both  the  validation  process  as  well  as  the  current  system of  
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Validation and MRV are, to some extent, “gatekeepers” of car-
bon offsets; once offsetting projects have passed through the arduous verifications, they are legitimized and 
enter either the Kyoto Protocol compliance market or the Voluntary Carbon Market. Currently, the MRV sys-
tem suffers from a lack of effective institutions, standardization and weak capacities. However, there are wide 
differences between the Kyoto compliance market and the various standards within the Voluntary Carbon Mar-
kets. For example, CDM regulation has been criticized to the extent that the legitimacy of CDM governance has 
become a factor of accurate auditing. In effect, auditing itself has become more of a policy goal than removing 
CO2 from the atmosphere (Lovell & Liverman, 2010). Another governance concern is the small circle of people 
working around carbon offsets, leading to situations where those creating regulations and auditing end up con-
ducting  offset  projects  themselves.  In  addition,  several  people  involved  in  the  business  of  carbon  offsetting  
(regulators, auditors, project developers) have personal financial motives to increase the amount of carbon off-
sets (Lohmann, 2010).  
 
Despite evident problems, the consensus views validation and MRV as the key framework to ensuring market 
functions, and therefore the TI report recommends a few basic governance reforms in the carbon offset host 
countries. Firstly and most importantly, is the question of land tenure, and ensuring an effective legal framework 
of land rights in the designated carbon offset areas. This is bound to be the most politically charged and difficult 
of the governance reforms, and one can question whether sufficient reforms can be conducted under the scope 
of current carbon-offset programs. Secondly, the report hails the establishment of oversight and auditing mech-
anisms, with third party monitoring. Finally, all carbon offset projects must ensure compensation to communi-
ties, as well as having established their free prior informed consent (FPIC). The above governance reforms are 
by no means simple to institute, nor are they necessarily sufficient. A key question that remains unanswered is 
who has the liability for counterfeit credits once they have passed through validation and MRV? Will entities 
such as the CDM Executive Board, or Voluntary Carbon Market issuers, have the right to remove unsubstanti-
ated credits from the market? Without such securities in place, it is difficult to establish long-term legitimacy for 
carbon offsets. Thus, regulation may be able to enhance processes of validation and MRV, however, “carbon 
cowboys” may not be completely eradicated. As the TI report concludes: “market actors who know how to 
‘game the system’ are likely to make big profits while most others suffer substantial losses” (TI, 2011; 340).  
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Table 8.1 List of private sectors expressing interest in developing REDD+ project in Laos (table 
obtained from MAF 5/2011, and excludes actors considered “non-trustworthy) 
Private company name Status 
Acadia Investment Management Submit feasibility study & MoU 
Indochina Resort Group Express interest with initial PIN 
New Chip Xeng (Prime Cons. Con., Express interests, initial meeting with REDD TF 
Oji Paper Submit idea note 
Green Planet JSC Express interest 
Vang Veuan trading export-import Co., Express interest in either REDD+ or CDM 
Kyoto Energy Co., Express interest 
Prime Invest Co., & Sinclair Knight Merz 
(Australia) 
Express interest & idea note 
Stora Enso (Finland) Express interest, invitation from FIP 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Forest Categories in Laos  
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Box 8.2 Types of Forest in Lao PDR 
 
In the general context the forest administration admits that it is difficult with so many projects entering 
and pending decisions at once: 
“We don´t want to have small, small, small - many small ones - we want to have more bigger pro-
jects that feed into a broad process. The situation with the production forest [SUFORD project] 
and its programmatic approach to assisting in the management of all production forest areas is 
good, a big program that we are able to manage”.  
It seems as though actors would agree that supporting the ownership of the recipient Lao forest sector 
could function by supporting a more programmatic approach instead of building on a project by project 
approach. In this sense the approach of SUFORD-project can be argued to be an efficient way of building 
administrative capacities across the board.   
8.2 The three threats on Lao Forests  
Current annual deforestation and forest degradation Lao PDR is estimated at 0,5-0,9% annually (GOL 
2010). In our interviews actors involved in REDD+ named illegal logging, shifting cultivation agriculture, 
forest fires, mining, hydropower development, plantations, agricultural encroachment as the main reason 
for the fact that forest cover (with the national definition of over 20% canopy density, excluding fast-
growing tree plantations) and quality is falling (MAF 2008). This points to the importance of what drivers 
of deforestation in the country are being targeted as part of REDD+.  
While Laos, as party of existing international commitments to e.g. the biodiversity convention and un-
der the Millennium Development Goals (addressing deforestation, biodiversity and climate mitigation un-
der target 7), should stop deforestation and logging operations, deforestation continues and large forest 
areas are being degraded. Weak governance and capacities are argued to be particularly responsible for these 
developments (GOL 2010). From a statistical point of view, which is somewhat unreliable in a context such 
as Laos (see Hardcastle and Baird 2008) commercial concessions or the agricultural method of shifting cul-
tivation (also denoted rotational cultivation, slash-and-burn cultivation) have been given main responsibil-
ity, with development and commercial schemes accounting for significant amounts as well. Illegal logging is, 
despite some commonly held beliefs, currently believed to cause rather forest degradation than deforesta-
tion: only the valuable species are taken out of the forest (interview with researchers: 5/2011).  The below 
At the national level, the Forestry Law differentiates three main categories of State forests, which are all relevant for 
national REDD+, and all involve both forest in good and not-ideal health.  
 
Protection forests, aimed at protecting watersheds and subdivided into total protection zones (all land uses prohib-
ited) and controlled use zones (permanent agriculture, non-commercial logging and collection of forest products 
allowed), 
 
Conservation forests and National Protected Areas (NPAs), aimed at preserving landscapes, ecosystems and biodi-
versity and subdivided into total protection zones (all land uses prohibited), controlled use zones (permanent agri-
culture, non-commercial logging and collection of forest products allowed), corridor zones (collection of forest 
products allowed) and buffer zones (non-commercial logging and collection of forest products allowed), 
Production forests, aimed at developing sustainable forestry activities and subdivided into forest management areas 
(devoted to timber exploitation) and village use zones (permanent agriculture, non-commercial logging and collec-
tion of forest products allowed). 
 
Of the forest area 13 % is protection forest,  33 % production forest,  35% areas designate as National protected 
areas and 19 % provincial and district protected areas. (Source: MAF) 2009).  
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statistic is from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Laos. In the statistics on deforestation drivers it 
is not currently considered to what extent shifting cultivation is causing emissions due to being displaced by 
other drivers from agricultural land, i.e. leakage of emissions and the indirect land use changes, which have 
become very important in analysing carbon accounting. Primary studies in Northern REDD+ pilot site in-
dicate that emissions due to shifting cultivation are surprisingly low (personal communication 2/2012) and 
that project areas are thus being extended. 
Table 8.2 Estimates of average yearly emissions of CO2 from 2012-2020 using the baseline settings. 
Source: (R-PP, GOL 2010) 
 
From the table above, the official main reasons of current deforestation can be deduced. Firstly, defor-
estation that is caused by land clearance in projects furthering national development priorities such as hy-
dropower but also a number of other causes identified in documents such as poverty reduction strategy 
paper (PRSP) and the national five-year development plan (GOL 2008; GOL 2005). The second reason 
relates to commercial development through economic land concessions, exemplified by a number of con-
cessions for mines, agricultural or forestry plantation development, which to a certain extent are additional 
and new compared to targets set in development plans. And thirdly, it is possible to distinguish shifting cul-
tivation or smallholder cash crops, which are often identified as poverty driven. These will be discussed one 
by one below. 
National Development Priorities 
The Ministry of Agriculture and forestry has developed a clear vision of development in the country, entic-
ing: "The strategic direction for agriculture and forestry based development is to ensure a successful gradual 
transition from subsistence into commercial smallholder production.” (MAF 2010) This vision is, however, 
overrun by other visions in an attempt to create fast economic growth through the utilization of the vast 
natural resources (land, water and forest) in the country, bringing export earnings. Building hydropower, 
promoting fast-growing tree plantations and developing the mining sector have been the key ingredients. 
Hydropower and the vision of Laos as the electricity-exporting “Battery of (Southeast) Asia” is probably 
the main political vision with 70 large-scale projects in the pipeline up to 2030, including eight on the con-
tested Mekong mainstream.  
A substantial amount of logging has been initiated and approved in recent years in reservoir areas of 
proposed hydroelectric dams (Baird 2010a). According to informants in the Lao forest administration and 
development projects the challenge of REDD+ will begin around 2018 or 2020 when the current and near-
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future infrastructure development sites have been utilized for logging and the sector will be looking for new 
areas for large-scale logging (interview 4 and 5/2011).  
Table 8.3 2006-2007 estimated government timber revenue by type of harvesting 
 
The national economic significance of logging revenue is still high, while only a part of it is accounted 
for in official statistics (Barney and Canby 2011). Timber, minerals and hydropower are Lao PDR’s primary 
exports, accounting for two-thirds of total official export value. (GOL 2010).  
In the interviews, the actors from the energy and mining sectors seem more interested in focusing on 
national priorities within their sectors than addressing deforestation in a pro-poor manner. The knowledge 
on REDD+ issues by representatives in the national Task Force was as of yet low, including of their own 
sectoral contribution. There is, what one researcher called, a tradition of “very strong sectoral distribution 
of work within Lao PDR natural resource management” (interview, Lao forest researcher 4/2011), which 
has caused and probably will cause difficulties for targeting some deforestation driver, even if a new integra-
tive approach has been defined with the 2011 reform to link different ministries under a new Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Environment.  
A close reading of the Lao PDR Readiness Preparing Proposal for REDD+ reveals the potential con-
flict between REDD+ goals and existing priority policy goals for the land use sector, such as the commer-
cialization of agriculture are acknowledged. The R-PP estimates that nearly half of the emissions from land 
use change in Lao PDR are highly dependent on decisions and actions from other sectors that require land 
for other purposes. The World Resources Institute (2010) has analysed the plan and argued it does not 
“Identify potential strategies for reconciling conflicts between competing land use priorities that go beyond 
raising awareness.” A key question for the further process is:  how will the REDD+ Task Force or the rep-
resentative bodies reach out to include a broader representation of sectoral interests? 
According to World Bank staff (interview 5/2011), the writing of the  
“R-PP was galvanizing, in that they needed broader consultation than they´ve ever had…  Many 
development initiatives require fellings of forest. The deforestation associated with infrastructure 
can be limited. The logging is seldom limited to the interdition areas. These kind of trade-offs 
maybe can be avoided in the future, which would already be huge."  
The national development priorities in the hydropower sector and REDD+ might be mutually support-
ive. This narrative was repeated time after time by forest administrators and academics explaining how the 
target for 70 per cent forest cover is compatible with the vision of Lao PDR as the Battery of Asia. This is 
related to the perceived function of forests serving a key hydrological service in the watershed areas and 
avoiding erosion (interview 5/2011):  
"The main industry is the hydropower, and they really need the forest for the water management. 
[...]. I don´t think it [forest conservation] hinders the national development. It could encourage it, 
the main industry of the nation. The long term for the energy supply. It goes back to the zoning 
of the land. 70 % if put in the right place could be enough to make place for the other [develop-
ment] projects. The watershed areas are prioritized [for protection] in the forest law.”  
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This is further reflected by the fact that the government has initiated a process around a prime ministe-
rial decree stipulating that 1 per cent of all revenue from hydropower shall in the future be used to support 
sustainable forest management, although the application of this is being contested by hydropower compa-
nies. These funds would be far larger than the potential of REDD+, and a payment for ecosystem scheme 
is considered in key areas to pay forest users. 
On a general level, the weak governance of forests has been a worry and will be in the near future, as 
the millions of REDD+ funding for building preparedness are coming in. There are concerns that the sig-
nificant financial resources that could become available under REDD+ might exacerbate, rather than ad-
dress, institutional and social factors that contribute to forest loss and degradation, such as elite capture of 
benefits and corrupt behaviour. Large scale plantation forestry development, which has developed very 
dramatically as of late, is looked at in more detail below.   
The commercial tree plantation boom 
In Asia, most of the tropical forests are under pressure of over-exploitation and conversion to plantations 
of oil palm and fast-growing timber for the pulp industry (Kanninen et al., 2007; Eliash, 2008). Understand-
ing and addressing these external causes is according to most REDD+ researchers crucial to identifying 
appropriate incentives to curb deforestation (see Anglesen 2009). 
Laos has experienced an investment boom in large scale plantation forestry and smallholder rubber 
since 2006, along with a number of other countries in the region (Hall et al.  2011). Even though the Na-
tional  Forestry  program  stipulated  that  500.000  ha  of  land  would  be  allocated  for  tree  plantations,  few  
thought that this would be realized in a matter of just a few years (Baird et al.  2009). Estimates announce 
1,4 million ha are already under concessions, although some raise that estimate to 2-3 million ha when ac-
tive and not yet implemented projects are taken into account (Barney 2010).  
The problem of the investments is the limited capacity of the government to negotiate land deals that 
involves benefits for either the government or on local levels: land in Lao PDR has been reported as very 
cheap compared to elsewhere in the region (figures from 1 to 12 dollars/ha/year reported in Barney 2009). 
In several  cases  in  the Southeastern and Northern parts  during the field  work of  this  project  we met  mi-
grant workers from China (in the North) and Vietnam (in the South and East) that had come due to the 
work opportunities that the quickly expanding sector of fast-growing trees provided (cf. Barney 2008). A 
considerable indirect driver seems to be the quickly growing demand of Laos’s quickly growing neighbours. 
For example, around 200.000 of fast growing eucalyptus plantations are in the process of being established 
for markets in China (see. Barney 2008).   
Rubber (seconded by eucalyptus) is the most quickly expanding crop, with large-scale plantations in the 
central and southern parts and small-holder schemes in the northern part of the country: estimates put the 
area already above 500.000 ha of rubber monocultures (Barney 2010). They are driven by generally high 
resource prices, which cause opportunity costs that REDD+ has difficulties in competing with, since it only 
involves a promise of future income. An expert with one of the development organizations brings this 
bluntly in play (interview 3/2011):  
“Currently the rubber price on the Singapore rubbers future exchange, it’s called (TSR20) is $5.50 
a kilo of rubber, and that’s rubber latex, and then you have being produced down in that area, like 
normal yield rubber, is 1350 kilos a year. If you do the simple maths that’s over $5500 per year 
per hectare. And I don’t think REDD’s going to be able to compete with that.” 
These themes are developing a new dynamic in land development. However, the local benefit has been 
reported as limited and often there are impacts such as decreasing access to land by local villagers and there 
does not seem to be much unused quality land (see Hall. Et al. 2011) During the field visit to plantation 
areas by Lao Plantation Forest Limited (subsidiary of OJI Paper) in Khammuane province, Mahasay district 
the research team ran into an area where forest fires had occurred on all in all 279 ha of land in controlled 
areas five days in a row in April just before local new year’s festivities. The area represented a larger area 
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than the company was able to plant during the whole year in the same district. The thin-peeled eucalyptus 
died as an effect of the burning. Equipment has been stolen from the company as well. The background to 
the conflict is clear to the villagers: “the company promised us work as we sign the documents. But it also 
plant in the forest and the work was only flowing for the first 2-3 years.”  
At  the  same  time  as  OJI  is  planting  50  000  ha  it  is  also  doing  feasibility  studies  for  REDD+ which  
would benefit villagers. The company hopes this would reduce the on-going land conflict, and enable vil-
lagers to get some additional benefit on a nearby area from REDD+ funding of the Japanese government. 
(interview with company staff 5/2011).  
OJI has also previously been shown to cut down forests to establish its plantations in Laos, and has 
caused  somewhat  serious  problems  of  access  to  land  for  local  groups:  causing  some  problems  for  local  
food security and forcing villagers to reintroduce patterns of encroaching shifting cultivation on marginal 
lands (Barney 2011). Our interviewees also emphasise this point: forest carbon projects without local sup-
port are destined to become a problem. 
As there is increasing problems of overlapping land concessions and land conflict it would seem that 
donor presence on large geographical areas is a good solution. The problem of economic land concessions 
on areas of production forests under World Bank and Finland SUFORD project seem to be less common 
than in  “donor-free  areas”.  As World Bank staff  argues:  “if  difficult  issues  surface,  when push comes to 
shove we have always in the end found a satisfactory solution” (interview 5/2011). This observation is sup-
ported by on the ground staff in different locations: the presence of donors or NGOs seems also to im-
prove the knowledge of the rights possessed by local people, which provides them with additional agency.  
Shifting cultivation and poverty-driven causes 
Shifting cultivation is still approximately the agricultural practice for over 20 per cent of people in the rural 
areas in Laos: especially in higher altitudes where ethnic groups are prevalent. Shifting cultivation has been 
accounted almost half of all Laos land-use change related greenhouse gas emissions. In the history of forest 
governance in Laos (and elsewhere) the practice has been considered environmentally problematic, it has 
been seen as a backward practice with no future: but the statements about the practice and its consequences 
do not match very well with empirical research (Ducortieaux et al.  2005; Lestrelin 2010). Most of our in-
formants argue that as part of REDD+ rotational shifting cultivation (or slash-and-burn, a more derogatory 
term) can be “contained” or stopped by the creation of alternative livelihoods: whereas a single environ-
mental group depicted the practice as possibly a zero-carbon lifestyle if the cycle of 15-20 years is consid-
ered. This is however not what current REDD+ baselines and measurement practices are measuring, as the 
time perspective is much shorter.  
As interest in land investment and land concession has risen, the fact that what is defined as degraded 
land is often a rotational cultivation fallow. (Dwyer 2007; Lestrelin 2011). Both paddy farming and shifting 
cultivation patterns have been reported to be disrupted due to impacts from economic land concessions 
(Barney 2010; GoL 2005; Baird 2010b; Kenney-Lazar 2010; Dwyer 2011).   
All forest land in Laos is principally owned by the government. In the Readiness Preparation Proposal 
for REDD+ the Lao PDR government acknowledges that the existing tenure situation poses some difficul-
ties for REDD+, since groups that do not hold legal title may not be able to benefit from REDD+ reve-
nues or there may be multiple stakeholder groups with overlapping claims to land. As the value of land rises 
also due to REDD+, the interest for land and benefit capture might rise (Chattre & Agrawal 2009). How-
ever, the R-PP does not elaborate further on how these conflicts could be resolved. This lack of clarity is 
reiterated in most of the interviews conducted.  
Without significant efforts towards enhanced local participation and clear social and governance safe-
guards, the role of local communities may indeed be restricted to at best forest patrolling, inventory and 
restoration activities, with few or no direct benefits derived from REDD+, while additional farming limita-
tions are imposed (Chokkalingam 2010). The frustration experienced in certain villages with conservation 
schemes in the northern areas of the country is a key concern.  
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Village-level land use planning has long represented the cornerstone of the land management system 
and, in principle, a key step toward the recognition of customary rights to use land and natural resources. It 
is pursued by agreeing on village boundaries and land delineation for different land-use purposes (paddy, 
forest etc.) (Vandergeest 2003; Fujita and Phanvilay 2008). Historically however, the authority of the local 
administration has long been subordinated to the national objectives of eradicating shifting cultivation and 
preserving forest resources. Thus, there has been a tendency from the part of district planners to discount 
local claims and thereby design plans favouring forest conservation over agricultural land uses (Ducourtieux 
et al. 2005; Lestrelin 2010). 
This adds to the fact that degradation of natural resources including deforestation has had a negative 
impact on the livelihoods of poor, as the World Bank reports that over 80 per cent of the population is en-
gaged in subsistence agriculture, non-timber forest product collection and fisheries and are, thus, directly 
dependent on the natural resource base and the non-timber forest products from forests (Foppes & Ket-
phanh 2004; GOL 2009). Widespread soil erosion resulting from the loss of forest cover, especially in the 
uplands, and shorter fallow periods in rotational swiddens has led to declining agricultural productivity (Fu-
jita and Phanvilay 2008). One cause to this is increasing land scarcity and other deforestation drivers. This 
links the sustainability of shifting cultivation firmly with other land use management: especially small-holder 
commercial planting and plantation development. 
The German GIZ and World Conservation Society CLIPAD project is a novel projects based on the 
protection of two national park areas. It is supposed to be the first area where things start running. The 
case study here concentrated on three villages (Houaytin, Khone Gnoua, and Phiengdy) in Viengthong Dis-
trict, Huapanh Province adjacent to the Nam Et Phu Loei National Park. The park is already controlling 
access  into  the  park.  A  shortage  of  rice  was  present  during  3-6  months  of  the  year.  The  villagers  of  
Houaytin had gathered a proposal to increase their paddy land by arguing, ”we can go back to our old vil-
lage from which we were moved because of project before”. The park manager response refers to the rule 
of the conservation that cultivation of land in the park is not promoted and should be restricted. The villag-
ers that currently engage in short-fallow upland shifting cultivation have thus been imposed new land-use 
restrictions.  In another area in the same National Park Khone Gnoua villagers claimed that they need 10 
years rotation in their shifting cultivation to secure rice production, now that has been reduced to 5. In ad-
dition, villagers have the right to collect NTFPs in their production forest which was allocated to them in 
2010 but these resources are long since depleted. The villagers find plans of carbon income possibilities as 
”strange” and ”non-understandable”, and trust is limited as the park has under previous projects usually 
limited their possibilities for income generation. In all three villages visited, villagers used to work with the 
conservation area staff for patrolling, sharing information about wildlife conservation and hunting re-
striction: a principle that was ”respected by all” villagers, as they told us. Both villagers and park staff hunt 
on the borders of the park. Villagers sign conservation agreements for guaranteed benefits, but these 
agreements also rather logically pose significant land-use constraints.  
The WCS/Clipad project is being carefully and ambitiously planned: with income generation and op-
tions for carbon mitigation within the project researched and considerable effort to ensure a meaningful 
process of Free, Prior and Informed Consent by villagers (see Box 8.3). A contrast to the JICA community 
REDD+ project in Louang Prabang exists, where a frustration with villagers was already surfacing. Accord-
ing to the project manager the “villagers just don´t understand” that shifting cultivation is problematic. The 
carbon sink value and capacity  building for  the project  has  also proved a  challenging activity.   When the 
project tried to do capacity building on forest carbon sinks it proved to be wholly impossible: villagers did 
not grasp what was going on when they were explained about carbon in the trees that can be sold for mon-
ey (interview 4/2011).  
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Box 8.3 Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
  
8.3 Governance choices 
Most projects on-going on the field already, including WCS/Clipad, JICA and WWF try to envisage alterna-
tive livelihoods, and have a soft approach to the issue of eradicating shifting cultivation. In spite of this, 
they echo the idea that shifting cultivation cannot be sustainable: and must be addressed through stabilisa-
tion, resettlement, capacity building, awareness raising and alternative livelihoods. The same goes for a 
number of planned private projects. 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is a promising initiative for securing local ownership of develop-
ment projects.  Its origins lies in respecting rights of indigenous communities in e.g.  the UN Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO-convention 169: both non-legally binding but normatively strong 
ways of asserting indigenous rights.   
 
While indigenous rights over land areas are not a new idea, the concept has gained momentum through the 
increase of REDD+ projects with the need to secure the rights of forest peoples at stake when forest carbon 
becomes valuated. FPIC is tied to questions about land rights and tenure, and thus paramount especially in 
REDD+ projects and VCM projects with forest and land-use components. A report by RECOFTC, the Cen-
ter for People and Forests, and German aid agency, GIZ outlines FPIC as “the establishment of conditions 
under which people exercise their fundamental right to negotiate the terms of externally imposed policies, 
programs, and activities that directly affect their livelihoods or wellbeing, and to give or withhold their consent 
to them” (Anderson et al. 2011; 15). As such, it is important to understand FPIC as a process – consultations 
do not end with communities signing agreements with yes or no answers to proposed projects. Rather, FPIC 
allows communities to negotiate with external developers about the conditions of forest and land use projects. 
At times, this can lead to communities agreeing upon projects with specific terms. On occasion, communities 
may decline, but this does not have to be a final decision. FPIC draws on the three interrelated terms – free, 
prior  and informed –  to  stress  the  importance  of  both  processes  and outcomes.  Specifically  FPIC refers  to  
forest right holders’ rights to freely consent (or not) to a project, with consideration prior to the initiation of 
project activities, and having the broader community informed in local languages. These three key themes 
should be carried along throughout the whole project consultation period. While promising, FPIC is still a 
relatively new concept. Further, the approach is yet unknown to most communities and therefore its commu-
nication needs both consideration and trial. 
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ter for People and Forests, and German aid agency, GIZ outlines FPIC as “the establishment of conditions 
under which people exercise their fundamental right to negotiate the terms of externally imposed policies, 
programs, and activities that directly affect their livelihoods or wellbeing, and to give or withhold their consent 
to them” (Anderson et al. 2011; 15). As such, it is important to understand FPIC as a process – consultations 
do not end with communities signing agreements with yes or no answers to proposed projects. Rather, FPIC 
allows communities to negotiate with external developers about the conditions of forest and land use projects. 
At times, this can lead to communities agreeing upon projects with specific terms. On occasion, communities 
may decline, but this does not have to be a final decision. FPIC draws on the three interrelated terms – free, 
prior  and informed –  to  stress  the  importance  of  both  processes  and outcomes.  Specifically  FPIC refers  to  
forest right holders’ rights to freely consent (or not) to a project, with consideration prior to the initiation of 
project activities, and having the broader community informed in local languages. These three key themes 
should be carried along throughout the whole project consultation period. While promising, FPIC is still a 
relatively new concept. Further, the approach is yet unknown to most communities and therefore its commu-
nication needs both consideration and trial. 
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Addressing inter alia indigenous communities and their shifting cultivation has a long-standing history 
in development in Lao PDR (see et al. Ducortieux 2005; Lestrelin 2010) leading to everything from violent 
forced resettlement to approaches highlighting “alternative livelihoods”. The uplands populations have 
been the subject of “stabilization” requirements for a long time. The issue of ethnic minorities, who are 
cultivators in the Lao uplands where shifting cultivation is prevalent, is difficult due to political reasons in 
Laos.  According  to  official  policy  all  Lao  are  equal  and  no  ethnic  groups  exist.  No  official  consultations  
with “indigenous” groups in Lao PDR has as of yet been held, but a Dedicated fund for local communities 
and  Indigenous  Peoples  under  FIP  has  been  put  forward.  The  REDD+  Advance  Negotiating  Text  has  
been called ‘ground-breaking’ for including references to the rights of indigenous peoples, and local com-
munities.  
Actors in project implementing agencies and government refer to these issues as anything from “stop-
ping the slash and burn to the benefits of settling down and reducing rotational swidden cultivation.” Ra-
ther surprisingly, all current pilot cases are on-going in areas where shifting cultivation is considered to be 
highly problematic, especially around national parks. Lestrelin (2011) has shown that the discourses around 
shifting cultivation are strong and largely accepted – although many of the beliefs of environmental destruc-
tion due to shifting cultivation are misguided: some biodiversity is even improved by the cycle of fire, culti-
vation and fallow.  
From the perspective of reaching the target of development policies, this issue raises some questions. Is 
it possible for ODA-funded actors to unproblematically agree that the farming practices of the poorest 
groups in Lao PDR should be limited, as these groups might be poor exactly because their farming practic-
es  have  been  seen  as  backward  and  difficult  to  develop  for  a  long  time?  (see  Ducortieaux  2005  et  al.;  
Lestrelin 2010).  As a lot of the encroaching swidden cultivation is caused by indirect drivers considered at 
least equally meaningful as causes of deforestation it is a further problematisation. Additionally, the groups 
engaged in shifting cultivation are most often not claiming the net benefits but rather from time to time the 
net negative consequences of plantations, hydropower and mines development as well.  
The technical focus of co-operation in REDD+ on the ground almost seems to hide these issues under 
a carpet in contrast to highlighting them and making them matters of debate. Addressing other drivers thus 
becomes dis-emphasised both in official documents and the actual on-going projects. The governance 
choices however highlight that currently shifting cultivation is a key part of the early projects that have 
aimed  for “low-hanging fruit”, while also politically convenient for the Lao PDR government.   
8.4 Conclusion  
A framework distinguishing different interest in relation to forest use has been presented. Participatory 
Forest Management (PFM), under which common property resource management is formalised with mean-
ingful delegation of decision-making power from the state to the communities using the forest resources, 
has been shown to be an effective policy instrument for reversing forest degradation and also enhancing 
carbon stocks (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009) To Chattre and Agrawal (2009) ”larger forest size and greater 
rule-making autonomy at the local level are statistically associated with high carbon storage and livelihood 
benefits while differences in ownership of communal forest are associated with trade-offs between liveli-
hood benefits and carbon storage.”  
In Lao PDR the first communal land titles ever were announced in October 2011 (interview 2011) and 
were shared to communities in February 2012. The scale of this should be understood by how many of 
these titles need to be rolled out for there to be significant results. Several of our interviewees also claimed 
that through REDD+ it is possible to push tenure agenda: not as it is often being discussed, by securing 
rights of ethnic groups per se, but rather creating village forestry - access to tenure for also ethnic groups. 
This shows how donors sometimes should and also do secure ownership of other groups that might be set 
against state interests. For example, Phelps et al. (2010, pp. 312–313) note that the institutional require-
ments of REDD+ present the real possibility of recentralization of forest management that could under-
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mine local participation in project design and management, arguing that ‘‘Communities may participate in 
collecting forest-specific data, but carbon accounting, a major REDD+ component, will require  centralized 
management with billions of dollars at stake. Governments could justify recentralization by portraying 
themselves as more capable and reliable than local communities at protecting national interest.’’ As of now 
this  does  not  seem to be a  justified fear,  but  in  many areas  the roles  of  international  NGOs and donor-
funded projects have actually increased with the entrance of REDD+ and some technical modules.  
In Laos the weak governance and limited capacities for monitoring, law enforcement and extension has 
currently fuelled fears for large displacing land concessions: and that is certainly the context where also 
REDD+ project developers need to situate their projects. These conflicts played out also during the time of 
fieldwork in this research project. The global discussions launched around REDD+ has put special empha-
sis on issues around accountability, transparency and open conflict resolution. However, as the global struc-
ture after Durban does not enforce strong environmental and social safeguards, these need to be ensured 
by other  means.  The key issue to understand is  if  the situation of  conflicting relations between state  and 
communities could turn to one of mutual accountability through REDD+, but current approaches are ac-
tually targeting poor communities, while the governments´ policies continue the path of deforestation with 
its policies and the admission of new economic land concessions. 
To date, the limited space of the civil society has hardly contributed to improve the situation. However, 
something might be changing. After 2005 several non-for-profit organizations in the fields of rural devel-
opment and environmental governance have emerged (including Lao Biodiversity Association, Community 
Development and Environment Association). These have sometimes strong ties within ministries and other 
government bodies and have gained influence over the past few years. After issuing the Prime Minister De-
cree No. 115 on associations in 2009, the groups are officially recognized as local NGOs. There are also a 
growing number of other civil society organizations. 50 local NGOs were listed by the Lao Non-Profit As-
sociations network in 2010. Some have become key partners for both governmental and international de-
velopment agencies and contribute to national networks of discussions and influence on land and forest 
governance (e.g. ‘Land Issues’). While these organizations are not grassroots initiatives, they have definitely 
contributed to bringing local land issues to the national agenda and prompted changes in land and forestry 
regulation – e.g. emphasis on secured land tenure and introduction of collective land titling in land alloca-
tion processes at the village level (Sipaseuth and Hunt 2009). 
While some of the fifty local NGOs officially registered involve members from ethnic minorities, none 
of these organisations is dealing specifically with indigenous rights and self-governance. In fact, the public 
debate over indigenous issues appears virtually non-existent. Ensuring equity and other multiple benefits 
(e.g. poverty reduction, political representation) will require a serious role for this emerging civil society. 
Without such a wide range of governance reforms, REDD+ will, at best as some of our interviewees argue, 
not change much in the landscape. Most likely in this situation, considering the significant flows of capital 
and the emergence of new actors and interests associated with REDD+, it will create additional institution-
al complexity and ambiguities, aggravated socioeconomic inequalities, and further marginalisation of forest-
dependent populations. The problems noted with village development clusters might be relevant here, as 
shortcomings are linked to limited resources and capacity, unclear mandates, limited political representation 
and the persistence of a top-down political culture (interview with forest researcher 5/2011). 
The ideas presented here are in line with those presented for the local level around the concept Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent (see Box 8.3), which has been proposed as a safeguard in indigenous rights 
and become especially relevant as indigenous communities have to worry about being displaced due to the 
carbon values they live amongst.  In Laos this process is seen as key, and also some conservationist express 
frustration with the general framework: "the private sector can go in and get a signature and take the land 
for development. Are we really supposed to sit around and wait for consent to emerge while the forest is 
being destroyed?” (interview 5/2011). 
The need for checks and balances are even more important because of some of the existing problems 
with non-serious or speculative carbon projects. All this has made serious companies rather vary about en-
tering the field, also as the UNFCCC has been unable to produce a viable and reliable market.  
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To sum up, forests are, a source of multiple benefits: but only if the targets and interests of poor and 
local communities are safeguarded. However, there is currently a governance focus on shifting cultivation 
stabilization, which raises questions of food security and access to land for uplands communities. Nonethe-
less, there might be potential win-wins. Adaptation and resilience can be seen to belong to the virtues of 
forest communities in Southeast Asia historically (Scott 2009). However, at the moment the governance 
framework is not focusing on REDD+ for adaptation (Interviews March-May 2011). While conducting 
climate mitigation it is important that also issues such as access to resources and food security effects be-
come evaluated. Early measurements are focused on carbon mitigation, but on this point this research has 
been conducted too early to draw longstanding conclusions.  
With regard to capacities, the Lao Forest sector is now in front of a daunting task to control both elab-
orate  systems  of  measurement,  verification  and  reporting.  Luckily,  it  is  supported  in  this  task.  The  
SUFORD-project  with  its  large  scale  “thousands  of  hours”  of  capacity  building  seems  to  have  gone  
through a relevant experience producing some tangible results in reaching forest certification in considera-
ble areas of production forest in Lao PDR: and simultaneously building further capacity for capacity build-
ing. The large-scale activities of the SUFORD project have been indispensable especially regarding local 
administrative capacity, if thinking on rolling out activities to further provinces. 
Regarding ownership donors run across the issue of conflicting ownership at the local and national lev-
el. Understanding ownership this way requires a difficult balancing game: but the pro-poor commitments in 
the Millennium Development Goals require donors to commit to participation of civil society and the 
rights  of  local  communities  to a  considerable  degree.  The demands for  ownership are  deep and broad in  
REDD+ in line with Busan Declaration requirements for democratic ownership. Local communities and 
their lives and resources become entangled in global climate governance. Similarly, the ownership frame-
work works in parallel with needs to establish and follow international best practice on transparency and 
safeguards. 
Regarding the combination of mitigation and poverty reduction REDD+ holds a lot of potential but 
for this to be realised the interventions should carefully adopt the lessons learned of previous forest sup-
port but also critical governance studies. In order not to repeat the forest policy history of aiming to stabi-
lise shifting cultivation with mediocre results there is a need to address other drivers as well. 
REDD+ is a multifaceted approach. This text has only attempted to bring some glimpses of the wealth 
of information. However, the chapter underlines the need to assert ownership at the heart of mitigation 
efforts, if it is to succeed. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
“The reduction of poverty and reaching the UN Millennium Development Goals by emphasizing needs and owner-
ship of the partner countries are the most important targets for development policy”  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, www.formin.fi accessed 21.11.2011 
This book has sought to trace trends in the relation between official development assistance and climate 
mitigation in its multiple forms in Laos and Cambodia. Whereas climate change can be defined as the global 
policy problem of the 21st century, the ideas of development assistance have a longer history. As such, mul-
tilateral climate governance goals have been imposed on previous patterns and trends of development assis-
tance – especially in the least developed countries. It is clear that development can no longer be thought of 
without reference to climate change. The development paradigm needs change to respond to the climate 
crisis. Several donors have already started integrating climate objectives into development cooperation 
agendas. While significant, this trend also brings into the fore new dilemmas. An important step has been 
the attempt to steer support away from activities and processes that aggravate climate change (e.g. the 
building of energy infrastructure based on fossil fuels) or increase the vulnerability of people to the impacts 
of climate change. Similarly efforts have been directed to support and enhance the resilience of targeted 
groups. The main dilemma related to the integration of development and climate objectives emerges when 
development finance is used for projects and initiatives that are mitigation-oriented, especially in the least 
developed countries.  
The analysis in this book has discussed four climate mitigation initiatives in Laos and Cambodia. Chap-
ter 2 introduced the context of international climate policies and the key questions for the least developed 
countries. A significant source of tension has been the definition of “new and additional” funds to assist 
developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Developing countries have been con-
cerned that integrating climate change objectives, especially with regards to mitigation, into official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) may imply a diversion of resources from one target group, country or region to 
another. The tension is heightened by the fact that a majority of internationally disbursed funds have tend-
ed to focus on mitigation – at  the cost  of  adaptation and REDD+ activities  by volume.  Chapter  3  high-
lights these questions in the context of climate-oriented development assistance of Finland in the years 
2007–2011. Through a textual analysis of the key development policy texts of Finland, it is argued that 
storylines of multiple synergies in climate and development may divert the attention away from the im-
portant issues facing developing countries specifically.  
Moving into the case studies, Chapter 4 introduced the Finnish ODA-financed Energy and Environ-
ment Programme (EEP), which seems suitable to the LDC context due to reasonable administrative de-
mands. However, some dimensions of the project such as the short time-frame, the emphasis on mitiga-
tion, and the approach that favours Nordic actors in implementation, invite questions about the sustainabil-
ity of this scheme. Chapter 5 analysed the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol in 
Cambodia. The case finds the problems of meaningfully integrating sustainable development in projects 
where climate mitigation and the offset logic of carbon markets is the priority. The focus of chapter 6 on 
voluntary markets was specifically on renewable energy projects and their certification. The chapter finds 
that projects often employ a strategy where financing from voluntary markets, official development assis-
tance and other sources is used interchangeably. The seventh chapter of the book looked at two REDD+ 
pilot cases in Cambodia that faced similar challenges in terms of large-scale agro-industrial plantations and 
illegal logging, yet employed different strategies. In both cases, the possible future funds from REDD+ 
were seen as an opportunity to hasten important local processes like tenure security and livelihood devel-
opment, yet insufficient to fully address the key threats posed to the forest areas. Chapter 8 looked at the 
governance of REDD+ in Laos and argues that the effort is focusing on deforestation caused by the rural 
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poor while other deforestation drivers are still somewhat outside of its scope. REDD+ does seem to be in 
line with national development priorities and the environmental targets of Laos, but pays considerably less 
attention to rural livelihoods.   
 Through the analysis of these four different climate change mitigation initiatives it has been attempted 
to disentangle the complex and often messy links between development assistance and climate change miti-
gation. This final chapter draws together conclusions from the cases. The mechanisms are discussed from 
the perspective of delivering multiple benefits in climate mitigation and poverty reduction. Analysing the 
links between these perspectives is a useful way of understanding the constraints and possibilities of inte-
grating new targets into development assistance. However, at the same time it must be remembered that the 
climate mitigation initiatives presented differ greatly in scope, extent and implementation. REDD+ focuses 
on forests and land-use, the voluntary market on energy and forests, CDM has a regulated multi-sectoral 
approach and the EEP focuses on energy through small-scale initiatives and capacity building projects. 
Making comparisons between these is  thus bound to be challenging and generalizing.  The aim is  to  raise  
issues and questions that should be further considered when integrating climate mitigation and develop-
ment not only in Laos and Cambodia, but in the least carbon emitting countries more generally.  
The promise of multiple benefits  
The possibility to reach multiple benefits has been the promise through which the integration of climate 
mitigation into development cooperation has been legitimised. This is seen in most of the project docu-
ments, certification standards or plans reviewed relating to the different mitigation initiatives. The assess-
ment and evaluation of development benefits has been generally weak in all of the studied mechanisms 
(EEP, REDD+, CDM and VCM) with perhaps the EEP as the most structured approach despite its weak-
nesses, with REDD+ in Lao PDR and Cambodia only on a rocky path of solving benefit-sharing disputes.  
The weak development framework does not however mean that development benefits could not be 
reached: the fuel-efficient stoves are a good example of a sustainable development project with tangible 
benefits through voluntary carbon markets (see chapter 6). However, in renewable energy only the Gold 
Standard and in forest carbon the CCBA (Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance) have some struc-
tured sustainable development requirements, while other standards still do not. Several voluntary market 
projects rely on narratives and stories of synergies in mitigation and poverty alleviation to guide and per-
suade investors and boutique shoppers.  
The concept of multiple benefits requires the explicit understanding of trade-offs in climate mitigation 
and development as well. Large-scale CDM projects have had development trade-off effects, as is argued in 
Chapter 5. There are some indications that REDD+ could join this pattern unless participation and guaran-
tees for local communities and civil society are considerably improved from present patterns (see chapter 8; 
cf. Lestrelin et al. 2011). The EEP and small-scale voluntary certified renewable energy projects do not pose 
dangers of trade-offs to a large extent, mainly due to their smaller scale and impact.  
Laos and Cambodia (along with other least developing countries) rely on ODA specifically for poverty 
alleviation. If more aid is channelled towards climate change mitigation projects there is a risk of diverting 
funds from poverty reduction and this goes for all the mechanisms involved when ODA is implicated. If 
REDD+ is successful it might be an exception in the long term, but benefit sharing in Laos and Cambodia 
will only occur years from the present time. The issue of “new and additional” (see Box 2.1) is not only a 
normative commitment of equity, but also fundamentally a question of addressing responsibility (i.e. the 
polluter pays principle) for climate change. The carbon market and its offset logic is not a quick path to 
development for LDCs. The CDM is a case in point, where CDMs have thus far only seen 1,1% of projects 
in the pipeline located in LDCs. As there are a lot of institutional capacities devoted to managing, support-
ing and assisting these projects and their institutional setup, the institutional trade-offs for administratively 
complex projects should also be considered. This refers to how trained capacities are used in projects that 
are not creating results. How many projects, funds and approaches are manageable and possible to regulate 
in the current LDC framework with regards to climate change, forests and energy?  
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Compared to the CDM, emissions reductions from the EEP, VCM and (at the moment) REDD+ do 
not function as offsets on a compliance market (i.e. these initiatives are not transferring emissions). This 
means these projects have some environmental benefits the CDM lack: the emissions reductions are addi-
tional to targets set in Kyoto, whereas CDM projects in practice only transfer the actions for emissions re-
ductions from one place to another. Emissions reductions from the voluntary market, while offsets, are 
additional to targets set in the Kyoto Protocol.  
The target of the scheme also has effects for its outcomes, as seen with the CDM. For most of the 
CDM project developers, maximisation of CERs has been the main motivation, which has overshadowed 
the other half of the twin objective, sustainable development. With currently only emissions reductions be-
ing measured and valued in the market, measurable mitigated carbon will steer projects in the future as well, 
be it REDD+, CDM or the voluntary markets. The ODA-funded EEP is “softer” in this regard, also tar-
geting groups outside of large-scale emissions reduction potential. In this regard, the limited mitigation po-
tential of the least developed countries should imply that public funds are in a key role for delivering sus-
tainable development rather than flexibility for a compliance market.  
At a minimum, the results highlight the need for enforcement of basic but thorough social and envi-
ronmental impact assessments, an issue that has not always been considered in CDM projects in Lao PDR 
and Cambodia. This is important regarding future REDD+ projects as well. Some REDD+ pilot projects 
around the world are promising, others have demonstrated the risks and difficulties of integrating different 
targets as land-use is politically contested, leading to displacement of poor communities (de Schutter 2011). 
As of yet there is no clearly defined way to address the issue of the potential of national development prior-
ities creating considerable social and environmental trade-offs. This is a difficult issue, but one requiring a 
clear strategy from donors engaging in REDD+.  
The importance of assessments is also highlighted, if the principle of free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) 
(see Box 8.2) is acknowledged in projects affecting local communities. The process of FPIC has gained new 
momentum via REDD+, and considering multiple benefits and avoiding trade-offs, this process should 
continue, and it is also meaningful when done in parallel with social and environmental impact assessments. 
At the local level, some projects combining different initiatives, such as fuel-efficient cook-stoves and 
community forestry, present possibilities for synergies and win-wins in terms of poverty alleviation and cli-
mate change mitigation. However, in the CDM and the voluntary markets, but especially in REDD+ there 
is still a need to solve who carries the risk of investment in the mechanisms and how benefits and risks will 
be fairly distributed among project communities and developers.  
Currently the use of ODA in mitigation projects has not been justified by clearly outlined and evaluated 
development benefits. Neither is its development impact assessed in terms of real expectations, based on 
proved evidence, research and evaluations. The trade-offs, which almost always exist, involved in projects 
need more analysis and attention. This is especially the case on land-use intensive or water-related projects, 
which are often problematic in terms of the social outcomes for the poorest. The multiple benefits and 
their political dynamics still need to take the lessons learnt from the past more seriously both on energy and 
forests in a local context.   
Capacity building   
Weak institutional capacities are generally argued to be a key obstacle for taking advantage of the possibili-
ties for finance through, for example, CDM, REDD+ and the voluntary carbon market. The lack of capaci-
ties the least carbon emitting countries begin from the capacity to participate in UNFCCC negotiations and 
goes all the way down to the village level capacities in changing behaviour represented as harmful for e.g. 
forests. In this comparison, both the limits to capacity and capacity building possibilities are highlighted. 
There is also, however, reason to critically ask about the mechanisms observed: what capacity is required, 
how many capacitated staff are required and what is being legitimized and transferred when subjects de-
fined as “low-capacity” gain training.  
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Cambodia and Lao PDR currently have limited or no capacity of directing the agenda in multilateral fora 
and this crucially affects the situations in these countries. While the capacity to participate in UNFCCC nego-
tiations has been supported, this support clearly needs to be broadened to be meaningful. This concerns the 
formulation of rules around CDM, REDD+, and different funds that are supporting the implementation of 
these mechanisms. The lighter format of the EEP makes it easier for LDC actors to participate in. 
Capacities are currently supported with ODA in all of the mechanisms discussed through multilateral 
or bilateral finance. Within the climate mitigation framework, capacities are addressed mostly by supporting 
administrative tasks for the recipient country. The CDM has attempted to ease registration and project pro-
cedures specifically for LDCs and ODA funds have been used to develop LDC capacities for project de-
velopment. REDD+ involves capacity development throughout implementation and will entail huge 
amounts of capacity building as it evolves into a national co-ordinated set-up in the target countries. How-
ever, the only mechanism in line with the LDC context is the EEP. Even in the EEP all selected projects 
include partners from the global North, but the process has less heavy requirements for applying or putting 
up a project compared with the other mechanisms. The EEP is also supporting projects which are building 
more general rather than specific capacities for the energy sector.   
For the government administrations, CDM and REDD+ also seem to strain resources through the 
complex project cycles they present. A more sectoral program-approach and governance support could in 
some instances be more in line with the appreciation of thin capacities in the country administrations, than 
by supporting a project-by-project approach. The CDM has already attempted to increase LDC participa-
tion by abolishing registration fees for LDCs and introducing programmatic CDM (or PoA), which bundles 
together several small-scale emissions reduction projects that expected more significant sustainability benefits. 
Regarding capacity in Laos and Cambodia we find that the Finnish SUFORD project in the forest sec-
tor discussed in chapter 8 is an interesting example of somewhat successful large-scale capacity building. It 
involves a whole branch of administration in sustainable community forestry practices, which at best bene-
fits all forest users (state, province, district, village). In comparison, the capacity building for carbon markets 
is sometimes highly specific, and does not support large-scale human or institutional capacities for mean-
ingful participation in development efforts. SUFORD, in its basic approach, also demonstrates how capaci-
ties are based on the local level: not brought in as a consultancy-based approach. However, the difference 
between the carbon market might be compared through the REDD+ preparedness work under SUFORD, 
which has a much more technical character, importing to some extent exclusively Finnish technology and 
expertise for complex measurement activities (see chapter 8). REDD+ funds are in this case intended for 
capacity building, readiness preparation and MRV. Some of these funds should already be given to support 
community involvement in, for example, carbon measurement and the processes in general to create ca-
pacities at all levels, e.g. through the process of FPIC.  
Few projects consider it, but looking at the use of ODA for general capacities some priorities could be 
set-up. In Laos and Cambodia the issue of conducting Social and Environmental Impact Assessment anal-
yses is one example that would ensure some amount of transparency. It could also ensure social and envi-
ronmental sustainability of a huge number of projects including those trying to produce carbon credits. The 
example  of  CDM  and  forestry  projects  shows  that  these  standards  and  their  enforcement  should  be  
strengthened with good effects to be produced also outside of a narrow sectoral or mitigation framework.  
With regards to capacity building it is essential to evaluate and re-think which projects are truly neces-
sary: not all capacity development has impacts and the commitment to actual activities and their realistic 
proceedings should be more important than fashion waves in climate finance. Strengthening the social and 
environmental impact assessment (SEIA) capacity and requirements and involving local communities could 
have longer term effects. Supporting and developing SEIA capacities should be a base requirement, since at 
the moment the lack of SEIA capacities significantly affects the ability to monitor potential harmful social 
and environmental impacts. This is a key issue in all mechanisms, but particularly in larger projects such as 
regional or national REDD+ schemes and CDM.  
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Ownership  
Ownership was adopted as a principle to guide donor-recipient relations in aid in the Paris Declaration of 
2005 and has since been reinforced in Accra and Busan. In the case of Laos and Cambodia, and probably a 
majority of the 48 countries in the least developed countries group, the target of national climate change 
mitigation measures does not carry priority. Adaptation measures carry a significantly higher legitimacy due 
to the vulnerability of LDCs to climate change. Given this it is surprising that a majority of funding in the 
least developing countries in Southeast Asia is oriented for mitigation.  This is a key observation regarding 
the mechanisms studied. Key in this regard is the ownership of the climate governance agenda (see Ostrom 
et al. 2002). In negotiating the mechanisms CDM came up very surprisingly in Kyoto (Newell & Patterson 
2010), REDD+ has had some kind of entitlement during the process, whereas the voluntary carbon mar-
kets  are  wholly,  and  the  EEP is  for  its  initiation,  outside  of  the  understanding  or  influence  of  Laos  and  
Cambodia  in  their  content  or  agenda.  A lack of  ownership can be seen on a  more fundamental  level  to-
wards climate mitigation targets. The multilateral climate mitigation agenda has been initiated by industrial-
ised countries, while the CDM beneficiaries have been strong developing countries such as the BASIC-
group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China). To address this issue participation of climate governance goals of 
LDCs at UNFCCC have been supported but it is a long and slow process.  
The ownership of CDM processes can be argued to be low especially for the LDCs. CDM processes 
are complex, highly technical and long-winded. It has been difficult for LDCs to keep track on the highly 
complex and technical CDM related processes and to try and influence them due to problems of limited 
resources and capacities. Improvements have been made to encourage CDM projects in LDCs but still 
challenges remain. A more profound issue is that the objective of providing flexibility for industrialised 
countries may be challenging to own for the least emitting and most climate change affected countries, to 
which most LDCs belong. This again stresses the importance of the mechanisms to produce benefits for 
sustainable development and technology transfer that the LDCs would appreciate. So far successes in this 
front have been limited resulting also in challenges to create ownership in LDCs.  The EEP is relatively 
light on technical requirements in comparison with the CDM, and thus local inputs can be better facilitated. 
The target of providing access to renewable energy in rural areas can carry significant ownership locally. 
However, this would require increased support for local inputs. To guarantee stronger ownership of the 
EEP the donors need to clearly enunciate how and when the program is continued. This would enable ben-
eficiary owners to plan and place their own assets (human, financial etc.) into use, and have clearer incen-
tives to participate in and determine processes and outcomes in the EEP. Finally, REDD+ is often de-
scribed as the project with most LDC ownership. It should be remembered, however, that REDD+ was 
the initiative of some, not all, tropical forest countries. The ownership of the results of REDD+ can be 
high if countries and localities are able to establish appropriate benefit-sharing systems. However, owner-
ship is still weak in terms of processes, which are dominated by complex monitoring, reporting and verifica-
tion (MRV). Although not met with great enthusiasm among donors generally (Fry 2011), community 
measurement processes will be interesting in this regard as they have found to distribute some benefits, and 
create ownership and capacities.  
All mitigation initiatives should attempt to create and secure some benefits at the local level through, 
for example, employment or taxation. The ownership of processes and decisions could be increased by em-
ploying more national experts, involving governments, communities and civil society. The question remains 
whether the three levels (international, national, local) of good ownership required for successful projects is 
something that, for example, the energy sector could learn from: e.g. for the creation of sustainable energy 
strategies that have a legitimate basis.   
Towards democratic ownership, improved capacities and multiple benefits  
The concept of ownership at its most promising combines two strands of legitimacy: legitimacy of results 
and legitimacy of process in a transformative path towards sustainable, meaningful and accountable devel-
opment (see. Bäckstrand 2011). These discussions are significant not only when climate change is integrated 
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into development assistance, but also in the finance of climate projects in developed and developing coun-
tries in general. A vast majority of all donor and recipient countries are committed not only to the principles 
of the UNFCCC, such as “common but differentiated responsibilities” but also to the ownership agenda.  
Extending the ownership principle to incorporate democratic ownership could be a step further in realizing 
the principle of ownership. The Paris Declaration focused narrowly on country ownership and it was often 
seen as ‘ownership by government officials in dialogue with donor officials’. Assistance has not seen the 
realization of ownership in practice, as development workers have still seen recipients as unreliable and in 
need of their guiding hand (cf. Koskenranta 2008). In addition, the Paris Declaration failed to take account 
and address issues of inclusion, gender equality and human rights. Most importantly, and also in relation to 
climate finance, accountability for sustainable development outcomes for poor and vulnerable people were 
overlooked. To fulfil these promises, there is a need for more structured democratic ownership, which re-
fers to concrete structures of participation and decision making for relevant anchoring of key community 
decisions. Democratic ownership also places people at the centre of aid and development. It is not only 
about government official participation, but rather, democratic ownership centres the legitimacy of devel-
opment priorities and processes on the rights of people. This is something that the developing countries 
will also need to show commitment to (RoA2011). With regards to development and climate change this 
means asking what kind of development projects are suitable and how the communities affected should be 
evolved. Free, prior and informed consent might form the backbone for more structured ideas of participation, 
representation and legitimacy at the local level with regards to development projects involving public or 
private, national or foreign investment. These kinds of ideals have guided community natural resource 
management before, and their ambition has been high. However, the present climate challenge should in 
the first place lead to a re-evaluation of resilient ways of life. For communities relying on access to natural 
resources and land, a highly common situation in rural areas in least developed countries, democratic own-
ership of projects that alter the use of, for example, land and water are of paramount importance. This is 
not a question of only a procedural commitment to an abstract value (democracy) but also a prerequisite for 
sustainable development and an important safeguard against socially or environmentally bad results. On 
national scales improving the possibilities of civil society to work and participate towards development will 
inevitably lead to a stronger ownership of development targets: implying less conflict, better capacity build-
ing results and the possibilities for authentic pro-poor and sustainable development benefits through sound 
development plans. Development outcomes will be sustainable when processes are inclusive of all actors.  
9.1 The future of mitigation in the developing countries 
The research for this volume was carried out in late 2010 – 2011. As such, it offers a glimpse into the state 
of four specific climate mitigation initiatives at a time when international climate policy was undergoing and 
also expecting great changes. Carbon markets have responded to the global economic downturn and been 
performing disappointingly since 2008, leading Reuters to argue that carbon has “been the worst-
performing commodity in the world”33. At the moment there are commitments and initiatives that aim to 
secure the continuation for carbon markets. In the case of compliance market, for example, the Durban 
agreement did support the continuation for the Kyoto Protocol, although several key countries (Canada, 
Japan) did not sign up for the second commitment period. There are also several new market-based mech-
anisms on the table. Still uncertainties on the future of post-2012 carbon markets prevail, especially with 
regards to the CDM and its historically low CER prices. This is particularly significant for the LDCs, which 
are, with due reason, wary about investing in costly mitigation mechanisms and capacity building if these 
carry no future value. While it is apparent that the World Bank and the carbon finance experts acknowledge 
                                                   
 
33 reuters.com, accessed 14.10.2011 
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the uncertainty affecting the future of carbon markets, it appears that the development community and the 
United Nations has only got its machinery supporting mitigation projects running and is enthusiastically 
building carbon projects in the global South. The question of financial sustainability and the distribution of 
risks are real. Further there is also a more generic worry about the carbon market: is it an avenue for long-
term, predictable and sustainable financing or is it more of a risk, which could end up as even worse than 
fluctuating prices in other contexts. Policy circles are acutely aware of the market uncertainties, which in 
calculations are argued to be based on among other issues healthy economic growth in the EU area. If the 
financial market crisis turns into a long-term recession the viability of present initiatives is an open ques-
tion. In the least developing country context these issues need to be taken very seriously in development 
assistance if capacity building is directed, as is already happening, towards climate mitigation.  
The larger question is where the carbon markets are driving us. What kind of development does it real-
ly try to envision? Are the capacity building measures supported really relevant for fostering sustainable 
livelihoods and development in Laos and Cambodia? Is the expert-driven measuring and control of carbon 
cycles really the first way forward for countries and their assistance where a majority of people live below 
the poverty line?  
With regards to the future of climate policies, the position of least developed countries is the most ex-
treme. They have most to lose due to a failure of reducing emissions, and simultaneously they have the 
most to lose if short-sighted climate investments with negative social impacts are carried out. Most trends, 
however, are based and focus on how decisions in the carbon market evolves, e.g. how the global market 
actors and the wealthy and powerful governments of the world are able to agree on either regulations or 
form voluntary commitments that lead to positive outcomes. The least developed countries and their in-
habitants with the most to lose, have little or no say in the future of their own fate. 
Looking at the future of climate policies and carbon markets from the perspective of pro-poor and sus-
tainable development benefits, capacities and ownership in the least developed countries, two scenarios 
emerge: inclusive low-carbon pathways and exclusive low-carbon pathways. With exclusive low-carbon 
pathways, development is carried out by a limited number of technically skilled experts from the developed 
world, with little interest about local context and suitable technology: local capacities are supported mainly 
to administrate these transformations. In contrast, inclusive low-carbon pathways take as its starting point 
the democratic ownership of people and communities, and their will to reach environmental and social 
multiple benefits. The transformations are led by an appreciation of existing resilient capacities with tech-
nology, expertise and development assistance motivated by demand.   
A key normative question is to what extent the target of development and modernization is held com-
pletely intact, and the level of regulation, incentives and technological change are altered. Regarding present 
forms of development co-operation, integrating development assistance with climate change mitigation is 
not without its problems. Focusing on multiple positive outcomes and synergies is often characteristic for 
policy, as it is necessary to construct consensus and unify disparate perspectives (cf. Hall et al. 2011). How-
ever, overly consensual and optimistic storylines of synergies and multiple benefits easily result in situations 
where the politics are taken out of decision-making. Simultaneously the need to make difficult choices gets 
obscured. In order to create space for open communication and critical discussion the possible trade-offs 
and contradictions between the objectives should be more explicitly addressed. Focusing on multiple bene-
fits renders ecological distribution conflicts almost invisible and at the same time undermines the im-
portance of access and communal rights.   
Internationally, attention gets diverted away from the responsibilities of industrialised countries to ex-
pectations for actions in developing countries. The commensuration of different greenhouse gases as well 
as commensuration of energy and land use sector required by the carbon market easily obscures the scale of 
reforms and changes required in the fossil fuel based economies and societies (cf. Lohmann 2008 and 
2010). The current focus on highly-skilled expert knowledge and technology presents the developed coun-
tries as the ones with the solutions for the problems caused by climate change. This omits expertise and 
knowledge in the current low carbon economies of developing countries. It also leaves little space for un-
derstanding the “uncharted landscape” of development developing countries may have to navigate through 
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(Gupta 2009; 210): ”promoting transfers of existing technologies and practices in the West may be less 
beneficial than designing more appropriate technologies and practices that fit better with the conditions of 
the developing world”. 
Gupta (2009: 211) offers a valuable perspective in her summary about the future of development and 
development co-operation, which is worth citing at length:  
“If we are to address climate change, climate change needs to be mainstreamed into development 
processes.  Such mainstreaming is  not  easy  in  the developing world nor  in  the developed world 
where it challenges existing consumption and production processes and lifestyles: nor is it easy to 
integrate into existing global trade and investment processes.” 
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